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INTRODUCTION

The firestorm ignited by the 1987 nomination of Robert H. Bork
provided a vivid reminder that public opinion and organized interest
groups can have a potent and even decisive impact upon the selection
of United States Supreme Court Justices and other federal judges. Although the Constitution vests the prerogative of nomination in the
President and the power of confirmation in the Senate, the public also
is a partner in the selection process in ways that often extend far beyond the citizenry's election of its President and representatives in the
Senate.
Public opinion has influenced the judicial selection process
throughout the history of the Republic, although public participation in
that process has been sporadic. The sharp contrast between the public
controversy over the recent Rehnquist and Bork nominations and the
widespread public silence concerning the Scalia and Kennedy nominations suggests that organized interest groups are not likely to have a
significant role in every nomination. A clear trend, however, exists toward an increased public awareness of the importance of federal judicial nominations and a growing public participation in the selection
process.
Several recent and pending developments are likely to influence the
scope of future public participation in the federal judicial selection process. For example, the procedures and role of the American Bar Association (ABA) in both the nomination and confirmation of federal judges
may change as a result of criticisms by both liberals and conservatives.
Although in June 1989 the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to require the ABA's Committee on Judicial Selection to open some of its
meetings and records to the public,' the Committee's practices have attracted the scrutiny of both the Bush Administration and the Senate.
The Department of Justice has insisted that the ABA refrain from using ideology in its ranking of judicial candidates, and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary is reassessing its own reliance upon the ABA.
Recent tax developments also are likely to affect the scope and na1. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989). This case was
consolidated with Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Department of Justice.
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ture of public participation in the judicial selection process. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has promulgated a new rule, proposed
regulation, and announcement that will affect the tax status of certain
nonprofit organizations that lobby for and against judicial nominations.2 Congress may enact legislation to override at least part of these
actions. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit has held that the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York is ineligible for full tax exempt status
because it rates candidates for elective judicial office.'
The controversy over the ABA's participation in the judicial selection process and the recent, potentially restrictive tax developments
demonstrate a growing awareness of the significance of public participation in the judicial selection process. Accordingly, it is useful to analyze
the appropriate scope and functions of such participation.
In analyzing the role of the public in the federal judicial selection
process, Part II of this Article first will explore the historical development of public participation in the nomination and confirmation
processes. Part III will demonstrate that the increasing importance of
public participation is consistent with the growth of participatory democracy, and it will explain why the excesses of the campaigns for and
against Bork should not discredit the need for a broad public role in the
judicial selection process. Part IV of the Article will argue that the Supreme Court's decision in the Association of the Bar case (ABA case)
was decided wrongly because the application of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act was consistent with the language and intention of that
statute and would not have violated the doctrine of separation of powers. In Part V the Article also will contend that the ABA should continue to have an important role in the judicial selection process but that
the ABA needs to reform some of its rating procedures for judicial candidates. Finally, Part VI of the Article will assert that the internal revenue laws should not be designed to discourage public participation in
the federal judicial selection process. Accordingly, the Article will argue
that the recent IRS actions misinterpret the Internal Revenue Code
and represent bad public policy and that the Code should be amended
to eliminate the restrictions created by the ABA case.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

Early History

From the Republic's earliest history, public opinion has influenced
the Supreme Court appointment process. President George Washing2. See infra notes 305-73 and accompanying text.
3. Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1768 (1989).
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ton's unsuccessful nomination of John Rutledge for Chief Justice in
1795 created an uproar that extended far beyond the chambers of the
United States Senate.4 The Federalist press in the North denounced
the nomination with particular vehemence. 5 The press also vigorously
encouraged the defeat of James Madison's nomination of Alexander
Wolcott in 1811.8 On a number of other occasions during the nineteenth
century, the Senate's highly partisan opposition to Supreme Court
nominees was accompanied by free-wheeling attacks on the nominees in
the newspapers. In opposing the nomination of Roger B. Taney to be
Chief Justice, for example, one Whig newspaper proclaimed that "[tihe
pure ermine of the Supreme Court is sullied by the appointment of that
political hack ...

."

The press's role in opposing nominations during

the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is especially significant because at that time newspapers had a potent impact on shaping
public opinion.' In the absence of any significant political activity by
voluntary organizations-labor unions, for example, did not exist
yet-the press represented the major intermediary between private citizens and their government.
During the nineteenth century, political parties and private citizens
also had a significant impact upon presidential selections and Senate
confirmations of Supreme Court Justices.9 Voluntary organizations also
had a role. 10 Private citizens, elected officials, and organizations regularly petitioned the Department of Justice for the nomination of particular individuals for vacant seats on the Court. The petitioners usually
resided in the candidate's home state or had professional or school ties
with the candidate. In 1853, for example, a number of prominent Alabama citizens petitioned President Franklin Pierce to nominate John A.
Campbell to the Supreme Court.11
4. See, e.g., 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 127-39 (1937).
Rutledge was lambasted widely for his vigorous opposition to the Jay Treaty with Great Britain,

and his foes spread the rumor that he was insane. His nomination was defeated by a vote of 14 to
10. Id.
5. See Middleton, The PartisanPress and the Rejection of a Chief Justice, 53 JOURNALISM

Q. 106

(1976); see also D. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS

OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD

221 (1969).

6. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 41 (2d ed. 1985); 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at
410-13.
7. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 16. Newspapers were notorious during the nineteenth century for their intense partisanship.
8. See, e.g., D. STEWART, supra note 5, at 3-32.
9. See generally Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: Prestige,Principles
and Politics, 1941 Wis. L. REv. 172, 343, 461; Friedman, The Transformationin Senate Response
to Supreme Court Nominations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5
CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1983).
10. Frank, supra note 9, at 461; Friedman, supra note 9, at 1.
11. See National Archives, Record Group 60 (General Records of the Department of Justice)
[hereinafter Department of Justice Records], File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Su-
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When a President was trying to achieve geographic balance with an
appointment to the Court, local support from unrepresented areas may
have influenced the presidential choice. Although vigorous letter writing
campaigns obviously demonstrated that candidates enjoyed support
among local elites, such campaigns did not prove that the candidates
enjoyed widespread support. As one opponent of the elevation of Court
of Appeals Judge Edward Sanford explained to President Warren Harding in 1922, "It is very natural for the lawyers in his judicial district to
commend him to you[;] most . . . feel he will not be appointed, but
know that they will have to continue to practice their profession before
him. '12 Presidents regularly passed over persons who had received
strong support from their home states and nominated individuals who
had not been the subject of any major lobbying campaign."'
preme Court, 1853-1932), Box 1 (Campbell folder). President Pierce received two petitions: one
signed by all seven members of the Alabama Supreme Court and thirty-one members of the Alabama Bar, and another petition signed by seven congressional representatives from Alabama and
four from Mississippi. Pierce also received a letter from the Governor of Alabama. See id.
12. Letter from J.D. Council to Warren G. Harding (Dec. 26, 1922) (available in Department
of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme Court,
1853-1932), Box 3 (Sanford folder)). The name "J.D. Council" may be ficticious. No record exists
of an attorney by that name anywhere in Tennesse in 1922. See S. Cook, Path to the High Bench:
The Pre-Supreme Court Career of Justice Edward Terry Sanford (unpublished doctoral thesis,
University of Tennessee, 1977)(available from The McClung Collection, East Tennessee Historical
Center, Knoxville, TN). Even the signature itself on the letter is somewhat illegible.
13. For example, President Benjamin Harrison received substantial unsolicited advice about
how to fill the four vacancies that occurred during his term, but he did not appoint the individuals
who had received the most vociferous support.
In 1889 approximately 100 prominent residents of Michigan recommended Alfred Russell for
the seat that became vacant when Stanley Matthews died. Russell also enjoyed the support of
former President Rutherford B. Hayes, Senator William M. Evarts of New York, General William
Tecumseh Sherman, and the historian George Ticknor Curtis. Russell, an 1850 graduate of
Dartmouth College, also received recommendations from 10 Dartmouth professors. Petitions on
Russell's behalf were signed by nearly all members of both houses of the Michigan legislature, all
five Michigan Supreme Court justices, the Michigan attorney general, and various lower state officials. See Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 349 (Appointment File for United
States Supreme Court Candidates Who Were Not Commissioned, 1853-1924), Tray 1309. Supporters of several other aspirants, including the young William Howard Taft, also launched movements
for their favorites. See id.; see also id. File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme
Court, 1853-1932), Box 5 (Taft folder); Frank, supra note 9, at 360-65. Despite the outpouring of
support on behalf of Russell and other potential nominees, Harrison nominated David J. Brewer of
Kansas, who had received some organized support but less than several of his rivals. See Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme
Court, 1853-1932), Box 1 (Brewer folder).
In 1892 hundreds of Pennsylvanians urged the Justice Department and President Harrison to
appoint Henry W. Williams to succeed the recently deceased Joseph Bradley on the Supreme
Court. The petitioners included more than 300 attorneys, 14 Pennsylvania members of the House
of Representatives, several members of the clergy, two professors, nearly two dozen present and
former state judges, two bank presidents, and various other prominent citizens. Williams also received scattered recommendations from New York and Ohio. See Department of Justice Records,
supra note 11, File 349 (Appointment File for United States Supreme Court Candidates Who

6
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The Early Twentieth Century

Public interest in the Supreme Court nomination process increased
somewhat during the early years of the present century, when the
Court's invalidation of various state and federal social welfare statutes
aroused the ire of trade unionists and Progressives. In 1911, for example, the nomination of Horace H. Lurton encountered opposition from
organized labor. Prior to Lurton's nomination, representatives of several railroad unions wrote to President William H. Taft in a futile effort
to prevent him from nominating Lurton. 1 4 Following Lurton's nomination, Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), expressed his opposition. In 1912 liberals and trade unions
strongly opposed the nomination of Mahlon Pitney and delayed his
confirmation.15 Between 1914 and 1916, many trade union leaders and
Progressives wrote to President Woodrow Wilson to discourage him
from nominating Taft to the Court. 6 Wilson received additional proWere Not Commissioned, 1853-1924), Tray 1311. Although Harrison nominated a Pennsylvanian
to replace Bradley, he chose George Shiras Jr., not Williams. Although the number of Shiras's
endorsements might have been less than the number of endorsements registered for Williams,
Shiras received the enthusiastic endorsements of prominent politicians, lawyers, members of the
clergy, and industrialists. See Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records
Relating to Members of the Supreme Court, 1853-1932), Box 3 (Shiras folder); Frank, supra note
9, at 368-69.
The following year, Harrison again disappointed a substantial number of petitioners when he
appointed Howell E. Jackson of Tennessee rather than Fifth Circuit Judge Don A. Pardee, a Louisianan who had received bipartisan and biracial support from prominent citizens in several Southern states. Petitioners for Pardee included 23 Alabama Republicans; the chair of the Republican
State Central Committee of Georgia; 24 members of the Florida Bar; 10 members of the bar and
citizens of Decatur, Alabama; several dozen black citizens of Louisiana; and the members of the
all-Democratic committee on the judiciary of the Alabama House of Representatives. See Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 349 (Appointment File for United States Supreme
Court Candidates Who Were Not Commissioned, 1853-1924), Tray 1309. Although Jackson's support may have been based less broadly than Pardee's, a few attorneys in Tennessee vouched for his
good character. See Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to
Members of the Supreme Court, 1853-1932), Box 2 (Jackson folder).
14. The unions included the Order of Railroad Telegraphers, the Order of Railway Conductors of America, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. See Department of
Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme Court,
1853-1932), Box 2 (Lurton folder).
15. See, e.g., A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
1910-1921, at 326-32 (1984) (Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States vol. 9).
16. See Letter from Samuel Gompers to Woodrow Wilson (Jan. 7, 1916) (available in Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme
Court, 1853-1932), Box 5 (Taft folder)). In January 1916, for example, AFL president Samuel
Gompers wrote to Wilson to complain that Taft's record as a federal judge, President of the
United States, Yale Law School professor, and ABA president demonstrated that Taft's view of
the law was unduly narrow and abstract and that Taft failed to appreciate that "[j]ustice and law
are for the protection of human life and human rights." Id.
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tests from various other unions and AFL affiliates. 17 Wilson never had
any intention of naming Taft to the Court; therefore, Wilson needed no
persuading."'
Woodrow Wilson's controversial nomination of Louis D. Brandeis
to the Supreme Court in 1916 was probably the first nomination to inspire both highly organized opposition and support outside of the Senate. 19 Powerful forces in the business, legal, and political communities
opposed Brandeis. The tone of much of the opposition was characterized by the now-famous comment of the New York Sun that Brandeis
was "utterly and even ridiculously unfit."20 Fifty-five prominent Bostonians, including the president of Harvard, signed a petition opposing
the nomination on the ground that Brandeis lacked "judicial temperament."'" During the lengthy hearings on the nomination, the Committee on the Judiciary received testimony from a broad spectrum of
Brandeis's opponents. For example, Clarence W. Barren, whose Boston
News Bureau received financial support from a major railroad, appeared before the Subcommittee armed with a file of court records,
newspaper clippings, and official reports that allegedly demonstrated
Brandeis's radicalism and questionable ethics.22 Brandeis was attacked
from the left by Clifford Thorne, the chairman of Iowa's board of railroad commissioners, who contended that Brandeis had betrayed the interests of shippers. 23 An official of the Anti-Saloon League of America
testified against the nomination on the ground that Brandeis had testified before the Massachusetts legislature a quarter of a century earlier

24
in support of the Massachusetts Liquor Dealers' Association. Wit-

17. Wilson received protests from various other unions and AFL affiliates, including the
United Mine Workers of America, the Central Federated Union of Greater New York and Vicinity,
at least one lodge of the International Association of Machinists, the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, the Detroit Federation of Labor, and the Chattanooga Central Labor Union. The
Anti-Saloon League of America also opposed Taft's appointment, as did a number of individual
attorneys. See Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme Court, 1853-1932), Box 5 (Taft folder).
18. Accordingly, Wilson ignored numerous letters urging Taft's appointment, including a petition signed by a number of prominent New York attorneys, including Elihu Root and Alton B.
Parker, a similar petition from the Tennessee Bar, and a letter from the president of the New York
State Bar Association. See id.
19. See Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) [hereinafter Brandeis Hearings]. For accounts of the five-month
fight over the Brandeis nomination, see A.MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 465-508 (1946); A.
TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL.: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS (1964).
20. See A. MASON, supra note 19, at 465.
21. Id.
22. Brandeis Hearings,supra note 19, at 116-34; see A. MASON, supra note 19, at 471-72.
23. See Brandeis Hearings,supra note 19, at 5-62; A. MASON, supra note 19, at 470-71, 477,
479.
24. Brandeis Hearings,supra note 19, at 1054-72 (statement of Dr. James Cannon, Jr.).
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nesses in favor of Brandeis included a member of the Municipal Civil
Service Commission of New York2" and the president of the National
Consumers League.2" A number of other leaders of liberal organizations
signed a petition supporting the nomination. Although those persons
signed as individuals rather than in their official capacity, their support
of Brandeis was likely to influence the rank and file of their organizations. Accordingly, their petitions represent an early form of interest
group lobbying in favor of a Supreme Court nomination.
Meanwhile, Brandeis's opponents launched a well-financed campaign to defeat the nomination. Two Wall Street attorneys, Austen G.
Fox and Kenneth M. Spence, organized a particularly aggressive effort.
They sent letters to a number of ABA members, urging them to write to
their senators stating their opposition to the nomination. Under separate cover, they sent a "brief" in opposition to the nomination. Another Wall Street attorney, Thomas C. Spelling, also circulated an antiBrandeis pamphlet and urged his colleagues at the bar to write to their
senators.29 In addition to letters prompted by Brandeis's opponents, a
number of persons wrote to members of the Senate to support or op25. Id. at 763-64 (testimony of Henry Moscowitz); see also id. at 759-60.
26. Id. at 759-63 (testimony of Newton D. Baker).
27. Id. at 760-62. The signers included the secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of
Christ of America, the president and secretary of the American Association for Labor Legislation,
the chair of the National Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor, the secretary of the National
Child Labor Committee, and various labor leaders from the state of New York. Officials of manufacturing organizations and arbitration boards also signed the petition.
28. See Letter from Austen G. Fox and Kenneth M. Spence to Charles F. Amidon, Esq. (Apr.
20, 1916); Letter from United States Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory to Senator Thomas J.
Walsh (Apr. 27, 1916) (available in Papers of Thomas J. Walsh, Box 311, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress [hereinafter Walsh Papers]); Letter from Melvin A. Hildreth and John
Carmody to Senator Thomas J. Walsh (Apr. 26, 1916) (available in Walsh Papers, supra); see also
A. MASON, supra note 19, at 494. Fox and Spence had coordinated anti-Brandeis testimony before
the Committee, much of which backfired. See id. at 473, 433-89. It is unlikely that the letter writing campaign had any significant impact. In reply to a letter from Attorney General Gregory, Senator Walsh, the chair of the Judiciary subcommittee, declared that "[tihe fact that the brief is going
out is important chiefly as it indicates that there is a well-financed campaign on." Letter from
Senator Thomas J. Walsh to United States Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory (Apr. 28, 1916)
(available in Walsh Papers, supra). Walsh noted that both Senator Albert B. Cummins of Iowa
and Senator John D. Works of California, the two subcommittee members who voted to oppose
Brandeis's nomination, had "declared before the committee with ill disguised contempt that the
thing is utterly worthless." Id.
29. See Letter from Samuel J. Graham to Senator Thomas J. Walsh (Apr. 12, 1916) (available in Walsh Papers, supra note 28); Letter from W.M. Johnston to Senator Thomas J. Walsh
(Apr. 4, 1916) (available in Walsh Papers, supra note 28); Letter from Clarence L. Reames to S.J.
Graham (Apr. 5, 1916) (available in Walsh Papers, supra note 28); Letter from Thomas C. Spelling
(Mar. 28, 1916) (form letter) (available in Walsh Papers, supra note 28). Noting that "[c]opies of
the Spelling outbursts have been sent to me by a number of lawyers," Senator Walsh assured the
assistant United States Attorney General that "I do not deem them worthy of notice and am sure
no member of the Committee does or will." Letter from Senator Thomas J. Walsh to Attorney
General Samuel J. Graham (Apr. 17, 1916) (available in Walsh Papers, supra note 28).
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pose the nomination." Meanwhile, in an effort to counter the effects of
the pamphlets and the unfounded and unsavory rumors that Brandeis's
opponents circulated throughout the nation, Brandeis's supporters
launched an aggressive publicity campaign in the nation's press.3 '
Although none of the five Supreme Court nominees between Brandeis in 1916 and Charles Evans Hughes in 1930 inspired intense public
controversy, 2 private individuals and special interest groups continued
to influence the process by which those nominees were selected and
confirmed. In 1921 a number of persons urged the Harding Administration to nominate William Howard Taft to be Chief Justice. A number of
private individuals, however, objected to Taft's nomination because he
had supported United States membership in the League of Nations.3
The Boston branch of the National Equal Rights League opposed Taft
because of Taft's alleged acquiescence to racial injustice.3 4 Other opponents of Taft's nomination objected to the quality of his presidential
appointments, his relatively advanced age, and his rejection by the voters in 1912.11
In his study of the nomination of Pierce Butler in 1922, Professor
David Danelski demonstrated that special interest groups had a fairly
prominent role in Butler's ascension to the Court.38 Prior to Butler's
30. For example, the Committee on the Judiciary received 620 letters from Massachusetts
lawyers endorsing the nomination. An overwhelming majority of the 198 letters from Massachusetts lawyers in opposition to the nomination were written by Boston attorneys. Letter from Senator Thomas J. Walsh to E.A. Purdy (June 15, 1916) (available in Walsh Papers, supra note 28).
31. A. MASON, supra note 19, at 495-97.
32. The nomination of Harlan Fiske Stone in 1925 encountered significant opposition in the
Senate, but this controversy was confined largely to the Senate chambers. Although Stone's nomination inspired widespread public interest and lively editorial comment, it did not inspire largescale activity by many private individuals or organized interest groups. See A. MASON, HARLAN
FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF LAw 181-200 (1956).
33. See, e.g., Letter from L.H. Wheeler to United States Attorney General H. Daugherty
(June 15, 1921) (available in Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records
Relating to Members of the Supreme Court, 1853-1932), Box 5 (Taft folder)).
34. Letter from National Equal Rights League, Greater Boston Branch, Office of the Secretary to Warren G. Harding (June 11, 1921) (available in Department of Justice Records, supra
note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme Court, 1853-1932), Box 5 (Taft
folder)).
35. Among liberals, the nomination was opposed by AFL president Samuel Gompers; the
People's Legislative Service; several prominent members of the National Association of Railroad
Commissioners; the Chicago Federation of Labor; the Wisconsin Women's Progressive Association
of Superior, Wisconsin; the Working People's Nonpartisan Political League of Ramsey County,
Minnesota, Butler's home county; and the powerful Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. Department of Justice Records, supra note 11, File 348 (Records Relating to Members of the Supreme
Court, 1853-1932), Box 1 (Butler folder). On the right, Butler was opposed by a number of groups,
including the Ku Klux Klan, then at the zenith of its power, and the Women's Auxiliary of the
Ohio State Good Government Association. D. DANmLsKi, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Is APPOINTED
92, 105 (1964).
36. See D. DANELSKI, supra note 35, at 56-72.
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nomination, Chief Justice Taft orchestrated a campaign in support of
Butler, enlisting the support of prominent laypersons and clergy in the
Roman Catholic Church, prestigious attorneys, and leaders of the business and academic communities.3 7 After Butler's nomination to the Supreme Court, his record as a corporate attorney inspired considerable
opposition among members of the public and organized groups of various political persuasions. Support for Butler's nomination came from
prominent attorneys, judges, and business persons, as well as the leader
of a farmer's cooperative and leaders of veterans' organizations."8
C. Hughes and Parker
Although the nomination of Charles Evans Hughes in 1930 encountered considerable opposition in the Senate, 9 the Senate's prompt action on the nomination prevented public opinion from galvanizing. Yet
even in the few days between the nomination of Hughes and his confirmation, senators received numerous letters and telegrams from opponents of the nomination.40 Only one month after Hughes's confirmation,
a broad spectrum of the public became deeply involved in the controversy over President Herbert Hoover's nomination of John J. Parker.
Roger S. Baldwin, the founder of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), even observed after Parker's defeat that "[o]nly a few of us
realize how far reaching the appointive power of the President in the
matter of. . .selection of judges of the highest Court . . .is in determining the social life of future generations. 41 The uproar over the
Parker nomination demonstrated that the importance of Supreme
Court nominations was understood very well by many individuals and
organizations. While Parker's nomination originally received highly
favorable press comment,4 2 the AFL and the National Association for
37. Id. Meanwhile, supporters of other possible nominees campaigned for their choices. For
example, a number of members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy endorsed a Sixth Circuit judge,
while other prominent Roman Catholics supported another Roman Catholic judge. Id. at 74-76, 87.
Supporters of a prominent Georgia attorney barraged the White House with a torrent of letters
and petitions, as did advocates of a prominent Texas attorney. Id. at 76, 78-79. In an early example of black participation in the nomination process, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other black organizations publicly opposed the nomination
of Tennessee Senator John K. Shields, and the leader of at least one black organization wrote to
President Harding to urge the nomination of United States District Court Judge William I. Grubb.
38. See supra note 35.
39. M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVAN HUGHES II 648-62 (1951).
40. See Papers of William E. Borah, Box 300, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress
[hereinafter Borah Papers]; Papers of George W. Norris, Box 41, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress.
41. Letter from Roger S. Baldwin to Senator William E. Borah (May 13, 1930) (available in
Borah Papers, supra note 40).
42. See Mendelsohn, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Appointments: The Nomina-
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the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) soon announced their
opposition.43 The AFL contended that one of Parker's decisions as a
Fourth Circuit judge" demonstrated an antilabor philosophy.45 The
NAACP opposed Parker because he had delivered a racialist speech as
a gubernatorial candidate in North Carolina in 1920 and he had failed
to question the North Carolina Constitution's abridgment of black voting rights." Opposition to Parker by the prominent labor and civil
rights groups led to opposition by other organizations and private citizens. The Subcommittee on the Judiciary received more than a thousand letters opposing the appointment and only seventy-five in its
favor. 7 Opponents of the nomination likewise inundated individual
senators with letters objecting to Parker's confirmation." s As public opposition to the nomination burgeoned, increasingly large numbers of
tion and Rejection of John J. Parker, 14 How. L.J. 105, 120-21 (1968).
43. Id. at 121-25; Watson, The Defeat of Judge Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and
Politics, 50 Miss. VALLEY HIsT. RaV. 213, 217-18 (1963).
44. United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir.
1927).
45. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary on the Confirmation
of Hon. John J. Parker to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) [hereinafter ParkerHearings]. In Red Jacket Parker had ruled that
union efforts to organize workers against mine owners who enforced an open shop pursuant to
"yellow dog" agreements constituted a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade. Red
Jacket, 18 F.2d at 844. Parker's defenders contended that the issue in Red Jacket was merely
jurisdictional and that Parker simply had followed precedent. ParkerHearings, supra, at 19-23.
46. ParkerHearings, supra note 45, at 74-79 (testimony of Walter White, secretary).
47. Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 125, 127. Opponents of the nomination included Norman
Thomas, then chair of the Socialist Committee on Public Affairs, ParkerHearings, supra note 45,
at 59, and 19 Dartmouth College professors, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1930, at 16, col. 7. Like Thomas
and many other liberal opponents of Parker, the Dartmouth professors based their opposition
largely upon Parker's alleged attitudes concerning race and labor.
48. For example, Senator Henry J. Allen of Kansas received letters from more than two
dozen organizations that opposed the nomination. Civil rights and religious groups that urged Allen to vote against confirmation included several Kansas branches of the NAACP, the Colored
Ministerial Alliance of Wichita, the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance of Kansas City, the
Baptist Alliance of Kansas City, the Committee on Race Relations of the Society of Friends, the
Equal Rights League of Topeka, and the Colored Republican Club of Butler County. Allen likewise
received messages from at least 15 labor groups, many of which were affiliated with the AFL. Allen
also received a personal letter from John L. Lewis, UMW president, urging him to oppose the
nomination. The Oakleaf Art Club and the Monrovian Club of Kansas City urged Allen to vote
against Parker's confirmation. See Papers of Henry J. Allen, Series C, Box 58, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
The widespread public opposition to the nomination similarly was reflected in the mail of
Senator William E. Borah of Idaho. Opponents of the nomination who contacted Borah included
many of the organizations that contacted Allen, as well as the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Veterans' Political Association, the National League of Republican Colored Women,
the Yale University chapter of the American Federation of Teachers, the Conference for Progressive Labor Action, the Improved Benevolent Order of Elks, the Order of Railway Conductors, the
International Photo-Engravers Union of North America, and the Colored International Ministers
Alliance of Washington and Vicinity. See Borah Papers, supra note 40.
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senators began to doubt the wisdom of the nomination. 49 As prospects

for Parker's confirmation grew dimmer, the AFL and the NAACP
stepped up their pressure against the nomination. Alleging that white
North Carolinians had harassed blacks who refused to sign a pro-Parker
petition, the NAACP held mass protest meetings in Detroit and Cleveland.5 0 When Parker's nomination finally reached the floor of the Senate, an acrimonious debate raged for several days before the Senate
finally rejected the nomination by the vote of forty-one to thirty-nine.
In view of the intensity of Senate opposition to the previous Hughes
nomination, 51 widespread opposition to Parker might have arisen without the campaigns organized by the AFL and the NAACP. Those campaigns, however, certainly intensified the debate and galvanized large
segments of the public. Moreover, the closeness of the vote suggests
that fears of electoral reprisals from organized labor and blacks tipped
the scale against Parker, even though Parker's views on race and labor
offended the bedrock principles of many senators who needed no
prompting from either group. 2 Senators were more vulnerable to such
reprisals than they had been in nominations prior to the second Hughes
nomination because the Senate in 1929 had changed its rules to provide
for open debates and votes on appointments; prior to 1929, such proceedings had been conducted in executive session. 3 One need not
mourn Parker's defeat to agree with President Herbert Hoover's comment that some Republican senators "ran like white mice" rather than
face the wrath of the AFL and the NAACP "lobbies.

' 54

Hoover drafted,

but did not release, a statement that acknowledged "the vital impor49. See Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 127-30.
50. Charges Parker Men Threaten Negroes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1930, at 16, col. 7.
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
52. Fear of reprisal was probably particularly significant among northern senators whose constituencies included large numbers of black voters. As the result of public meetings sponsored by
the NAACP in Chicago and Detroit shortly before the vote on the nomination, several hundred
telegrams in opposition to the nomination were sent to Senators Charles Deneen and Otis Glenn of
Illinois, and Senators Arthur Vandenberg and James Couzens of Michigan. Watson, supra note 43,
at 232. All four of those Republican senators defied their Republican President to vote in opposition to the nomination. Black pressure in Indiana may have persuaded another Republican senator, Arthur R. Robinson, to oppose the nomination. Id. Professor William Burris has concluded
that "[a]lthough we do not know exactly which senators changed their votes because of pressure
from the NAACP, there can be no doubt that the opposition of this organization was an important
factor in changing the odds against Judge Parker." W. BURRIS, DUTY AND THE LAW: JUDGE JOHN
PARKER AND THE CONSTITUTION 97 (1987). Professor Burris believes that the impact of organized
labor may have been less significant, but that labor opposition gave Progressives a pretext for
opposing Parker and that labor actually influenced the votes of Senators Hugo Black of Alabama,
Park Trammell of Florida, and Thaddeus Caraway of Arkansas. Id. at 95-96.
53. See J. HARRIS, THE ADviCE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY IN THE CONFIRMATION
OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 253-55 (1953).
54. H. HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HoovER: THE CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 19201933, at 269 (1952).
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tance of public opinion" but warned that such mobilization of mass
opinion as occurred during the Parker confirmation threatened to alter
fundamentally the structural balance of the nation's institutions.5 5 In
another draft of the same statement, Hoover declared that "[n]o man
fit for the position of a Supreme Court Justice can or will organize
counter-propaganda against mistaken impressions or strive for the
weighting of public opinion in his own favor.. '.. 1151
D. Black, Frankfurter,and Clark
After Parker, the next nominee to inspire widespread public opposition was Hugo Black in 1937. Although no major organized group lobbied for or against Black, major newspapers and magazines criticized
the nomination because of Black's alleged lack of legal expertise, his
liberal politics, and his alleged association with the Ku Klux Klan."
Individual citizens urged senators to oppose the nomination for those
reasons, and because of Black's support for President Roosevelt's plan
to pack the Supreme Court and his alleged use of illegally seized evidence and harassment of witnesses during a Senate investigation." The
leaders of the fight against the Parker nomination also surfaced again,
albeit in different roles. William Green of the AFL and John L. Lewis
of the United Mine Workers (UMW) endorsed the nomination; 59 Walter White of the NAACP demanded an open hearing on Black but privately expressed confidence in him."°
Franklin Roosevelt's eight other nominations following Black engendered less controversy in both the Senate and the nation.,' The only
nomination that aroused more than a scintilla of public opposition was
that of Felix Frankfurter, who encountered hostility from an exiguous
but vehement assortment of right-wing activists. Frankfurter's foes discerned evidence of left-wing or "un-American" tendencies in Frankfurter's foreign birth; his defenses of Sacco and Vanzetti and the copper
mine strikers in Bisbee, Arizona in 1916; and his membership on the
55. Fish, Spite Nominations to the United States Supreme Court: Herbert C. Hoover, Owen
J. Roberts, and the Politics of Presidential Vengeance in Retrospect, 77 Ky. L.J. 545, 559 (19881989).
56. Id. at 560.
57. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 212; G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 51-52 (1977); W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW
LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 83-84 (1970).
58. See Borah Papers, supra note 40.
59. G. DUNNE, supra note 57, at 51.
60. Id. at 56.
61. After Black, who was confirmed by a vote of 63 to 16, no other Roosevelt nominee except
William O. Douglas, who was confirmed by a vote of 62 to 4, received any negative votes in the
Senate.
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Civil Liberties Union's national committee. 2 While a number of members of the public testified in opposition to Frankfurter's nomination,6 3
Frankfurter's opponents do not appear to have represented any major
organization or to have reflected widespread public opinion.
Although all four of the Justices nominated by President Harry S.
Truman have been criticized for their alleged mediocrity, 4 only Tom
Clark's nomination in 1949 precipitated any sustained and widespread
public protest. 5 Clark received unfavorable ratings from the press,
members of the legal profession, and influential public figures. 6 6 He became the first nominee since Parker to encounter significant opposition
from organized groups. Moreover, Clark was the first nominee in history
to face opposition from a substantial number of organizations, although
the campaigns waged by those organizations were far more limited than
the campaigns waged against Brandeis and Parker. Clark's nomination
was opposed by a wide range of left-leaning groups.6 7 Although most
persons and organizations opposing Clark may have lacked significant
political clout, their representatives blasted Clark with volleys of histrionic rhetoric during the confirmation hearings" similar to the apocalyptic terms in which Robert Bork's most vehement opponents decried the
prospect of Bork's confirmation.
62. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Felix
Frankfurterto Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8, 29, 65, 74-75, 95, 96 (1939).
63. See id.
64. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 238.
65. See id. at 229; F. RUDKO, TRUMAN'S COURT:. A STUDY IN JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 33-34 (1988).
66. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 243.
67. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Tom C.
Clark, of Texas, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). These groups included the American Committee for Protection of Foreign
Born, see id. at 32 (testimony of Carol King, general counsel); the Progressive Party, see id. at 39
(testimony of 0. John Rogge, party representative); the National Lawyers' Guild, see id. at 72
(testimony of Fowler V. Harper, prof. of Law, Yale Univ.); at least one local of the Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, CIO, see id. at 79 (testimony of Marshall White,
Local 301); the Communist Party, USA, see id. at 85 (testimony of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, party
member); the United Negro and Allied Veterans of America, see id. at 92 (testimony of George B.
Murphy, Jr., national commander); the International Fur and Leather Workers Union, CIO, see id.
at 163 (testimony of George Kleinman, union representative); and the National Council of the
Arts, Sciences, and Professions, see id. at 100 (testimony of Bernard Rosen, representative).
68. For example, a member of the board of directors of a bookstore that was blacklisted by
Clark while Clark was United States Attorney General predicted that Clark would make "a Roman
Carnival" of the Constitution, id. at 129 (testimony of Alfred Henley, Washington Cooperative
Bookshop), and a representative of the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions
proclaimed that Clark's nomination was "tragic," id. at 102 (testimony of Bernard Rosen, representative). A member of the Civil Rights Congress described Clark's blacklist as "a wicked thing."
Id. at 144 (testimony of Rev. Clarence Parker).
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Haynsworth and Carswell

For two decades following Clark's nomination, the public was not
involved significantly in the confirmation process and had little impact
on Supreme Court nominations. Although some conservatives in the
Senate expressed severe misgivings over the nominations of John Mar-

shall Harlan,"' Potter Stewart, 70 and Thurgood Marshall,1 the principal
opposition to those nominees outside the Senate came from individuals

who had private grievances against the nominees.72 The only other unfavorable public comment emanated primarily from right-wing organi-

zations.73 Even the firestorm over the Fortas and Thornberry

nominations in 1968 was confined largely to the chamber of the Senate
and the editorial pages of newspapers.7 4 Activity on behalf of Supreme
69. Harlan's internationalism troubled a number of senators. See, e.g., Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of John MarshallHarlan,of New York, to Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 166-67
(1955) [hereinafter HarlanHearings] (statement of Sen. Herman Welker); id. at 174-76 (statement
of Sen. William Jenner); see also 101 CONG. REc. 3015-19 (1955) (statement of Sen. James Eastland); id. at 3035-36 (statement of Sen. Olin D. Johnston).
70. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Potter
Stewart to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. passim (1959).
71. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of
Thurgood Marshall,of New York, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1967).
72. See, e.g., HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Abe
Fortas,of Tennessee, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 23-31 (1965) [hereinafter Fortas Hearings] (testimony of Charles Callas); Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Arthur J. Goldberg, of Illinois,
to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 83
(1962) [hereinafter Goldberg Hearings] (testimony of David Walsh); Harlan Hearings,supra note
69, at 4-30, 55-61, 67-68 (testimony of Herman Methfessel).
73. For example, spokespersons for such groups as the American Anti-Communist League,
the Christian National Crusade, and the American Rally testified against Earl Warren at Senate
hearings, alleging variously that he was a Communist or Marxist and that he was corrupt. See J.
POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 170-71 (1979). Harlan's internationalism inspired opposition from the National Economic Council, Inc., see Harlan Hearings, supra
note 69, at 77 (testimony of Merwin K. Hart, president); the American Coalition of New York, see
id. at 95 (testimony of George Racey Jordan, executive director); and the Wheel of Progress, see id.
at 124 (testimony of Mrs. Ernest W. Howard, legislative representative). The Maryland State Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution also opposed Harlan. See id. at 2-3 (prepared
statement of Mrs. Joseph S. Huxley, regent). At least one senator received a number of letters
suggesting that Goldberg was a Communist. See Goldberg Hearings,supra note 72, at 43 (statement of Sen. Alexander Wiley).
74. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Abe
Fortas, of Tennessee, to Be Chief Justice of the United States and the Nomination of Homer
Thornberry, of Texas, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1968) [hereinafter Fortas and Thornberry Hearings]; R. SHOGAN, A
QUESTION OF JUDGMENT-. THE FORTAS CASE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT

148-82

(1972). Like other nominees during the 1950s and 1960s, Fortas in 1968 was opposed by right-wing
groups, including the Conservative Society of America, see Fortas and Thornberry Hearings,
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Court nominees during the 1950s and 1960s was confined primarily to
endorsements of nominations from bar associations and prominent
attorneys. 5
Widespread public participation in the nomination process was revived during 1969 and 1970, when Richard Nixon's controversial nominations of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. and George Harrold Carswell
galvanized opposition among liberals throughout the nation. For the
first time since the Parker nomination in 1930, major labor and civil
rights groups mounted a campaign against a nominee. As in 1930, the
opposition of those groups appears to have been crucial in defeating a
nomination because the Senate narrowly rejected Haynsworth's nomination by the margin of forty-five to fifty-five and Carswell's by a vote
of forty-five to fifty-one.
Contending that Haynsworth's decisions as a Fourth Circuit judge
were antilabor, the AFL-CIO attempted to dissuade the White House
from nominating Haynsworth when it became clear that he was a leading contender for the vacant seat on the High Bench.76 Three days after
the nomination of Haynsworth in August 1969, the AFL-CIO announced that it actively would oppose confirmation of Haynsworth."
The union's national leadership urged all fifty state federations of the
AFL-CIO and its 120 affiliated unions to contact senators and to make
clear that their vote on the nomination would be used in deciding how
the union would ask its members to vote in the 1970 and 1972 elections.
Labor unions also warned Democratic senators, and even some Republisupra, at 75 (testimony of Kent Courtney, national chairman); the Council Against Communist
Aggression, see id. at 77 (testimony of Marx Lewis, chairman); Liberty Lobby, see id. at 283 (testimony of W.B. Hicks, Jr., executive secretary); and the National Organization Citizens for Decent
Literature, see id. at 291 (testimony of James J. Clancy, executive board attorney). For a recent
and lively account of the protracted struggle over the Fortas nomination, see B. MURPHY, FORTAs:
THE RIsE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 360-526 (1988).
75. See, e.g., Fortas and Thornberry Hearings, supra note 74, passim; Fortas Hearings,
supra note 72, passim; HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of
Byron R. White, of Colorado, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-17 (1962).
76. See A NominationRejected: Why, How and by Whom, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Dec.
1, 1969, at 32; Weaver, Rights and LaborLeaders Oppose Court Nomination, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1969, at 27, col. 3. After an AFL-CIO official had conferred with Administration officials, AFL-CIO
president George Meany sent a telegram to President Nixon opposing the nomination of Haynsworth. A Nomination Rejected: Why, How and by Whom, supra. The AFL-CIO particularly objected to Haynsworth's opinion in Deering Milliken v. Johnson, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961), which
upheld the right of a manufacturing company to close a textile mill after the Textile Workers
Union won an election to represent workers at the plant. See HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina,to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 162-208 (1969)
[hereinafter Haynsworth Hearings] (testimony of George Meany, president).
77. See Labor to Oppose Senate Confirmation of Judge Haynsworth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21,
1969, at 24, col. 4.
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cans, that rich union coffers might snap shut if they voted in favor of
the nomination. 8 Moreover, the union asked its millions of members to
contact their senators.79 At the apex of its campaign against Haynsworth, the AFL-CIO deployed forty full-time lobbyists in the cause8
Meanwhile, major civil rights groups, including the NAACP and
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a group of 125 welfare, labor, religious, and civil rights groups, announced their opposition to
Haynsworth on the ground that his decisions as a Fourth Circuit judge
were insensitive to blacks.8 ' Like the labor groups, the civil rights organizations conducted their campaign at the grassroots level in addition
to lobbying on Capitol Hill. For example, Republican Senator Roman
Hruska of Nebraska reported that an NAACP official traveled to Nebraska to build up sentiment against Haynsworth among Hruska's constituents." Nebraska clergy members and women's church groups
joined in the NAACP effort.8 " The Nixon Administration attempted to
counter the grassroots drive against Haynsworth by mounting its own
grassroots drive in support of his confirmation.84 Republican Party machinery in states throughout the nation began to apply blunt pressure
to uncommitted Republican senators.8s
78. See The Judge Comes to Judgment, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1969, at 36.
79. See id.
80. See "The Nomination Is Rejected," NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1969, at 21, 22.
81. See, e.g., Haynsworth Hearings, supra note 76, at 423 (testimony of Clarence Mitchell,
legislative chair, and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., counsel, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); id. at
520 (statement of Samuel W. Tucker, legal staff chair, Virginia State Conference of NAACP); Kenworthy, The Haynsworth Issue: A Study in Pressure Politics, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1969, at 20,
col. 1. Several Jewish organizations opposed Haynsworth on the basis of his civil rights record; the
chair of the American Jewish Congress explained that it had found that Haynsworth consistently
opposed desegregation rulings that the Supreme Court later validated. See Jewish Groups Oppose
Bid, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1969, at 24, col. 5. The National Catholic Conference for Interracial
Justice also announced its opposition to the nomination. Catholic Racial Group Opposes Haynsworth Seat, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1969, at 32, col. 3.
82. See A Nomination Rejected: Why, How and by Whom, supra note 76, at 33.
83. See id.
84. See Maltese, The Selling of Clement Haynsworth: Politics and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 72 JUDICATURE 338, 342-43 (1989).
85. L. KOHLMEIER, JR., "GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE COURT" 138 (1972). The Nixon Administration's efforts were reflected in the mail of Republican Senator William Saxbe of Ohio, whose
mail shifted from 40 to 1 against confirmation in October to 5 to 4 in favor during the days preceding the vote. Kenworthy, supra note 81, at 20, col. 1. Likewise, the mail sent to Republican Senator
Charles Percy of Illinois in opposition to the nomination fell from more than 80% to about 50%. A
Nomination Rejected: Why, How and by Whom, supra note 76, at 33. Similarly, Republican Senator Len Jordan of Idaho told the Senate that "[d]uring my more than [seven] years of service in
the [United States] Senate few issues have generated more pressure on my office ....
Support of
the President is urged as if it were a personal matter rather than an issue of grave constitutional
importance." 115 CoNG. REc. 34,288 (1969). Republican Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania received telephone calls from a Cabinet officer and three major campaign contributors, all apparently acting under prodding from the Administration. Weaver, Rejection of Haynsworth
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The intense public involvement in the controversy over the nomination was particularly evident at the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings when testimony was received from an unprecedented number
of persons and groups. Labor's opposition to Haynsworth was presented
by representatives of an array of powerful organizations.8 6 Representatives of virtually every significant civil rights group testified against
Haynsworth87 A number of liberal organizations, including Americans
for Democratic Action; the Committee for a Fair, Honest, and Impartial
Judiciary; and the National Lawyers Guild also offered testimony in opposition to Haynsworth. ss An assortment of other persons, including
seven members of the United States House of Representatives," an academic, 90 and a representative of a major religious denomination 9 ' testified in opposition to the nomination. Testimony in favor of the
nomination was provided by leading members of the bar and distinguished law school professors.92 Haynsworth, however, failed to receive
Indicated in Senate Tallies, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 2. Similarly, Senator Mark 0.
Hatfield of Oregon received letters from campaign contributors in his home state. Id. Both senators also received some threats, open or veiled, of opposition in their next primary campaign.
Weaver, Senate BarsHaynsworth, 55-45; 17 Republicans Vote Against Him; Nixon to Press Court
"Balance," N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1969, at 1, col. 5. Despite the pressure, Hatfield and Schweiker
voted in opposition to the nomination. 115 CONG. REc. 35,396 (1969). In contrast, Senator Ralph T.
Smith of Illinois was said to have voted in support of the nomination because of threats of nonsupport by party leaders in his home state. Weaver, supra note 76.
86. These labor organizations included the AFL-CIO, whose arguments were presented by its
president, George Meany, see Haynsworth Hearings, supra note 76, at 162; three unions affiliated
with the AFL-CIO (the International Union of Electricians, see id. at 391 (testimony of Irving
Abramson, general counsel); the Textile Workers Union of America, see id. at 481 (testimony of
William Pollock, general president); and the American Federation of Teachers, see id. at 621 (testimony of Carl J. Megel, director of legislation)); the United Automobile Workers of America, see
id. at 353 (testimony of Stephen I. Schlossberg, general counsel); and the Ladies Garment Workers
Union, see id. at 622 (testimony of Louis Stulberg, president).
87. The Committee heard from leaders of the NAACP, see id. at 520 (testimony of Samuel
W. Tucker, legal staff chair, Virginia State Conference of NAACP); the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, see id. at 423 (testimony of Clarence Mitchell, legislative chair, and Joseph L. Rauh,
Jr., counsel); the Black American Law Students Association, see id. at 580 (testimony of J. Otis
Cochran, national chair); and the National Conference of Black Lawyers, see id. at 612 (testimony
of Floyd B. McKissick).
88. See id. at 530 (testimony of Nils R. Douglas); id. at 541 (testimony of Randolph Phillips);
id. at 614 (statement by Victor Rabinowitz).
89. See id. at 314 (testimony of William F. Ryan, D-N.Y.); id. at 473 (testimony of John
Conyers, Jr., D-Mich., Charles C. Diggs, Jr., D-Mich., Shirley Chisholm, D-N.Y., Louis Stokes, DOhio, and William Clay, D-Mo.); id. at 537 (testimony of Willie G. Lipscomb, Jr., Republican
District Chairman of the 13th Congressional District of Detroit, Mich.).
90. See id. at 554 (testimony of Prof. Gary Orfield).
91. An official of the United Church of Christ's Council for Christian Social Action opposed
Haynsworth, alleging that he was insensitive to the needs of racial minorities. See id. at 590 (statement of Tilford E. Dudly).
92. See id. at 591 (statement of Charles Alan Wright); id. at 602 (statement by G.W. Foster,
Jr.); id. at 611 (statement by William Van Alstyne).
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the overwhelming support from the bar that a nominee for the Supreme
Court customarily receives. In addition to three bar groups that testified at the hearings in opposition to the nomination, the governing
boards of the 2400-member National Bar Association, an organization
of black lawyers, the 24,000-member American Trial Lawyers Association, 3 and the New York State Trial Lawyers' Association announced
their opposition to the Haynsworth nomination.9 4 Although the ABA
unanimously endorsed the nomination after an intensive investigation
and affirmed its endorsement after another investigation following allegations of improper financial conduct, the second vote lacked unanimity. 5 The lack of unanimity was believed to have blighted Haynsworth's
prospects, although the announcement that a "substantial majority" of
the Committee favored the endorsement and the dissenters' failure to
issue any public criticism may have minimized the negative impact of
the divided vote.9 6
In view of the narrowness of the vote, it seems likely that the opposition of labor, civil rights, and sundry other liberal groups was decisive
in defeating Haynsworth's nomination, even though the senators' own
convictions and questions concerning Haynsworth's ethical propriety
clearly also may have been a necessary, although not sufficient, cause.
For example, it is difficult to believe that the dramatic decision of Hugh
Scott, the Senate Republican leader, to oppose the nomination was not
influenced by the strength of labor and civil rights groups among
Scott's constituents in Pennsylvania." On the other hand, Republican
Senator William Saxbe of Ohio probably was honest when he said that
his decision to vote in opposition to the nomination was based upon his
own convictions, notwithstanding the fact that labor was strong and
blacks were fairly numerous in his state.9 8
Organized opposition to the nomination of Carswell in 1970 resembled the campaign against Haynsworth, but with some important differences. While the AFL-CIO and other major unions actively opposed the
Carswell nomination, 9 organized labor seems to have taken less interest
93. See Fenton, Trial Lawyers' Board Opposes Judge Haynsworth's Approval, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 27, 1969, at 35, col. 1. The resolution of the American Trial Lawyers Association was based
upon an extended discussion of the case and a questionnaire poll of 1204 members, of whom
73.29% of the 715 who replied opposed the nomination. Id.
94. See Weaver, Haynsworth Backers in Senate Hold Preview of Floor Debate, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1969, at 40, col. 2.
95. See Graham, Bar Unit Endorses Haynsworth Again, but Vote Is Divided, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
96. See id.
97. See Graham, Haynsworth Confirmation Faces Little Opposition in the Senate, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 4, 1969, at 34, col. 4.
98. Kenworthy, supra note 81, at 20, col. 3.
99. In addition to the AFL-CIO, the United Automobile Workers opposed the nomination,
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in the struggle over the Carswell nomination than in the fight over
Haynsworth. 100 Although AFL-CIO president George Meany publicly
opposed the nomination, 10 ' he did not testify personally at the Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination. Moreover, in testimony to the Committee, the AFL-CIO explained that its opposition to
the Carswell nomination was based primarily upon Carswell's civil
rights record rather than on his labor record. 0 2 Because Carswell's record on civil rights may have been more questionable than Haynsworth's, civil rights groups may have been more prominent in the
opposition to Carswell. But while the NAACP opposed Carswell, it did
not testify in opposition to the nomination before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights was the primary civil rights group to testify against Carswell. 103 Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA) also actively opposed Carswell, 04 although
none of its representatives testified against him at the hearings. Another prominent group opposing the nomination was the National Organization for Women (NOW).1 0 5
The major difference between the public response to the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations was the widespread hostility to Carswell among prominent attorneys. Testimony against Carswell by three
prominent academicians at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings'
presaged a later torrent of opposition to the nomination among members of the elite bar. During the weeks following the hearings, Francis
T. Plimpton, president of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, called a press conference to release a petition signed by more
than 300 prominent lawyers throughout the nation.10 7 Meanwhile, more
see Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of George Harrold
Carswell, of Florida,to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1970) [hereinafter Carswell Hearings] (testimony of Stephen I. Schlossberg,
general counsel), as did the American Federation of Teachers, R. HARRIS, DECISION 36-37, 60, 114
(1971).
100.. See R. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 36-37, 60, 114.
101. See id. at 60.
102. See Carswell Hearings,supra note 99, at 233-37 (testimony of Thomas E. Harris, associate general counsel, AFL-CIO, accompanied by Laurence Gold, attorney, AFL-CIO).
103. See Carswell Hearings,supra note 99, at 267 (testimony of Clarence Mitchell, legislative chairman, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); id. at 278 (testimony of Joseph L. Rauh,
Jr., general counsel, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights).
104. See R. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 35, 64, 91, 104, 172.
105. See Carswell Hearings,supra note 99, at 88 (testimony of Betty Friedan). NOW was
making one of its initial forays into national politics.
106. Id. at 133 (testimony of William Van Alstyne, professor of law, Duke University); id. at
139 (testimony of John Lowenthal, professor of law, Rutgers University); id. at 238 (testimony of
Louis H. Pollak, dean, Yale Law School). Testimony in favor of the nomination was provided by
Yale Law School Professor James William Moore. Id. at 111.
107. L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 85, at 156; see also R. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 89-93.
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than 500 lawyers employed by various federal agencies signed a letter of
opposition that was sent to every member of the United States Senate.10 8 Hundreds of law professors also registered their opposition to the
nomination. 109
Meanwhile, a number of anti-Carswell lobbying groups were organized at the grassroots level. In Michigan a United Automobile Workers
of America (UAW) official and Representative John Conyers formed the
Michigan Committee Against Racism in the Supreme Court.110 The
Michigan group distributed hundreds of thousands of broadsides headlined, "We Call on Senator Griffin to Oppose Carswell," along with letters to members of the committee's component organizations urging
them to "write, wire or visit Senator Griffin in an effort to prevent the
confirmation of George Harrold Carswell.""' In Washington, D.C., an
anti-Carswell organization, led by a civil rights activist, and ADA and

UAW officials, coordinated mail campaigns through civil rights and labor groups in states represented by senators who might be swayed by
such activities. 1
The organized campaign of opposition may have made a critical
difference because the Carswell nomination was defeated by a margin of
13
only a few votes. The actual effect, however, is impossible to gauge.1
F.

Rehnquist Nomination: 1971

Although liberal activists acquiesced to the nomination of Harry A.
Blackmun later in 1970 and mounted no serious campaign of opposition
to Lewis F. Powell in 1971, the nomination of William H. Rehnquist, at
108. L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 85, at 156.
109. Id.; see R. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 114. Derek C. Bok, dean of Harvard Law School,
publicly opposed the nomination, L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 85, at 156; as did 21 law professors
from Stanford, R. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 114; 19 from the University of Virginia, 35 from
UCLA, and the entire law faculty at the University of Iowa, which sent a letter to President Nixon
urging him to withdraw the nomination, L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 85, at 156. See R. HARRIS,
supra note 99, at 185. At Florida State University, where Carswell had helped to found a law
school, 9 of the 19 law faculty members urged President Nixon to withdraw the nomination, and
450 students and faculty members held a rally to protest the nomination. Id.
110. This group included such disparate individuals and organizations as the president of the
Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, a member of the National Council of Catholic Women,
the executive director of the Metropolitan Detroit Jewish Community Council, a district chair of
the Republican Party, and a vice president of the International Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union. R. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 75.
111. Id. at 75-76.
112. Id. at 91.
113. One anti-Carswell activist suggested, for example, that a mail campaign helped to persuade Democratic Senator Thomas E. Eagleton of Missouri to vote in opposition to the nomination. R. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 92. On the other hand, Republican Senator William Saxbe of
Ohio reluctantly voted for Carswell even though labor and civil rights groups in Ohio had deluged
him with anti-Carswell mail. Id. at 158-59.
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the same time as Powell's nomination, stirred a modest revival of the
loose alliance of forces that had lobbied against the nominations of
Haynsworth and Carswell. The NAACP, the AFL-CIO, the UAW, and
NOW opposed Rehnquist and sent representatives to the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings to oppose the nomination,""' as did various
other groups, including the National Alliance of Postal and Federal
Employees, the National Lawyers Guild, and an ad hoc committee of
Brown University students.' But the opposition to Rehnquist was generally less intense and less organized at the grassroots level than the
campaign against Haynsworth and Carswell.
G. Recent Nominations
Even though the nominations of John Paul Stevens in 1975 and
Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981 stirred some organized opposition, the
public reaction to those nominations generally was muted. Nevertheless, a much greater number of groups registered approval or disapproval of those nominations than had voiced an opinion about similarly
noncontroversial nominations in the past."' The participation of such
groups even in the confirmation process of noncontroversial nominees
suggested that special interest groups would be increasingly prominent
in the confirmation process. This trend reflected a growing public interest in the selection of Supreme Court Justices and a more intense scrutiny of nominees. Unlike any previous nominees who had no vocal
opponents in the Senate, Stevens and O'Connor were questioned at
length during their appearances before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on a broader range of subjects than at any previous confirmation
hearings.
The importance of groups was illustrated again in 1986, when op114. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia, to Be Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 289 (1971) [hereinafter Rehnquist
and Powell Hearings] (testimony of Clarence Mitchell, Washington Bureau, NAACP, and legislative chair, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); id. at 400 (testimony of Andrew J. Biemiller,
legislative director, AFL-CIO); id. at 419 (testimony of William Dodds, political action director,
UA Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of America, UAW); id. at 423 (testimony of
Wilma Scott Heide, president, NOW).
115. See id. at 452 (testimony of Barbara Hurst and Jonathan Rogers, Ad Hoc Committee of
Brown Students); id. at 456 (statement of Catherine G. Roraback, president, National Lawyers
Guild); id. at 470 (testimony of John W. White, legislative director, National Alliance of Postal and
Federal Employees).
116. See HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Sandra
Day O'Connor, of Arizona, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of John Paul Stevens, of Illinois, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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ponents of Rehnquist's nomination as Chief Justice, especially civil
rights and women's groups, organized what probably was the most extensive campaign waged against any nominee since Rehnquist's nomination to the Court in 1971. A number of groups, including NOW, the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and the NAACP,' 1 7 that had
opposed nominations in the past, sent representatives to testify against
Rehnquist's nomination. Many additional groups made an initial appearance in the fray against the nomination. 1 "
The fight over the Rehnquist nomination deflected attention from
Antonin Scalia's nomination. Although his confirmation was opposed by
ADA and NOW," 9 those groups did not organize any extensive campaign against the nomination. Similarly, the struggle over the Bork
nomination in 1987 probably explains why public interest groups took
12 0
little interest in the nomination of Anthony Kennedy.
The magnitude of the extra-senatorial campaigns for and against
the nomination of Robert Bork in 1987 probably was unprecedented, as
was the virulence of the anti-Bork campaign. An unprecedented number of witnesses testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee,'12 and
opponents and proponents of the nomination introduced a novel feature into public discourse when they paid for a significant number of
22
newspaper and television advertisements to influence public opinion.'
117. See HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Justice
William Hubbs Rehnquist to Be Chief Justice of the United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 780
(1986) (testimony of a panel including Eleanor Smeal, NOW, and Althea Simmons, NAACP); id. at
881 (testimony of a panel consisting of Clarence Mitchell, III, National Black Caucus of State
Legislators, Elaine Jones, Legal Defense Fund, Estelle Rogers, Legal Defense and Education Fund,
NOW, Benjamin L. Hooks, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and Joseph Rauh, Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights).
118. These groups included Americans United for Separation of Church and State, see id. at
479 (statement of Dr. Robert L. Maddox, executive director); the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, see id. at 568 (statement of Jeffrey Levi, executive director); the National Abortion Rights
Action League, see id. at 573 (testimony of Karen Shields, board chair); People for the American
Way, see id. at 605 (testimony of panel including Melanie Verveer, public policy director); the
National Black Caucus of State Legislators, see id. at 881 (testimony of Clarence Mitchell, III,
president); and the Center for Constitutional Rights, see id. at 470 (testimony of William
Kunstler).
119. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Judge
Antonin Scalia to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1986) (testimony of Eleanor Smeal, president, NOW); id. at 204 (testimony of
Thomas Kerr, executive committee chairperson, ADA).
120. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of
Anthony M. Kennedy to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearings].
121. See HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Robert
H. Bork to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings].
122. See, e.g., Taylor, Of Bork and Tactics, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1987, at A23, col. 1; Taylor,
Ads Against Bork Still Hotly Disputed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1987, at A23, col. 4.
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Many of the advertisements were notable for their apocalyptic tone 1 3
or misleading content. 12 4 Many persons expressed concern that such
media razzle-dazzle might unduly politicize the judiciary by creating a
nomination process in which there is an excessive emphasis upon the
political philosophy of the nominee. As Lloyd N. Cutler observed,
"We're getting perilously close to electing a Supreme Court justice." '25
The ads also led to concern that the politicization of the nomination
process might diminish respect for the Supreme Court or undermine
the independence of judges and law professors by discouraging aspirants to the High Bench from advancing controversial positions that
might offend powerful lobbies. For example, Senator Alan Simpson alleged that "the independence of the judiciary has been placed in jeopardy by a confirmation process that has, in too many respects,
resembled a no-holds-barred political campaign, complete with highpowered lobbying activities and questionable radio and TV ads." 2 '
123. For example, an advertisement by the National Abortion Rights Action League began
with a warning that Bork might seek "to wipe out every advance women have made in the 20th
century." Taylor, Of Bork and Tactics, supra note 122, at A23, col. 1. The leader of the Moral
Majority told his followers that "the future of America may be at stake." Taylor, Ads Against
Bork Still Hotly Disputed,supra note 122, at A23, col. 4.
124. For example, a Washington Post ad sponsored by Planned Parenthood alleged that
Bork "upheld a local zoning board's power to prevent a grandmother from living with her
grandchildren because she didn't belong to the 'nuclear family'" and asked, "Is this the sort of
closed-minded extremism we want on the Supreme Court?" Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1987, at A9, col.
1. As Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg has pointed out, the ad referred to Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a case that was decided five years before Bork became a judge and about
which Bork does not appear to have written or made public remarks. Ginsburg, Confirming Supreme Court Justices: Thoughts on the Second Opinion Rendered by the Senate, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REv. 101, 115. In one particularly controversial 60-second television ad sponsored by People for the
American Way, actor Gregory Peck charged, among other things, that Judge Bork "defended poll
taxes and literacy tests which kept many Americans from voting. He opposed the civil rights law
that ended 'whites only' signs at lunch counters. He doesn't believe the Constitution protects your
right to privacy." Taylor, Ads Against Bork Still Hotly Disputed, supra note 122, at A23, col. 4.
Bork's opponents contended that the ad was accurate because Bork had opposed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that desegregated lunch counters; criticized the Supreme Court's rulings on the poll
tax, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1967); and literacy tests, Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); and assailed the Supreme Court's "creation" of a general right to
privacy. Judge Bork's supporters pointed out, however, that Bork's comments on the poll tax and
literacy tests were based upon jurisprudential grounds; that Bork never had said that he personally
favored such restrictions on voting; that Bork had stated publicly that he had changed his mind
about the Civil Rights Act; and that Bork had testified at the confirmation hearings that individual provisions of the Bill of Rights protect some aspects of privacy. Taylor, Ads Against Bork Still
Hotly Disputed, supra note 122, at A23, col. 4.
125. Taylor, Politics in the Bork Battle, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 5. Similarly,
Suzanne Garment observed in an article highly critical of the tactics of Bork's opponents that
"judges are not supposed to be chosen by popular election. This does not mean that judges are to
be fully insulated from democratic pressures ....

But the insulation must be substantial." Gar-

ment, The War Against Robert H. Bork, 85 COMMENTARY 17, 26 (1988).
126. 133 CONG. REc. S14,997 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
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III.

DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC

The shameful dishonesty and meretriciousness of some of the public appeals for and against the Bork nomination have tended to discredit the very idea of vigorous or widespread public participation in
the federal judicial selection process. This development is unfortunate.
The uglier aspects of the Bork confirmation fight should not obscure
the obvious fact that public interest groups have a right to make known
their views concerning judicial selection. Moreover, the excesses of the
Bork episode do not prove that such public participation cannot be an
intelligent and fair process that complements rather than impedes the
performance of the constitutional duties of the President and the
Senate.
Critics of public participation in the judicial selection process base
their arguments on a number of faulty premises. The first assumption is
that public interest groups profane the sacred process of judicial selection. The excesses of public interest groups during the Bork nomination
process lend superficial credence to this view. But while many of Bork's
supporters and detractors may have engaged in tasteless or unwholesome tactics, the partisan character of their opposition did not unduly
"politicize" the nomination process. In large measure, the process already was highly political. The President often selects a nominee on
criteria that largely are political or ideological-Bork's nomination is a
prime example-and there is widespread agreement that the Senate

may allow at least broad political considerations to influence its
decision.
127. As Professor Charles Black has argued:
[Political considerations] play (and always have played) a large, often a crucial, role in the
President's choice of his nominee; the assertion . . . that they should play no part in the
Senator's decision amounts to an assertion that the authority that must "advise and consent"
to a nomination ought not to be guided by considerations which are hugely important in the
making of the nomination.

Black, A Note on Senatorial Considerationof Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 658
(1970). Similarly, Senator Alan Cranston observed during a Senate debate on the Bork
nomination:
By all accounts, Judge Bork was selected by this administration on the basis of his commitment to a certain judicial ideology. It is naive to think otherwise and deceptive to pretend
otherwise.
This President, like Presidents before him, obviously took his nominee's judicial ideology
into account before deciding to name him. This Senate, like Senates before us, has an obligation to examine that judicial philosophy in deciding whether to confirm the President's
nominee.
133 CoNG. REc. S13,117 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1987).
A recognition or acceptance of the presence of political considerations in the nomination or
confirmation process does not compel the conclusion that the process is or should be wholly political. See Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 BoSTON U.L. REv. 273, 276-83 (1989).
For an argument in favor of the view that the Senate should limit its role to determining whether
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Accordingly, there is no apparent reason why organized groups
should not oppose a nominee for partisan reasons. Organized groups not
only have the constitutional right to make known their views; they have
a virtual obligation to speak out concerning issues of interest to their
members. Although many of Bork's opponents exaggerated the extremity of Bork's views or the impact that his confirmation would have had
on the Court, there is no doubt that many organizations, especially civil
rights groups, profoundly disagreed with Bork's judicial philosophy and
contemplated with genuine alarm the prospect of his confirmation.
Such organizations, therefore, would have shirked their duty as advocates of their own causes if they had not campaigned against a nomination they believed would jeopardize the hard-won advances that they
had helped win for their members and lessen the likelihood of future
gains.
Broad public participation in the federal judicial selection process
is particularly compelling because judges are not elected and serve a
lifetime tenure. The federal judiciary has remained isolated from a
trend toward expansion of popular democracy. Citizens may not select
federal judges and have no means of removing them from office for any
reason other than treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors;"' thus, the process of judicial selection is the most undemocratic feature of American government. Retention of an unelected
federal judiciary contrasts sharply with the increasing democratization
of other aspects of American government since the beginning of the Republic. The Constitution has been amended to require the direct election of senators, 2 9 who were chosen originally by the state legislatures.
Presidential electors, who originally were selected by the legislatures in
many states, have long been chosen by the voters in every state. The
use of primary elections for the nomination of candidates for most political offices has become universal. Suffrage has been expanded to eliminate voting restrictions based upon property ownership, race, gender,
and poll tax payment, and to narrow restrictions based upon age. On
the state level, popular selection of judges or ratification of their tenure
has become the norm. 13 0 Although critics of the federal judiciary have
advocated the election of federal judges and the abolition of lifetime
the nominee is intellectually competent and whether his nomination was tainted by cronyism, corruption, or crass political partisanship, see Fein, Commentary: A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1989).
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
•
129.

U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII.

130. See L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M.
COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS

(1980).
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tenure,1 3 l and a number of proposals for limitations on judicial tenure
have been made again during the past few years,' 32 there does not appear to be any significant likelihood that such measures will be enacted.
Although there are good reasons for retaining an appointive judiciary,
the exclusion of public participation in a process that has so vast an
impact upon the lives of virtually all Americans would contravene the
democratic character of American government. Accordingly, individuals
and special interest groups should be encouraged to make their views
known to the President prior to the nomination and to the Senate during the confirmation process. A robust participation by the public in the
prenomination and confirmation processes assures that the judicial selection process will take proper account of the public will.
Opponents of broad public participation in the judicial selection
process also have expressed fears that narrow special interest groups
will coerce senators into rejecting the nominations of highly capable
men and women whose selection is acceptable to a broad spectrum of
the American public. The Senate's rejection of the Bork nomination in
the wake of a well-organized, histrionic, and allegedly unfair campaign
by Bork's foes ostensibly confirmed the worst fears of those who advocate a circumscribed role for the public. 3 ' The widespread perception
that the Senate acquiesced to public pressure was given credence by
131. During the early twentieth century, for example, a number of Populists and Progressives advocated election of federal judges for limited terms. Chief Justice Walter Clark was the
most vocal proponent of an elective federal judiciary. See, e.g., Clark, Law and Human Progress,
37 AM. L. REv. 512 (1903); Clark, Some Defects in the Constitutionof the United States, 54 AM. L.
REG. 263 (1906). A raft of bills was introduced in Congress during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to provide for election of federal judges or to impose limitations on the length
of tenure of federal judges. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 109, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) (proposing amendment providing that Supreme Court Justices shall hold office "during good behavior" and that
judges of inferior courts shall hold office for terms of ten years); S. 3112, 62d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1911) (providing for election of district and court of appeals judges for four-year terms); H.J. Res.
226, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1907) (proposing amendment to provide eight-year terms for federal
court judges); H.J. Res. 93, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. (1904) (bill for constitutional amendment to provide twelve-year terms for Justices of the Supreme Court, eight-year terms for judges of the courts
of appeals, and six-year terms for district court judges); S. Res. 47, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1899)
(bill to amend the Constitution to provide for election of federal judges for eight-year terms).
132. Cf. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1202,
1211-12 (1988) (tentatively suggesting the possibility of imposing age and length of tenure limitations on Supreme Court Justices); Oliver, Systematic Justice:A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 799 (1986) (proposing system of fixed, staggered, 18-year terms for Supreme Court
Justices); see also A. O'CONNOR & M. HENZE, DURINQ GOOD BEHAVIOM JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY A GUIDE FOR DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH TERMS OF OFFICE FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1984) (discussion guide on constitutional reform issues published by the Jefferson Foundation); Bandow, End Life Tenure for Judges, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1986, at 27, col. 4.
133. The Wall Street Journal,for example, concluded that the campaign against Bork "intimidated not only Senators who spin like weather vanes, but also Senators made of sterner stuff."
Bogeyman Fund-Raising, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
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senators who accused their anti-Bork colleagues of succumbing to the
virulent campaign against the Bork nomination.""
Senators who voted against the nomination resentfully denied that
the public campaign opposing the nomination unduly influenced their
votes. 13 5 Several senators pointed out that the Senate Judiciary Committee had accorded Judge Bork a full hearing, which elicited thirtytwo hours of testimony from Bork and-permitted testimony by sixtytwo pro-Bork witnesses, who outnumbered the forty-eight anti-Bork
witnesses.136 Senator Joseph Biden observed that "[a]ll the money
spent by all the interest groups on both sides could not have paid for
[one] day of the television coverage Judge Bork received in the hearings.' 1 37 Senators who opposed the nomination argued that Bork had

defeated himself through his own extensive writings, opinions, speeches,
interviews, public record, and testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.'
134. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S14,915 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Pete
Domenici).
135. For example, Senator Dale Bumpers declared that "[tihe suggestion that the opposition
to Judge Bork in the Senate is the result of some kind of owerful public relations campaign is an
insult to every Member of this body." 133 CONG. REC. S13,806 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987). Similarly,
Senator Joseph Biden observed that "[t]o suggest that the . . . colleagues here today who are
going to vote against Judge Bork are doing so because they have succumbed to the raw pressure,
from wherever it was generated . . . is one heck of an indictment of your colleagues." Id. at
S14,946 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987). Senator Alan Dixon protested that "I do not believe that the
votes of Senators can be so easily swayed." Id. at S14,862 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). In a gentler
vein, Senator William Proxmire averred that public advertisements in opposition to the nomination "had about the same impact on this Senator as a butterfly's hiccough. That is absolutely
none." Id. at S14,766 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). Senator Proxmire likewise contended that the ads
were "directed primarily" at 10 or 15 undecided senators and that the ads "very likely had no
effect." Id.
136. See, e.g., id. at S14,862 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Alan Dixon); id. at
S13,806 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Dale Bumpers); id. at S14,793 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1987) (remarks of Sen. Patrick Leahy). As Senator Dixon observed, "Judge Bork clearly had an
ample time to make sure the Senate had a thorough and accurate record of his views." Id. at
S14,862 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987).
137. Id. at S14,917 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987). Senator David Durenburger, however, alleged
that "[tihe hearings were deliberately delayed to allow the public relations campaign to gear to."
Id. at S14,951.
138. See id. at S14,916-17 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Joseph Biden); id. at
S14,862 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Alan Dixon). Senator Biden argued that the
Senate was not swayed ultimately "by advertising, fair or unfair, pro or con. . . . Notwithstanding
all of the charges thrown about Senators' motives in this matter, the verdict of history will be
made on the same basis as the verdict in the Senate: On the merits." Id. at S14,917 (daily ed. Oct.
23, 1987). Similarly, Senator Dixon observed:
Both supporters and opponents of Judge Bork organized emotional, simplified appeals to mobilize public support and raise money for their position. In those appeals there have been
excesses and exaggerations on both sides. That cannot be denied. However, it was not the
efforts of grassroots citizens groups, or media ads, that defeated the nomination, it was Judge
Bork himself!
Id. at S14,862 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987).
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The extensive hearings on Bork do not demonstrate that the campaign against Bork did not unduly influence the Senate. The Senate's
critics have charged that senators were loath to defy the pressures of
the special interest groups that waged the anti-Bork campaign, not that
the anti-Bork propaganda actually misinformed the senators. 39 Moreover, selective media coverage of the Bork hearings may have misled
the public about Bork's views and contributed to anti-Bork agitation by
persons who misunderstood Bork's views. 140 While the question of
whether voter pressures were responsible for Bork's defeat must remain
problematical, it is unlikely that the Senate's rejection of the nomination represented a blatant capitulation to the demands of special interest groups. Although the anti-Bork forces may have tried to intimidate
some senators,"' the force of the anti-Bork lobby was diluted, at least
partially, by the lobbying activities of Bork's supporters.142 The antiBork campaign may have caused senators to take a closer look at the
nomination, but it seems unlikely that many would have voted against
it unless they had grave doubts about the candidate. As Senator Howell
Heflin observed during the final debate on the nomination:
[M]any factors influence how a Senator votes. Among these are: How his or her
constituents feel, the views of outside groups, and the opinions of colleagues. But
while these factors may influence how a Senator votes, they do not dictate how a
Senator votes. My vote is mine alone. I made
143 the ultimate decision and I stand
behind it. I have to live with my conscience.

If the anti-Bork campaign intimidated any senators into voting against
the nomination, the impropriety lies with the senators themselves
rather than with the special interest groups.
To the extent that senators were influenced, rather than pressured,
by their constituents and organized groups, they simply were performing their proper role as elected representatives of the people. Although
senators obviously should not have accorded weight to public opinion
139. While the Wall Street Journal,for example, admitted that the hyperbolic presentations
of Bork's record had not influenced senators directly, the Journal contended that "the hyperbole
was needed to raise the money to persuade Senators." Bogeyman Fund-Raising,supra note 133.
140. See Garment, supra note 125, at 23.
141. Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, for example, reported that the executive
director of the South Carolina NAACP said that Hollings "might as well forget the black vote" if
Hollings supported Bork. 133 CONG. REc. S13,859 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987).
142. For example, the Moral Majority sent a pro-Bork letter to its members and solicited
funds for efforts on Bork's behalf. See id. at S14,825 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (remarks of Sen.
Dennis DeConcini). Senator Howell Heflin observed that "the process has been politicized....
[I]t has been politicized by both Democrats and Republicans and outside right-wing groups and
left-wing groups. Neither side or group can cast blame without first accepting it." Id. at S14,918
(daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987). Similarly, Senator Robert Byrd pointed out that pressure "has come from
both sides." Id. at S14,999 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987); see also id. at S14,765-66 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1987) (remarks of Sen. William Proxmire).
143. Id. at S14,918 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
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that was based on the misinformation disseminated by Bork's opponents or appeals from uninformed participants in mass letter writing
campaigns, such appeals do not appear to have had much influence. But
senators properly listened to the more thoughtful comments of their
constituents and other persons who had formed opinions about the
nomination.' As Senator Patrick Leahy noted:
[Senators] took time to hear from the people, the people of the [fifty] states who
elected the [one hundred] Members of the Senate who count on us to do our duty
under the Constitution. Two hundred [florty million Americans are going to be
affected by our decision on the Bork nomination.. . . That makes it all the more
important that the Senate look at the nomination seriously and carefully .... I'l

Allegations that public interest groups unduly influence the Senate
also tend to overlook the fact that senators may induce participation by
public interest groups. For example, one study of the Bork controversy
has indicated that a group of liberal senators opposed Bork from the
moment he was nominated and actively encouraged public interest
groups to mobilize their forces in opposition to the nomination. 1 46 Senator Edward Kennedy delivered perhaps the most scathingly unfair attack on Bork immediately after the nomination, before any interest
groups had an opportunity to enter the fray. 147 Although critics of public participation in the judicial appointment process might argue that
senatorial ability to manipulate public interest groups demonstrates
that the influence of such groups can be baneful, the existence of such
manipulation further demonstrates that the Senate is not a helpless
captive of public interest groups. It also demonstrates the fallacy of the
argument that public participation in the process should be discouraged
because it can be irresponsible. The same logic might lead one to conclude that the power of appointment should be vested solely in the
144. Senator Patrick Leahy, for example, said that he paid little attention to an avalanche of
preposted postcards and letters, but that he considered the views expressed in the "hundreds and
thousands of thoughtful and thought-provoking letters and telephone calls from the people of my
State on both sides of the issues" and the many comments that his constituents made to him
personally during his visits to Vermont. Id. at S14,792 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). "[W]hatever I was
doing in Vermont, somebody would come up and talk to me about this nomination. Whether it was
in small towns or on city sidewalks, the people of Vermont let me know what they thought about
Judge Bork." Id.
145. Id.
146. Boston Globe, Oct. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 6; see Garment, supra note 125, at 19-20.
147. In his now famous philippic against Bork, Senator Kennedy declared:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced into back-alley abortions,
blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens' doors in
midnight raids. . .. and the doors of the Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of
millions of citizens. ...
133 CONG. REc. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987). For a thoughtful critique of the Senate's consideration of the Bork nomination, see Myers, Advice and Consent on Trial: The Case of Robert H.
Bork, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 1 (1988).
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President because senators can be unfair to nominees. Indeed, the existence of bias among senators provides further support for encouragement of participation by public interest groups because such groups can
help to counteract such biases.
Although critics of public participation in the judicial selection process correctly point out that no one can predict accurately a nominee's
performance on the bench, the impossibility of making such predictions
does not justify public apathy. 4" Even though judges often confound
the hopes and fears that their nominations arouse, there is likely to be
at least a rough correlation between their public records prior to their
ascension to the bench and their performances on the court. The exceptions are many, but it is absurd to suggest that they swallow the rule.
Accordingly, it makes no sense to suggest that a civil rights group, for
example, should sit back and blithely acquiesce to the nomination of an
outspoken opponent of laws or programs it supports. Although the restrictions of judicial precedent, the olympian perspective of the bench,
the independence afforded by life tenure, and a host of other circumstances might cause the nominee to compile a more moderate judicial
record than the organization might have predicted, the philosophies of
the nominee are still very likely to find expression in the decisions of
the judge.
During the fight over the Bork nomination, public interest groups
also served a salubrious role by gathering information, making more
reasoned presentations before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and educating and mobilizing their members. The investigatory role of the
groups can be especially useful. The Department of Justice's own investigations of the candidates prior to the nomination sometimes have
been deficient.149 The Senate's investigations of the nominees tradition148. The judicial record of Judge John J. Parker after the Senate's rejection of his nomination provides an example. Many scholars have contended that Parker's subsequent record demonstrates that Parker would have been a more liberal Justice than his critics contended. See, e.g., H.
ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 189; Mendelsohn, supra note 42, at 122. A recent evaluation of Parker's
record as a Fourth Circuit judge during the 28 years following his defeat in the Senate has concluded, however, that critics of his nomination to the Supreme Court were quite prescient. Lively,
The Supreme Court Appointment Process:In Search of ConstitutionalRoles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 567-72 (1986).
149. In 1970, for example, the Nixon Administration failed to discover that G. Harrold Carswell in 1948 had made a public speech in which he had expressed a belief in white supremacy;
records of the speech were uncovered by an enterprising radio reporter. R. HARRIS, supra note 99,
at 26-27. In 1988 the Reagan Administration was surprised by information that was revealed about
Douglas Ginsburg's background after his nomination to the Supreme Court. See Taylor, Haste and
Ideologicial Fights Set Nomination on Course Ending in Its Doom, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, at
34, col. 1. Although the revelations concerning Ginsburg and Carswell were made primarily by
journalists, individual citizens often have assisted the Senate in its investigation into charges
against nominees. See, e.g., Carswell Hearings,supra note 99, at 149-95, 197; Rehnquist and Powell Hearings,supra note 114, at 101-06.
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ally have relied heavily upon information provided by private individuals and organized interest groups. Most particularly, the Senate
traditionally has relied upon the ABA to provide an assessment of nominees' professional qualifications and until fairly recently has not even
made a pretense of conducting its own investigation.
The useful role that public interest organizations perform cannot
obscure the excesses that occurred during the fight over the Bork nomination. As one observer pointed out, some of the advertisements placed
by Bork's opponents "seemed at least as likely to provoke simplistic
fears as to spread real understanding.' 5 0 Even though there is evidence
that the advertisements had little impact upon public opinion, 151 Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has observed rightly that "campaigns against
judges that spread misinformation, turn complex issues into slogans,
and play on our fears are worrisome."' 52
The antidote to uninformed or fickle public opinion is not, however, to banish the public from the process but rather to encourage a
wiser form of public participation. The need to encourage a form of
public participation that is robust yet prudent obviously presents a
challenge, especially because the growing public interest in the judicial
selection process that culminated in the fight over the Bork nomination
demonstrates that the activities of organized interest groups and private individuals have become a permanent feature of the judicial selection process. 53
The worst features of the Bork battle are not likely to recur again
soon because few nominations are likely to be so controversial. The ease
of Anthony Kennedy's confirmation after the uproar over Bork, and the
lack of controversy inspired by the nomination of Harry Blackmun after the fights over Haynsworth and Carswell, demonstrated that most
public interest groups have neither the resources nor the inclination to
initiate a crusade against every nominee whose judicial philosophy is at
odds with their own. A high degree of deference must be accorded to
the President, who has the sole power to select a nominee. Even if quer150. Taylor, Of Bork and Tactics, supra note 122.
151. The results of public opinion polls showed that the sharpest swing against Bork resulted
from his five days of televised testimony. Id. While it is disturbing that much of the unfavorable
reaction to Bork's testimony appears to have been attributable to form rather than to substance, it
is encouraging to suppose that the public reaction to Bork at least appears to have been formed in
part from Bork's own testimony rather than from hysterical or misleading advertisements.
152. Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 117.
153. Professor Gregory Caldeira has concluded that "organized group mobilization and pressure on controversial judicial nominations has become a permanent feature of our political land-

scape" and "[tihis conflict has been institutionalized." Caldeira, Commentary on Senate
Confirmationof Supreme Court Justices: The Roles of Organized and Unorganized Interests, 77
Ky. L. REv. 531, 538 (1988-1989).
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ulous groups financed major campaigns against every nominee whose
political persuasion differed from their own, it is unlikely that such efforts would have much impact on the Senate. Alexander Hamilton observed that senators will not reject the President's candidate merely
because they prefer someone else because they could not be certain
"that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their favorite, or
upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the
one rejected."' 154 Accordingly, while the intense public participation in
the Bork nomination process is part of a salubrious trend toward
heightened public interest in the judicial selection process, the excesses
of that participation probably represent an aberration. Nevertheless,
the danger of a recurrence of the unfair tactics that characterized the
Bork struggle remains present, especially in the event of a controversial
nomination. As Professor Ronald Rotunda has warned, "At a future
confirmation, there will always be waiting in the sidelines the possibility
of a media blitz of innuendo and false statement, converting complex
theories of jurisprudence into snappy slogans.' 155
Meanwhile, the benefits of public participation in the federal judicial selection process appear to outweigh the abuses. In the unlikely
event that the excesses seen during the Bork fight become a common
feature of the judicial selection process, means for curbing such abuses
will need to be developed. The search for such means will not be simple. As Judge Ginsburg has observed, there is "no magic formula for
making the interest groups involved act more responsibly, for keeping
their comment fair."'' 5 The most obvious ameliorative, a limit on
spending, raises obvious first amendment problems. At the present
time, however, discussion of such measures would be premature.
While the time has not come yet for the government to impose restrictions on public participation in the judicial selection process, the
time is surely ripe for public interest groups to consider how they might
make such participation more responsible. The techniques that groups
should use in supporting or opposing a nomination should vary according to the nature of the group. An organization, such as the ABA, that
has a politically diverse constituency and purports to base its recom154. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 449 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton argued that
the Senate's "sanction would [not] often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal." THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
155. Rotunda, The ConfirmationProcess for Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era, 37
EMORY L.J. 559, 585 (1988). Similarly, Professor Rotunda has expressed the not unreasonable fear
that "[w]hat may become a legacy of the nomination of Robert Bork is the tendency to treat a
confirmation as if it were an election campaign, a media event complete with an avalanche of
stump speeches and a bombardment of negative advertising, all accompanied by extensive direct
mail advertising, campaign buttons, and solicitation of funds." Id.
156. Ginsburg, supra note 124, at 117.
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mendations on nonpolitical criteria should ensure that its advocacy
avoids a partisan cast. Because the avowed purpose of the ABA's ratings procedure is to ensure the selection of temperate, honest, and competent judges, the ABA should make certain that it polls a broad
segment of the bar and that its ratings reflect their stated objectives.
The difficulty in applying such "objective" criteria is that ideological
and political considerations may influence evaluations of competence
and temperament. For example, only one of the five members of the
ABA Standing Committee which concluded that Judge Bork's temperament should have precluded him from receiving a rating of "Qualified"
based his dissent in part upon a relatively "objective" factor: reservations about what that member termed Bork's inconsistent and possibly
misleading recollections of the events surrounding the resignations of
Attorney General Elliott Richardson and Deputy Attorney General Wil-

15 7
liam Ruckelshaus during the investigation of the Watergate scandal.

The dissents of the other members were based solely upon concerns
about Judge Bork's "compassion, open-mindedness, his sensitivity to
the rights of women and minority groups and comparatively extreme
views respecting constitutional principles or their application, particularly within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 58 Such an evaluation appears to have been colored by relatively subjective political
considerations. In contrast, an organization that promotes a specific political objective need not make any pretense of representing the public
interest or presenting a balanced view of the candidate. Barring any
knowing or negligent misrepresentation of the nominee's record, the
group zealously may oppose or support a nomination for the narrowest
of reasons. Senators are not likely to mistake the nature of such a narrow-interest group's lobbying activities.
A group properly may attempt to define and advocate a public interest that transcends its own narrow interests and may draw parallels
between its own members' interests and the interests of various other
persons, but special interest groups should avoid hypocrisy. For example, a labor union properly may oppose a nomination on the ground
that the nominee's views on civil liberties are antithetical to ideals of
personal freedom that affect union members but that also go far beyond
issues of trade unionism. The union should not pretend, however, that
its principal concern is civil liberties or racial equality if its real quarrel
with the nominee is his or her attitude toward trade unions.
157.

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT

JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
(1988) [hereinafter BORK REPORT].

158.

Id. at 5.

H.

BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE

S. ExEc. Doc. No. 7, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6
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THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

A. Procedures and Practices
The ABA has lobbied more pervasively, and perhaps more persuasively, with respect to judicial nominations than any other private interest group. The opinions of the 328,000-member ABA would be
significant under any circumstances because the ABA is the largest and
most significant bar group in the country. Not content, however, merely
to influence the process from outside the government, the ABA meticulously has developed a special institutionalized relationship with the executive branch. Since the formation in 1946 of what now is called its
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 59 the ABA regularly has
made recommendations to the Department of Justice based upon its
review of the professional qualifications of persons identified by the Department as potential nominees for the federal judiciary.6 0 The Standing Committee was particularly thorough in its investigation of Judge
6
Bork.

1

1

Throughout its history the fifteen member Standing Committee 6 '
has purported to rank prospective nominees on the basis of integrity,
159. For a discussion of the formation of the Committee, see Grossman, The Role of the
American Bar Association in the Selection of Federal Judges: Episodic Involvement to Institutionalized Power, 17 VAND. L. REv. 785, 793-96 (1964). Even before 1946, the ABA hardly had been
a passive observer of the judicial selection process. During the first decades after its formation, the
ABA had concerned itself primarily with the systems for selecting and retaining judges at the state
level because the ABA regarded the state courts, in contrast to the federal courts, as centers of
radical thought. Id. at 791. Although the ABA did not comment formally upon judicial nominees,
seven former presidents opposed the nomination of Brandeis in 1916. Id. at 790-91. By 1932 the
ABA had established a Special Committee to advise the Senate Judiciary Committee on judicial
nominations. Id. at 792-93.
160. For a history of the Standing Committee during its first 15 years, see J. GROSSMAN,
LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION 58-80 (1965). Professor
Joel Grossman's book also provides a thorough discussion of the procedures followed by the Committee as of 1965 and offers a sound critique of its role in the judicial selection process.
161. In its investigation of Judge Bork, for example, the Committee interviewed Judge Bork,
five members of the United States Supreme Court, many of his colleagues on the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, and approximately 170 other federal and state court judges throughout the
United States. Bork Hearings,supra note 121, at 5. The Committee also conducted interviews with
approximately 150 practicing lawyers, 79 law school deans and professors, 11 of Judge Bork's former law clerks, and a number of attorneys who served under Bork when he was Solicitor General.
Id. The dean and 10 professors at the University of Michigan Law School examined Judge Bork's
opinions for the Committee, which also received submissions from a number of institutions and
groups. Id.
162. The president of the ABA appoints members of the Standing Committee, which consists
of two members from the Ninth Circuit, one member from each of the other twelve federal judicial
circuits, and one member-at-large. ABA, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is
AND How IT WORKS 1 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY]. The
members are appointed for staggered three-year terms and may not serve for more than two terms.
Id. As a condition of appointment, each member agrees not to seek or accept federal judicial appointment while on the committee and for at least one year thereafter. Id.
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competence, and judicial temperament. 6" A 1977 ABA brochure stated
that "[t]he Committee does not attempt to investigate or report on political or ideological matters" with respect to the prospective nominee."" In 1980, however, the Standing Committee acknowledged that
its evaluations would not exclude ideological considerations entirely:
the evaluation of prospective nominees would be directed "primarily"
to the professional qualifications of competence, integrity, and judicial
temperament, and "[t]he Committee does not investigate the prospective nominee's political or ideological philosophy except to the extent
that extreme views on such matters might bear upon judicial temperament or integrity.' 16

5

Following criticisms of its role in the judicial se-

lection process, the Standing Committee in June 1988 deleted the word
"primarily" from the language quoted above and declared that
"[p]olitical or ideological philosophy are not considered except to the
extent that they may bear upon other factors.' 16 6 This change, however,
did not satisfy the Standing Committee's critics; some critics alleged
that the change actually increased the ABA's latitude in considering political and ideological philosophies.6 7 After criticism by the Reagan Administration, the ABA has agreed to delete this language and to add a
sentence stating that the ABA does not consider political or ideological
philosophy."
In their evaluations of prospective Supreme Court nominees,
Standing Committee members interview persons who are knowledgea163. According to the Standing Committee's official handbook, the Committee "considers circumstances and factors which range so widely that it would be difficult to provide a comprehensive
catalogue." Id. at 3. The handbook nevertheless attempts to explain the general guidelines that the
Committee considers. "Integrity" includes the prospective nominee's character, general reputation
in the legal community, industry, and diligence. "Professional competence" is defined as embracing "such qualities as intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and analytical ability, industry, diligence, knowledge of the law and professional experience." In evaluating competence, the
Committee prefers prospective nominees who have been admitted to the bar for at least 12 years
and have had "[s]ubstantial trial experience." The Committee states that it considers that political
activity and public service are valuable experiences, but that such activity and service are not a
substitute for significant experience in the practice of law. "Judicial temperament" includes "the
prospective nominee's compassion, decisiveness, open-mindedness, sensitivity, courtesy, patience,
freedom from bias and commitment to equal justice." Id. at 3-4.
164.

ABA,

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is AND

How

IT WORKS

2

(1977).
165. ABA,

STANDING COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 4

(1980).
166. 1988 STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 162, at 3.
167. In its brief in the ABA case, the Washington Legal Foundation pointed out that "[i]t
now seems that the ABA believes that even the non-extreme political or ideological views of a
candidate can be considered in evaluating the qualifications of candidates." Brief for Appellant at
7 n.5, Washington Legal Found. v. ABA Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353
(D.D.C. 1986) (No. 85-3918) (emphasis in original).
168. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
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ble about the prospective nominee's qualifications, and they receive reports from specially commissioned teams of law school professors and
practicing lawyers. According to the Committee, its investigation "is intended to weigh professional competence, not to assess the ideology of
the prospective nominee."' 16 9 The Committee frequently has changed
the categories of rankings that it gives to prospective nominees. 17 0 Currently, the ABA ranks candidates for the lower federal courts as "Exceptionally Well Qualified," "Well Qualified," "Qualified," and "Not
Qualified.''7 Supreme Court nominees are ranked as "Well Qualified,"
"Qualified," and "Not Qualified.' ' 7 2 The rating and the report remain
confidential. 7 3 The Standing Committee's rating, together with such
other information as Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, the prospective nominee's financial declaration, and reports on medical background, are considered in the Attorney General's recommendation to
1 74
the President.
Different Presidents have accorded different levels of deference to
the ABA's opinions. Since 1956, attorneys general usually have permitted the ABA to comment on prospective nominations to the lower fed169. 1988 STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 162, at 8.
170. See S. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 107-12 (3d ed.
1988).

171.

1988

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY,

supra note 162, at 7. The ABA's

handbook explains that the rating of "Exceptionally Well Qualified" is "sparingly awarded" and
indicates that the nominee stands "at the top of the legal profession in the community" and has
"outstanding legal ability, wide experience and the highest reputation for integrity and temperament." To merit this rating, a candidate also "should have a reputation as an outstanding citizen
who has made important community and professional contributions." Id. An award of the "Well
Qualified" ranking requires a nominee to "have the Committee's strong affirmative endorsement
and be regarded as one of the best available for the vacancy from the standpoint of integrity,
competence, and temperament." Id. The evaluation of "Qualified" indicates that the prospective
nominee would appear to "be able to perform satisfactorily as a federal judge with respect to
integrity, competence, and temperament." Id. A ranking of "Not Qualified" means that the Committee's investigation indicates that the candidate "is not adequate from the standpoint of integrity, competence, or temperament." Id.
172. Id. at 9. The explanations of the categories for Supreme Court nominees are more amorphous than are the definitions of the rankings for lower federal nominees. The Standing Committee's handbook explains that the designation of "Well Qualified" is reserved for persons "who meet
the highest standards of integrity, professional competence, and judicial temperament." Such persons "must be among the best available for appointment to the Supreme Court." Id. A person who
is in the second category, "while not deemed unqualified by the Committee, is not among the best
available for the appointment." Id. The handbook does not explain the Committee's criteria for
the "Unqualified" designation, except to suggest that such persons simply lack Supreme Court
caliber. Id.
173. Washington Legal Found. v. ABA Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp.
1353, 1355 (D.D.C. 1986).
174. Washington Legal Found. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483, 487
(D.D.C. 1988), afl'd sub noma.Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558
(1989).
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eral courts. 17 Beginning with the nomination of William Brennan in
1956, the Justice Department also has notified the ABA of most prospective Supreme Court nominations twenty-four hours prior to their
transmission to the Senate. 176 In view of the ABA's conservative political leanings, it is not surprising that the Standing Committee has had
more influence upon Republican administrations. 7 No President can
afford to ignore the influence of the Standing Committee; even Democratic Presidents have listened carefully to its opinions.1 78 For example,
a study of President Lyndon Johnson's court appointments concluded
that the Standing Committee exercised the greatest continuing influence over the judicial selection process of any nonfederal government
17
actor.
A major structural change in the judicial selection process
threatened the influence of the Standing Committee when the Carter
Administration established the United States Circuit Judge Nominat175. L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 85, at 221. The ABA's review of candidates for lower court
positions usually is conducted by the member of the Standing Committee who resides in the judicial circuit in which the vacancy exists. The member examines a Personal Data Questionnaire that
the candidate completes; studies the available legal writings of the prospective nominee; and conducts a large number of confidential interviews with a representative sampling of attorneys and
various persons who have knowledge of the candidate's competence, integrity, and temperament. A
personal interview with the candidate also is conducted. The member then prepares a report for
the Committee.
176. J. GROSSMAN, supra note 160, at 806. For a brief but eventful period during the Nixon
Administration, the ABA was given an opportunity to take a closer look at prospective nominees.
Following the defeat of the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations, the Department of Justice
under John Mitchell arranged to submit to the ABA for its private comment the names of persons
whom the President was considering for nomination. The arrangement turned into a contretemps
when the ABA took a dim view of the six persons that the Nixon Administration proposed as
successors for Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan in 1971. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 85, at
219-41.
177. For example, President Harry S. Truman's attitude toward the Committee seemed to
range from indifference to contempt. J. GROSSMAN, supra note 160, at 64-69. During the Eisenhower Administration, however, the Standing Committee appears to have achieved "a degree of
access to the judicial-selection process not theretofore attained by any private association." Id. at
69. The Kennedy Administration, in turn, was less amenable to the Standing Committee's suggestions. Id. at 78-80. Similarly, President Lyndon Johnson had a stormy relationship with the Standing Committee during the first half of his tenure, although relations improved after he came to
recognize the political advantages of cooperation with the ABA. See N. MCFEELEY, APPOINTMENT
OF JUDGES: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 60-65 (1987). During the Nixon and Ford Administrations,
the position of the ABA appears to have strengthened. See S. WASBY, supra note 170, at 108. A
study of judicial selection during the Carter Administration concluded that "[t]he Committee's
evaluation still carries great weight, but it is likely that the Standing Committee does not exercise
the influence it will have during a Republican Administration. . . ." A. NEFF, THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES 44
(1981) (assessing federal judicial selection during the Carter Administration).
178. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
179. N. MCFEELEY, supra note 177, at 60.
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ing Commission in 1977180 and encouraged senators to establish similar
screening commissions in their states.18 1 As one observer pointed out,

"one could argue that the nominating panels cut at the heart of the
ABA Committee's credibility" if the Standing Committee opposed a
nominee approved by the commissions, because the President could
rely upon the commission's recommendation and "remain insulated
from the negative impact of a poor ABA rating.

'182

The Carter Admin-

istration also may have diluted the influence of the Standing Committee when it solicited evaluations of the candidates' views concerning
racial, religious, and gender discrimination from the National Bar Association and the Federation of Women Lawyers."8 " Reliance upon the
Standing Committee also may have diminished since the Senate Judiciary Committee began to undertake its own independent investigation of
nominees. l 4 Despite these changes, however, the Standing Committee

contended that it maintained its influence during the Carter Administration to the extent that it improved its relations with the Senate Judiciary Committee and remained the principal source of information
concerning nominees and potential nominees.1 85 The Standing Committee also shifted its focus from screening potential nominees to reviewing
the qualifications of actual nominees.188
Although the Reagan Administration did not continue the circuit
court panels

17

and did not have direct contact with the National Bar

Association or the Federation of Women Lawyers, it did not rely entirely upon the ABA in assessing the quality of judicial candidates. As
part of its emphasis upon the ideology of nominees, the Reagan Administration internally conducted much of the judicial screening process.
The center of this process, the Office of Legal Policy, was systematized
180. Exec. Order No. 11,972, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1978). The order later was superceded by Exec.
Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1979).
181. Exec. Order No. 12,097, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1979).
182. Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: A Contemporary Assessment (pt. 1), 66 JUDICATURE 349, 353 (1983). Professor Elliot Slotnick pointed out that "[t]he
president held an advantage in any disagreement with the ABA's findings since his panels were
representative and included several attorneys from the region where an appointment was being
made while the ABA's depended on an investigation predominantely [sic] run by a single attorney
from the region." Id.
183. A. NEFF, supra note 177, at 45.
184. Id. at 42. The Judiciary Committee "hired investigators for this purpose and developed
a personal information questionnaire similar to those used by many individual senators and commissions, the Standing Committee, and [various] other organizations.

. .

."

Id.

185. See Slotnick, supra note 182, at 352-53. An ABA Standing Committee co-chairperson,
Brooksley Born, has contended that during the Carter Administration the Committee continued to
enjoy a "most favored status" because of the depth of its investigations. Id.
186. Id. at 353.
187. Exec. Order No. 12,305, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1982).
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to an unprecedented degree.18 8 As another major innovation, the Reagan Administration established the President's Committee on Federal
Judicial Selection, which conducted its own investigation of candidates,
independent of the Department of Justice's investigations.18 9 At the
district court level, senators in some states continued to consult nominating commissions in making recommendations to the President.'
One study of the judicial selection process at the end of President Ronald Reagan's first term in office, concluded that the Reagan Administration was "the first Republican Administration in 30 years in which the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
was not actively utilized and consulted in the pre-nomination stage."''
A follow-up study at the end of Reagan's second term concluded that
the Reagan Administration had a more distant relationship with the
Standing Committee than previous Republican administrations. 9 2 In
contrast to earlier practice, the Reagan Administration gave the Standing Committee only one name to evaluate for each vacancy, and there
were no close relations between Department of Justice officials and the
188. See S. WASBY, supra note 170, at 103-04; Goldman, Reagan's JudicialLegacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 319 (1989) (stating that "for the first time in
the history of judicial selection, all leading candidates for judicial positions were brought to Washington for extensive interview[s] by Justice Department [staff]"). The Reagan Administration also
carefully scrutinized the candidate's prior judicial record, writings, and speeches. S. WASBY, supra
note 170, at 103-04. For an analysis of the Reagan Administration's use of ideology in the selection
of judges, see H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS (1988).
189. See S. WASBY,supra note 170, at 199; Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary:The First
Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313, 315-16 (1985); Slotnick, Federal Judicial Recruitment
and Selection Research: A Review Essay, 71 JUDICATURE 317, 319 (1988). The committee "was
chaired by the counsel to the president and included the assistant to the president for personnel,
the assistant to the president for legislative affairs, the attorney general, the deputy attorney general, the deputy assistant attorney general, and the assistant attorney general for legal policy."
Goldman, supra note 188, at 320. Professor Sheldon Goldman concluded that at the end of Reagan's first term "[i]t is perhaps not an overstatement to observe that the formal mechanism of the
Committee has resulted in the most consistent ideologic or policy-orientation screening of judicial
candidates since the first term of Franklin Roosevelt." Id. at 315. Professor Goldman concluded at
the end of Reagan's second term that "[a]rguably, the Reagan administration was engaged in the
most systematic judicial philosophical screening of judicial candidates ever seen in the nation's
history." Id. at 319-20.
190. See Fowler, Judicial Selection Under Reagan and Carter:A Comparison of Their Initial Recommendation Procedures, 67 JUDICATURE 265, 269-73 (1984); S.WASBY, supra note 170, at
103.
191. Goldman, supra note 189, at 316. Professor Goldman has cautioned, however, that the
Reagan Administration's exclusion of the ABA from the prenomination process does not necessarily "suggest that relations were cool with the ABA Committee." Id. Goldman has found that the
Administration appears to have had a close working relationship with the Standing Committee
after the selection of nominees and that the Reagan Administration was concerned that its nominees receive high ABA ratings even if it was not willing to give the Committee "an opportunity to
influence the selection during the more fluid pre-nomination stage." Id.
192. Goldman, supra note 188, at 320.
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Committee chairperson. 193
Although it is too early to assess the Bush Administration's relationship with the Standing Committee, several significant events already have occurred. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh asked the
ABA to agree categorically to refrain from undertaking any consideration of a candidate's political or ideological views.194 In testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 2, 1989, Thornburgh
indicated that he was troubled particularly by the language of the June
1988 version of the Standing Committee's Brochure, which stated that
"[p]olitical or ideological philosophy are not considered, except to the
extent that they may bear upon other factors." 195 Thornburgh told the
Senate Judiciary Committee that the Standing Committee had complied with the Administration's request and had "seen fit to withdraw
from an area that was not only contentious, but in my view improper
for their consideration."19 Shortly after Thornburgh testified before
the Senate Committee, ABA president Robert Raven declared that
"[w]e have never gotten into political ideology, so there is no
change.119 7 In a May 8, 1989, letter to Thornburgh, Raven similarly in-

dicated that the Standing Committee had not considered the politics or
ideology of candidates.198 Thornburgh, however, continued to contend
that the language of the Standing Committee's Brochure indicated that
the Standing Committee was willing to make improper inquiries concerning political and ideological philosophy. 9 Raven announced in
June 1989 that the Committee, in order to correct misperceptions,
would delete the offending passage and add a sentence declaring that
2 00
"[p]olitical or ideological philosophy are not considered.

Despite the controversy between the ABA and the Department of
Justice concerning the Brochure, the Standing Committee was expected
193. Id.
194. Attorney General Thornburgh explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee during testimony on June 2, 1989, that "I and others have been disturbed that during this decade the
[Standing] Committee has extended its inquiry in[to] areas which I believe are more properly left
to the administration and the legislative branch." American Bar Association NominationProcess:
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter ABA
Hearings] (official printing not yet available; unofficial copy of testimony on file with Author)
(statement of Richard Thornburgh, United States Attorney General).
195. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
196. ABA Hearings, supra note 194.
197. Id., quoted in A.B.A. to Resume Rating of Judicial Nominees, N.Y. Times, June 3,
1989, at 9, col. 1.
198. Letter from Robert Raven to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh (May 8, 1989) (provided to Author by Senate Judiciary Committee).
199. ABA Hearings, supra note 194.
200. Raven stated that "[alny implication that the change we have agreed upon is to correct
improper activity, rather than misperceptions, would do a grave injustice to the committee." Id.,
quoted in A.B.A. to Resume Rating Judicial Nominees, supra note 197.
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to enjoy a more prominent role in the Bush Administration when
Thornburgh chose Robert B. Fiske, a former chairman of the Standing
Committee, to be Deputy Attorney General. Fiske's association with the
Standing Committee, however, led conservatives to oppose Fiske's nomination. On July 6, 1989, Fiske withdrew from consideration because of
the likelihood of a "prolonged controversy" concerning his role on the
Standing Committee. 01 Earlier, at the Senate hearings on June 2, 1989,
Thornburgh explained that "[w]e seek the input, under appropriate circumstances, of the American Bar Association particularly on professional qualifications. But our doors are open to any individual or group
that wants to express an opinion."202
B. The ABA Case
1. Antecedents
The high level of influence that professional organizations have exercised in the judicial selection process has long assured the emergence
of critics who allege that such influence is excessive. In 1912, for example, Theodore Roosevelt made the following observation regarding state
judicial nominations:
If a judge were only to deal with lawyers, then it would be right to consider
primarily the view that the various Bar Associations may take of [a judicial nomination]. But judges deal not only with individual rights of men and women, but
under the American system of government they deal with the fundamental rights of
men and women in masses, with the right of the people to secure social justice.
From this standpoint the interest of the local Bar Association or the local Chamber
of Commerce is no more important than the interest of the labor union or the
grange, than the interest of the individual clerk, or retail trader, or wage-worker, or
small farmer. 03

The ABA's immense influence in the judicial selection process has
made it a particular target of criticism. In 1979, for example, the Judicial Selection Project, a broadly based interest group that monitored
judicial recruitment procedures, declared that it objected "to the quasiofficial status that is sometimes given to that committee and to its recommendations."20 4 A popular study of the federal judiciary earlier in
201. Wines, Thornburgh Abandons Choice for Top Justice Post, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at
Al, col. 2 (nat'l ed.).
202. ABA Hearings,supra note 194.
203. Roosevelt, The Judges, the Lawyers, and the People, 101 OuTLOOK 1003, 1004 (Aug. 31,
1912).
204. See Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 71 (1979) (testimony of Charles Halpern). At the
same hearings, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont remarked that "[w]ith all due respect to the
American Bar Association, there have been some who have suggested that their very significant
role in determining the qualification of judges has been on some occasions like Jack the Ripper
determining the qualifications of surgeons ....

."

Id. at 10.
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the 1970s had alleged that "the ABA wants to exercise professional
birth control over the judiciary, but not take full responsibility for do05
'2
ing so."

The Standing Committee's harshest critics traditionally have been
liberals, who have contended that the ABA's views on judicial selection
reflect the conservative biases of the elite corporate practitioners who
allegedly dominate the ABA. 20 6 During the Reagan Administration,

however, the Standing Committee began to attract the ire of conservatives. The emergence of conservative hostility toward the ABA is attributable to the ascendancy of ideological conservatism during the Reagan
Administration and also may be related to changes within the ABA itself. The political views of the judicial candidates favored by the government shifted toward the right at the very time that the political tone
of the ABA may have grown more liberal. 07 In contrast to previous administrations, the Reagan Administration favored judicial candidates
whose political and judicial views often were even more conservative
than the views that traditionally have prevailed among the ABA leadership. Meanwhile, the ABA's apparent attempts to diversify the political
complexion of the membership of the ABA Standing Committee may
have made the Standing Committee more sympathetic to liberal judicial candidates. By the middle years of the Reagan Administration, conservatives had begun to complain that political considerations had
motivated the Standing Committee to express reservations about some
qualified conservative candidates and to block the nominations of
others.20 8 The Committee members' practice of consulting with repre205. J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 40 (1972).
206. D. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETr REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE
ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 93 (1988).
207. Although generalizations about the ABA's political character are highly problematical,
many conservatives have alleged that the ABA is increasingly liberal. For example, one recent
article stated that "[allong with many of the large law firms that are still the chief source of its
leadership, the ABA has changed from stuffed-shirt conservative to stuffed-shirt liberal." Allen,
Judgment Day for a Judging Panel, INSIGHT, Mar. 20, 1989, at 47.
208. In 1985 conservative activists at the Washington Legal Foundation alleged that the
"Committee has successfully blocked the nomination of well-qualified conservative lawyers and
delayed the appointment of such leading constitutional scholars as J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the
University of Virginia" and "effectively . . . side-tracked" the confirmation of other conservative
scholars, including Professors Lino Graglia of the University of Texas and William Harvey of Indiana University. Popeo & Kamenar, Behind Closed Doors: How the ABA Vetoes JudicialNominations, 2 BENCHMARK 11 (1986); see also Dwyer, Picking Federal Judges: Is the ABA Too Powerful?,
Bus. WK., June 9, 1986, at 78. Professor Graglia contends that the ABA blocked his nomination
because he was a longtime opponent of affirmative action and forced busing for school integration.
See Allen, supra note 207, at 47. Similarly, Senator Gordon J. Humphrey of New Hampshire has
contended that the ABA appears to have blocked Professor Harvey's nomination to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1985 because the ABA disapproved of his leadership of the Legal
Services Corp., especially his reduction in funding for the ABA's Fund for Public Education. Harvey withdrew his name from consideration after delays in the ABA's investigation. Humphrey, End
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sentatives of liberal groups particularly aroused the ire of conservatives.
Even prior to promulgation of the controversial 1980 guidelines, Committee members met regularly with representatives of NOW, the
ACLU, and other liberal groups.2 0 9 After Reagan became President, the
Committee began to send names of potential nominees to People for
the American Way, a group that had announced its intention to oppose
conservative judicial nominees, and the Alliance for Justice, an umbrella group of twenty-six liberal organizations that established its own
Judicial Selection Project in 1985.210
The tension between the ABA and conservatives intensified when
the Standing Committee failed to endorse Bork overwhelmingly. For
the first time since the Standing Committee began evaluating Supreme
Court nominees, a substantial minority of the Standing Committee
found that a nominee was "Not Qualified." Ten members voted that
Bork was "Well Qualified," four members declared that he was "Not
Qualified," and one member voted "Not Opposed."2' 1 1 The ABA's response to the Bork nomination renewed senatorial criticism of the
ABA's role. During the hearings on Bork and Kennedy, conservative
senators questioned the propriety of the ABA's part in the judicial selection process. Senator Alan Simpson told an ABA representative that
"somehow the [ABA] has become a bigger player tha[n] they should be
here ....
We do not have a hearing until we have had the word from
the ABA, and I don't think it's right ... ."I" Similarly, Senator
Gordon Humphrey observed that "[t]he ABA is taken very seriously,
perhaps too seriously by the public, and the Senate" in the judicial selection process.213
ABA Role As Hanging Judge, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1989, at A14, col. 3. Senator Humphrey also
contends that "[t]here is good reason to believe that the ABA's scrutiny of James Graham's religious beliefs was an improper factor in the inexplicably low rating he received in 1986 when he was
nominated for the federal district court in Ohio." Id. Likewise, Arthur Schwab, an attorney in
Philadelphia, has alleged that the ABA blocked his nomination because of hostility toward his
conservative political and religious views. Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1989, at A22, col. 1. Similarly, Senator Charles Grassley has alleged that the Standing Committee's political biases explain why the
Committee accorded no better than a "Qualified" ranking to the eminent conservative legal scholars Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and Ralph K. Winter, all of whom were confirmed nevertheless. Grassley, Judging the Judges: A Memo to the ABA, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Feb. 11,
1988, at 15, col. 1.
209. See Allen, supra note 207, at 47.
210. Id.
211. BORK REPORT, supra note 157, at 4. Prior to the Bork nomination, Rehnquist in 1971
and Haynsworth in 1969 were the only nominees to receive less than unanimous approval from the
Standing Committee. Three members declared that they were "not opposed" to Rehnquist, id.,
and the second vote on Haynsworth was eight to four, id.
212. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 120, at 276. Senator Simpson concluded that the Senate
should blame itself for the ABA's excessive role. Id.
213. Bork Hearings, supra note 121, at 943.
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In view of the growing conservative hostility toward the Standing
Committee, it is not so ironic that the first legal challenge to the ABA's
arrangement with the government was brought by a conservative public
interest group, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF). In 1985, prior
to the Bork nomination, the WLF commenced an action against the
ABA for a judgment declaring that the Standing Committee's procedures violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 14 and the
Freedom of Information Act. 15 The WLF alleged that the Standing
Committee constituted an "advisory committee"2 16 as defined by FACA
and that the Committee, therefore, was required to: 1) provide reasonable advance public notice of its meetings; 2) open its meetings to the
public; 3) provide the plaintiff and the public with access to the Committee's records; and 4) recompose the membership of the Committee
so that it was fairly balanced in terms of points of view represented.2 1"
Although the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
ruled that the WLF had standing to bring the suit based on allegations
that it had been "directly affected" by the Standing Committee's lack
of balance, the court dismissed the lawsuit because FACA does not authorize a private party to bring an action against a private, preexisting
group that has not been established, appointed, and financed by the
government.2 1 8 Although the WLF lost the suit, it won something of a
victory when the ABA Committee agreed in the wake of the lawsuit to
discontinue its practice of passing candidates' names to liberal
219
groups.
2.

The District Court's Decision

Prior to dismissal of its case, the WLF and a liberal public interest
group, the Public Citizen Litigation Group, commenced an action
against the Department of Justice in the same court for the same relief
sought in the earlier action, except that the plaintiffs did not allege that
FACA required a balance of membership. In an August 1988 opinion,
the district court held that while the Standing Committee was an "advisory committee" within the meaning of FACA, application of FACA
to the Standing Committee would violate the separation of powers doc214. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
215. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
216. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (1988).
217. Complaint for the Washington Legal Foundation para. 1, Washington Legal Found. v.
ABA Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 85-3918).
218. Washington Legal Found. v. ABA Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary (WLF I), 648 F.
Supp. 1353, 1358, 1361 (D.D.C. 1986).
219. See Allen, supra note 207.
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trine and the President's constitutional power of appointment.2 2
The court first found that the ABA Standing Committee fit
squarely within FACA's definition of an "advisory committee":
any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other
similar group... which is-...
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies,
in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or
more agencies or officers of the Federal Government .... 221

Although the government obviously did not establish the ABA Standing
Committee, the district court had no trouble finding that the Department of Justice clearly "utilized" the Standing Committee "by directly
and preferentially soliciting its assistance and recommendation on judicial nominees. '222 The court also found that the ABA Standing Committee fit squarely within the General Services Administration's (GSA)
definition of a committee utilized by FACA.223 The court explained that
the "Committee's historically lengthy, direct, and significant relationship with DOJ in the evaluation process has clearly made it a preferred
source of advice in the nomination process." The court observed that
the "relationship between DOJ and the ABA Committee is mutual, direct, and to a large extent exclusive" because nominees are directed by
the Department of Justice to submit personal information to the ABA
on an ABA-designed questionnaire; the ABA Standing Committee is
the only nongovernmental entity that routinely receives from the Department of Justice the names of potential nominees in advance of public announcement; and the ABA Standing Committee first reports
confidentially to the Department of Justice and reports only later, and
publicly, to the Senate. 2 4 Finally, the court rejected the defendant's
220. Washington Legal Found. v. United States Dep't of Justice (WLF II), 691 F. Supp. 483,
490, 496 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S.Ct.
2558 (1989).
221. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (1988).
222. WLF II, 691 F. Supp. at 488. The court contended that the statute's legislative history,
although not "greatly illuminating," also supported a liberal interpretation of the word "utilized."
Id.
223. In regulations promulgated by the GSA under FACA, a committee "utilized" under
FACA is defined as follows:
a committee or other group composed in whole or in part of other than full-time officers or
employees of the Federal Government with an established existence outside the agency seeking its advice which the President or agency official(s) adopts, such as through institutional
arrangements, as a preferred source from which to obtain advice or recommendations on a
specific issue or policy within the scope of his or her responsibilities in the same manner as
that individual would obtain advice or recommendations from an established advisory
committee.
41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1988).
224. WLF II, 691 F. Supp. at 488-89.
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argument that Congress did not intend FACA to cover the ABA
Committee.2 2 5
After concluding that the plain language of FACA, its legislative
history, its purpose, and GSA's interpretation of the Act all supported
the conclusion that the Standing Committee was subject to the requirements of FACA, the court invoked a balancing test in order to determine whether the application of FACA would disrupt the proper
balance between the coordinate branches of government. Affirming that
the clear language of the Constitution assigns the President exclusive
power over the nomination of federal judges,22 6 the court concluded
that the "obvious and significant potential" for disruption of the President's constitutional prerogative during the nomination process was not
justified by any overriding congressional need to apply FACA. According to the court, "the application of FACA to the ABA Committee
would potentially inhibit the President's freedom to investigate, to 2be
27
informed, to evaluate, and to consult during the nomination process.
The court contended that the application of FACA would discourage

the Department of Justice from consulting the ABA or would discourage the ABA Standing Committee from continuing to perform the ser-

vice of investigating

and

evaluating

potential

federal judicial

nominees. 2 1 The court explained that public accountability, the purpose for which FACA was intended, was satisfied through the confirmation proceedings, when the Senate Judiciary Committee has the
opportunity to question a representative from the ABA Standing Committee and to request additional information. The court further pointed
225. Id. at 489-90. The court concluded that the legislative history of the statute evinced a
broad purpose "to control the advisory committee process and to open to public scrutiny the manner in which government agencies obtain advice from private individuals and groups." Id. at 490
(quoting HLI Lordship Indus., Inc. v. Committee for Purchase from the Blind, 615 F. Supp. 970,
978 (E.D. Va. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 791 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1986)). The court also pointed
out that FACA itself mentions few exceptions based on the nature of the organization giving the
advice and that the statute specifically excludes only groups established or utilized by the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Reserve System, and "any local civic groups whose primary function is that of rendering a public service with respect to a Federal program." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.
app. § 4(c) (1988)) (emphasis in original).
226. Id. at 491. The court explained that the exclusivity of the President's prerogative in this
area, as mandated by art. II, § 2, cl.2 of the Constitution, "is democratically tolerable. . . because
of the checking function performed by the Senate." Id. at 492.
227. Id. at 493.
228. Id. The court contended that the "unique need for confidentiality in the initial stages of
evaluating the professional qualifications of potential nominees for federal judgeships distinguishes
this case from others where the public interest would be served by full disclosure throughout the
agency's decisionmaking process." Id. at 495. The court explained that investigation of an individual's competence, integrity, and temperament, in contrast to ordinary policy research and analysis,
"is inevitably a sensitive undertaking and it would normally evoke forthright, critical comments
that would not otherwise be provided to decisionmakers were the comments to be made public."
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out that other groups and individuals also have an opportunity to present their own views on the nominee and to differ with the ABA Standing Committee concerning the nominee's qualifications and that the
Senate is free to reject advice from the ABA and others." 9
3.

The Supreme Court's Decision

In a decision on June 21, 1989, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaints of the WLF and
the Public Citizen Litigation Group. 3 0 Unlike the district court, however, the Supreme Court held that the ABA Standing Committee is not
an "advisory committee" within the meaning of FACA. Accordingly, the
Court did not address the separation of powers issue. A concurring
opinion by Justice Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor vigorously disputed the majority's contention that FACA
does not cover the Justice Department's use of the ABA Standing Committee, but concluded that application of FACA would violate the appointments clause of the Constitution. 21
In a remarkable exercise of statutory interpretation, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court took pains to explain why Congress could
not have intended the result that the plain language of the statute
seemed to compel. Although the Court acknowledged that the plain language of the statute favored FACA's application to the consultations
between the Justice Department and the ABA Standing Committee, the
Court determined that various clues from the legislative history collectively provided minimally sufficient support for the Court's conclusion
that Congress did not intend for FACA to cover such consultations.3 2
With a diffidence rarely seen in Supreme Court decisions but richly justified under the circumstances, Justice Brennan concluded that "it
seems to us a close question whether FACA should be construed to apply to the ABA Committee, although on the whole we are fairly confident it should not. ' 233 Justice Brennan declared, however, that doubts
about the constitutionality of applying the statute tipped the scales decisively against its application. 23 4
229. Id. at 495-96.
230. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989), afg WLF II,
691 F. Supp. at 483.
231. Id. at 2573 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia recused himself, apparently because
he had helped to draft a memorandum to the ABA concerning the ABA's duties and responsibilities under FACA in 1974 when he was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal
Counsel. Brief for Washington Legal Found. at 5 n.3, Washington Legal Found. v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989) (No. 88-494).
232. See Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2572.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2572-73.
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In construing FACA, the Court acknowledged that the executive
branch obviously "utilizes" the ABA Standing Committee in one common sense of the word. The Court expressed its belief, however, that
"utilize" is "a woolly verb, its contours left undefined by the statute
itself. 23 5 The Court warned that a literal reading of the word would

extend FACA's requirements to any group of two or more persons, or at
least any formal organization, from which the President seeks advice.
FACA, therefore, would require the filing of a charter, the presence of a
controlling federal official, and detailed minutes any time the President
sought the views of the NAACP before nominating Commissioners to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or asked the leader of
an American Legion Post for the organization's opinion on some aspect
of military policy.236 The Court likewise declared that "[n]or can Congress have meant-as a straightforward reading of 'utilize' would appear to require-that all of FACA's restrictions apply if a President
consults with his own political party before picking his Cabinet."2 7 The
Court explained:
FACA was enacted to cure specific ills, above all the wasteful expenditure of public
funds for worthless committee meetings and biased proposals; although its reach is
extensive, we cannot believe that it was intended to cover every formal and informal consultation
between the President or an Executive agency and a group ren2 8
dering advice. 8

Because the Court thought that a literal reading of the statute would
"compel an odd result," the Court believed that it was appropriate to
probe the intentions of Congress. 3 9
The Court traced FACA's use of the word "utilize" to a 1962 executive order2 40 containing provisions similar to those that Congress later
incorporated into FACA. The Court could discern no indication that
the executive order was intended to apply to the Justice Department's
consultations with the ABA Standing Committee. The Court observed
235. Id. at 2565.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2565-66.
239. Id. at 2566 (quoting Green v. Buck Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1984 (1989)).
The Court explained that "[l]ooking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when
the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress'
intention ....
Id. The Court stated that close attention to FACA's history particularly was helpful because "FACA did not flare on the legislative scene with the suddenness of a meteor." Id. at
2567.
The Court quoted Judge Learned Hand's observation that "it is one of the surest indexes of a
mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Id. at 2566 (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), afl'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
240. Exec. Order No. 11,007, 3 C.F.R. 573 (1962).
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that none of the three Presidents who acted under the terms of the
executive order between 1962 and 1972 deemed the Standing Committee to be "utilized" by the Department of Justice within the meaning of
the order.2 41 Although the Court acknowledged that FACA's legislative

history evinces a congressional intent to widen the scope of the executive order's definition of an "advisory committee," there "is scant reason to believe that Congress desired to bring the ABA Committee
within FACA's net.

'242

The Court's review of the House bill on FACA

led it to conclude:
There is no indication in the Report that a purely private group like the ABA Committee that was not formed by the Executive, accepted no public funds, and assisted the Executive in performing a constitutionally specified task committed to
the Executive was within the terms of Executive Order 11007 or
was the type of
243
advisory entity that legislation was urgently needed to address.

Similarly, the Court found that while a Senate report manifested a
clear intention not to restrict FACA's coverage to advisory committees
that are financed by the federal government, it did not indicate any
desire to make all private advisory committees subject to FACA.244 The
Court also was unpersuaded by the GSA regulations upon which the
district court had relied. The Court explained that the definition of
"advisory committee" from the GSA regulations was "too sweeping to
be read without qualification"; the GSA had failed to list the ABA as an
agency covered by FACA in any of the GSA's seventeen annual reports
listing advisory committees covered by FACA; the GSA regulations
were published only in 1983 and therefore were not contemporaneous
with FACA; and the GSA regulations were not entitled to a high level
of deference because they were not promulgated pursuant to express
241. See Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2568.
242. Id. The Court explained:
FACA's principal purpose was to enhance the public accountability of advisory committees
established by the Executive Branch and to reduce wasteful expenditures on them. That purpose could be accomplished, however, without expanding the coverage of Executive Order
11007 to include privately organized committees that received no federal funds. Indeed, there
is considerable evidence that Congress sought nothing more than stricter compliance with
reporting and other requirements-which were made more stringent-by advisory committees
already covered by the Order and similar treatment of a small class of publicly funded groups
created by the President.
Id. (emphasis in original).
243. Id. at 2569.
244. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972)). The Court observed that the
examples of advisory committees offered by the Senate Report were limited to groups organized by
or closely tied to the federal government, and thus enjoying quasi-public status. The Court concluded that "[g]iven the prominence of the ABA Committee's role and its familiarity to Members
of Congress, its omission from the list of groups formed and maintained by private initiative to
offer advice with respect to the President's nomination of government officials is telling." Id. at
2570.
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statutory authority. 245 The Court concluded that the serious constitutional issues involved in applying FACA to the ABA Committee provided a stronger basis for its decision than the admitted weakness of its
statutory exegesis alone would afford.246
4.

The Concurring Opinion

In his astringent concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Court's decision "seems sensible in the abstract," but he
contended that the Court's method of interpreting the application of
FACA "does not accord proper respect to the finality and binding effect
of legislative enactments" and that he could not "go along with the 2un47
healthy process of amending the statute by judicial interpretation. 1
Kennedy asserted that the Court had failed to demonstrate that a plain
reading of the statutory language would compel such an absurd result
so as to enable the Court under canons of statutory interpretation to
disregard the statute's literal language. Because the language of FACA
was unambiguous and the application of FACA to the ABA Standing
Committee would not be patently absurd, Kennedy contended that "it
does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage
through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation
in order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with
which the Court is more comfortable. '24s According to Kennedy, the
245. Id. at 2571 n.12. Kennedy disputed each of the four reasons that the Court gave for
slighting the GSA regulations. He dismissed the Court's concern that the language of the regulations was too sweeping as another example of the Court's failure to adhere to the plain language of
a text. Second, Kennedy argued that the GSA's failure to list the ABA Committee among the
advisory committees covered by FACA is not determinative because the GSA's awareness of the
applicability of the statute is irrelevant. Similarly, Kennedy perceived no relevance in the fact the
GSA regulations were not added until 1983, and he stated:
[I]f anything one would think that the GSA's regulation should be entitled to more deference
than a regulation promulgated immediately after the passage of a bill, for at least in the
situation we have here, we can have some assurance that GSA thought long and hard, based
upon considerable experience and the benefits of extensive notice and comment, before it
promulgated an administrative rule that has the binding force of law.
Id. at 2579 (Kennedy, J., concurring)(emphasis in original). Finally, Kennedy contended that "the
Court errs in suggesting that the GSA's regulations are mere nonbinding administrative guidelines" because the GSA has statutory authority to implement FACA. Id. at 2580.
246. The Court presented the following explanation:
Where the competing arguments based on FACA's text and legislative history, though
both plausible, tend to show that Congress did not desire FACA to apply to the Justice Department's confidential solicitation of the ABA Committee's views on prospective judicial
nominees, sound sense counsels adherence to our rule of caution. Our unwillingness to resolve
important constitutional questions unnecessarily thus solidifies our conviction that FACA is
inapplicable.
Id. at 2573.
247. Id. at 2573-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 2576. Kennedy observed:
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fact that the executive branch utilizes the ABA Committee in the common sense of the word "utilizes" should "end the matter" of any question concerning the facial application of the statute.249
Denouncing the Court's "one-sided" review of legislative history,
Kennedy first argued that executive practice prior to the enactment of
FACA was of questionable relevance because Congress would have had
little reason to enact any statute if it had intended FACA to be nothing
more than a codification of the provisions of Executive Order No.
11,007.250 Kennedy also criticized the Court for "its narrow preoccupation with the ABA Committee" because the statute "was intended to
provide comprehensive legislation covering a widespread problem in the
organization and operation of the Federal Government. 25 1 Although
the Court noted that Congress did not mention or discuss the ABA
Committee specifically in the legislative history of the FACA,252 Kennedy pointed out that this omission hardly was surprising because the
FACA was enacted at a time when between 1800 and 3200 target committees existed and the congressional report mentioned few committees
by name. Moreover, Kennedy emphasized that Congress usually legislates by setting forth broad principles rather than by specifying examples. Finally, Kennedy concluded that the legislative purpose of FACA
as set forth in the Conference Committee Report demonstrates that it
should apply to the Standing Committee. 53 Justice Kennedy declared
that it was "most striking" that the Court had not mentioned these
It comes as a surprise to no one that the result of the Court's lengthy journey through the
legislative history is the discovery of a congressional intent not to include the activities of the
ABA Committee within the coverage of FACA. The problem with spirits is that they tend to
reflect less the views of the world whence they come than the views of those who seek their
advice.
Id. Kennedy observed that "[r]eluctance to working with the basic meaning of words in a normal
manner undermines the legal process. This case demonstrates that reluctance of this sort leads
instead to woolly judicial construction that mars the plain face of legislative enactments." Id. at
2574.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 2576-77.
251. Id. at 2577.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1403, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972)). The Report stated
that: 1) the need for many existing advisory committees had not adequately been reviewed; 2) new
advisory committees should be established only when they are determined to be essential and their
number should be kept to the minimum necessary; 3) advisory committees should be terminated
when they no longer are carrying out the purposes for which they were established; 4) standards
and uniform procedures should govern the establishment, operation, administration, and duration
of advisory committees; 5) Congress and the public should be kept informed with respect to the
number, purpose, membership, activities, and cost of advisory committees; and 6) the function of
advisory committees should be only advisory, and that all matters under their consideration should
be determined, in accordance with law, by the agency or officer involved. Id.

1990]

JUDICIAL SELECTION

stated purposes "on its amble through the legislative history." 54 Kennedy likewise faulted the Court for failing to accord appropriate deference to the GSA's regulations. Like the district court, Kennedy
concluded that the GSA's definition of a "utilized" advisory committee
fit the ABA Standing Committee. Indeed, Kennedy declared that "I
cannot imagine a better description of the function of the ABA
Committee." 55
Despite Kennedy's conclusion that the ABA Standing Committee is
an advisory committee within the meaning of FACA, he concluded that
"the application of FACA in this context would be a plain violation of
the [a]ppointments [c]lause of the Constitution." Kennedy explained
that the appointments clause vests the President with the sole power to
nominate, leaving the Senate with only the power to grant or withhold
its advice and consent. Kennedy averred that neither the Senate nor
the Congress as a whole has a role in the nomination process.2 56 Kennedy contended that recent separation of powers cases in which the
2 57
Court has weighed the degree of intrusion on the President's power
were inapposite because the power at issue in those cases was not explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution. Kennedy explained
that the Court has refused to sanction any intrusion into the Executive
domain where "the Constitution by explicit text commits the power at
issue to the exclusive control of the President ... .258
254. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 2578.
256. Kennedy quoted Alexander Hamilton's observation in The Federalistthat "[i]n the act
of nomination [the President's] judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole
duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment." Id. at 2581 (emphasis added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (A. Hamilton)). Similarly, Kennedy quoted another
of Hamilton's essays, in which Hamilton explained:
It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to appoint. There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate.
They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they
cannot themselves choose-they can only ratify or reject the choice he may have made.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 66 (A. Hamilton)).
257. Id. (referring to Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)).
258. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974)); see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1872). Kennedy relied in particular upon Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which he
read to recognize the exclusivity of the President's power to nominate federal officials. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 3583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Buckley the Court held that the appointment
of Federal Election Commissioners through procedures that were inconsistent with those set forth
in the appointments clause was unconstitutional. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124-37. Kennedy stated that
the Court explicitly had rejected arguments advanced by the Federal Election Commission and
various amici that Congress could avoid the strict letter of the appointments clause because Congress had plenary authority to regulate elections and had good reason for not creating a commission entirely composed of presidential appointees.
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Criticism of the Majority and Concurring Opinions

Although Justice Brennan properly concluded that the question of
whether FACA applies on its face to the ABA Standing Committee is
not simple, Justice Kennedy's resolution of that issue is a more appropriate method of statutory construction. If one accepts the premise that
application of FACA would not compel an absurd result, the plain language of FACA must control its interpretation in the absence of any
legislative history or other extrinsic sources that convincingly demonstrate that FACA should not apply. As the majority opinion correctly
recognized, the threshold issue of the statute's facial applicability cannot be separated from the separation of powers issue because resolution
of the question of whether the application of the statute would unconstitutionally impinge on the President's powers helps to determine
whether the prima facie application of the statute would be absurd.
In analyzing the separation of powers questions, the majority and
concurring opinions of the Supreme Court and the opinion of the district court adopted an improperly wooden view of the appointments
clause and an unnecessarily rigid conception of the practical effects of
requiring the ABA Standing Committee to comply with the requirements of FACA. A proper analysis of the appointments clause and the
probable impact of the application of FACA demonstrates that neither
the formalist view of separation of powers invoked by Justice Kennedy
nor the functionalist approach employed by the district court would
preclude the application of the statute to the ABA Committee. 5 9
Kennedy explained:
The justification for our refusal to apply a balancing test in these cases, though not always
made explicit, is clear enough. Where a power has been committed to a particular Branch of
the Government in the text of the Constitution, the balance already has been struck by the
Constitution itself. It is improper for this Court to arrogate to itself the power to adjust a
balance settled by the explicit terms of the Constitution.
Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
259: For a discussion of the competing formalist and functionalist methods of resolving separation of powers issues in the context of the ABA's role, see Note, The American Bar Association
and JudicialNominees: Advice Without Consent?, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 550, 566-68 (1989). Formalist
analysis adheres to a strict distinction between the functions, powers, and duties of the three
branches of government and regards as unconstitutional any incursion of one branch into the powers allocated to another branch. The functionalist view holds that a balancing test may be appropriate in certain instances in which the relations between the branches are fluid. Id. The
appellants in the ABA case urged the Court to employ a functionalist analysis. See Brief of Appellant Public Citizen at 32-42, Public Citizen (No. 88-429); Brief for Washington Legal Foundation
at 26-29, Washington Legal Found. v. ABA Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp.
1353 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 85-3918). The appellants relied heavily upon Mistretta v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 647 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In upholding the GSA's statutory power to control the disposition of
presidential records, the Court in Nixon rejected the "archaic view of the separation of powers as
requiring three airtight departments of government." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443 (quoting Nixon v.
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Justice Kennedy's dichotomy between the President's power to
nominate and the Senate's power to advise and consent is unduly stark.
His reliance upon Hamilton's observation that the Senate itself has no
power of choice is misplaced because Hamilton's observation merely
states the obvious. Justice Kennedy ignores the close interaction between the President and the Senate that characterizes the appointment
process. Although the Constitution vests the power of nomination in
the President, the President is hardly oblivious to the need to select a
person whom the Senate will approve. Accordingly, Presidents have
sometimes tested the waters on Capitol Hill by consulting senators
about their reactions to possible Supreme Court nominees and frequently have admitted that their choice was influenced by the political
exigencies of the confirmation process. 2 60 Moreover, the President's selection of lower federal court judges, especially district court judges,
and other federal officials long has been dictated by the tradition of
senatorial courtesy, which virtually obliges the President to follow the
recommendation of the members of Congress in the state or states in
which the judge or officer will preside.261
Just as the President does not make a selection in isolation, so the
Senate takes many factors into account in deciding whether to confirm
the President's nominee. Although there is considerable disagreement
about the exact parameters of the Senate's role, a fairly broad consenAdministrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976)). The Court in Nixon declared
that "in determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate
branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." Id. at 443 (citing United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)). In Morrison the Court held that Title VI of the Ethics of Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. V 1987), did not violate separation of powers. Morrison, 108
S. Ct. 2616-22, and the Court in Mistretta upheld the constitutionality of placing the United
States Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch and having judges serve on the Commission. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 658-73. Justice Kennedy distinguished Nixon on the ground that the
Executive Branch's power to control the disposition of presidential papers "is not given to exclusive Presidential control by any explicit provision in the Constitution itself." Public Citizen, 109 S.
Ct. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly, Kennedy distinguished Morrison on the ground
that the President's power to remove executive officers "is not conferred by any explicit provision
in the text of the Constitution . . . ." Id.
260. See, e.g., Boyd, Bork Nomination to Court Weighed by the President,N.Y. Times, June
30, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
261. The tradition of senatorial courtesy dates from 1795, when the Senate surprised President Washington by rejecting a highly qualified nominee for a naval position in Savannah because
Georgia's two senators preferred a different candidate. In acquiescing to this new protocol, President Washington sent a message to the Senate requesting that it spare him further embarrassment
by making its choices known in advance of nominations. J. HARRIS, supra note 53, at 40-41. The
tradition of senatorial courtesy with respect to judicial nominees dates at least from 1801, when
members of the congressional delegations from New York, Connecticut, and Vermont took the
initiative in recommending potential nominees for a circuit court judgeship. R. SWANSTRoM, THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 1787-1801, S. Doc. No. 19, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1985).
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sus exists that the Senate may scrutinize more than a nominee's professional competence and integrity. Accordingly, the roles of the President
and the Senate are complementary even though they are distinct."'
Far from thwarting the intention of the Framers of the appointments clause, applying FACA to the ABA Standing Committee actually
would facilitate their vision of the judicial appointment process, so far
as we may presume to discern such intentions. It would be a mistake to
assign much value to our poor ability to divine any clear legislative intent from the highly ambiguous evidence at the Constitutional Convention and Alexander Hamilton's rather murky discussions of the
appointments power in The Federalist.Those records, however, do suggest that the Framers expected that the Senate, in Hamilton's words,
"would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity."2' 6 3 Because many Framers
originally had vested the appointment power in both houses of Congress or the Senate, the Framers may have envisioned a fairly active
role for the Senate in giving advice and consent. The application of
FACA, therefore, would facilitate the role of the Senate as the Framers
envisioned to the extent that it would help the Senate to comprehend
the reasons behind the ABA's recommendations. As Public Citizen Litigation Group argued in its brief to the Supreme Court,
[s]ince the ABA Committee's recommendations have become a vital link in the
chain of appointment, and are used by the Senate itself in reviewing nominations, a
statutory scheme that furthers the Senate's understanding of the role and processes
of the ABA Committee will certainly place the Senate in a better position to perform its advice and consent function effectively." 4

The debates at the Constitutional Convention also demonstrate
that the Framers were concerned that the process would ensure accountability to the public.2 6 5 Similarly, Alexander Hamilton in The
262. As one observer recently concluded:

Regardless of the proper intensity of Senate scrutiny in its nomination hearings, it seems that
the appointments clause does not freeze into place executive or legislative roles, but requires
participation from each branch, which indicates that a functional approach is appropriate.
The only boundaries that flow from the clause are that the President must name the nominee
and the Senate must act as a powerful check on that choice.
Note, supra note 259, at 568.
263. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
264. Brief for Appellant Public Citizen at 31, Public Citizen (No. 88-429).

265. For example, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts had favored giving the appointment
power to the President because he believed that the President "would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone," J. MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (1984), and that "[p]ublic bodies
feel no personal responsibility, and give full play to intrigue [and] cabal," id. at 315. Gunning
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Federalist derogated the highly clandestine process by which judges
were appointed in a number of the states. 6 6 The application of FACA,
therefore, would be consistent with the intention of the Framers because it would help to ensure that the nomination is subject to greater
public scrutiny. As the Public Citizen Litigation Group observed in its
brief, the Framers' concern for public accountability "certainly coincides with the objectives of FACA, which. . . seek to ensure that governmental advisory bodies, consisting of private individuals who are not
otherwise accountable to the public, are held to minimum standards of
267
public access and accountability.
Just as the language and history of the appointments clause does
not warrant an invocation of the formalist view of separation of powers,
the functionalist theory of separation of powers also provides no support for the conclusion that FACA should not apply to the ABA Standing Committee. The functionalist arguments against applying the
statute, expressed by the district court and the Government's brief to
the Supreme Court, and implied by Justice Brennan's opinion, rest
upon the unwarranted premise that the application of the statute seriously would impede the President's ability to obtain confidential, accurate, and objective advice that is critical to the ability to select a judge.
An examination of the actual nature of the appointments process, the
workings of the ABA Standing Committee, and the impact of FACA's
application demonstrates that no factual basis exists for such fears.
Functionalist arguments against the application of FACA tend to
ignore the fact that the ABA Standing Committee is only one of many
sources available to the President in making a selection. The legislative
history of FACA demonstrates that any advisory committee that has
assumed a quasi-public status in the deliberation of important issues
should be subjected to public scrutiny.2 6'8 The Department of Justice
Bedford, however, contended that "[t]he responsibility of the Executive so much talked of was
chimerical. He could not be punished for mistakes." Id. at 316. Charles Pinckney worried that the
President would lack the "confidence of the people for so high a trust." Id. at 344. The issue of
public accountability also arose during the final debate on the appointments clause, when

Gouverneur Morris stated that as "the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility,
and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security." Id. at 598.
266. Hamilton explained:
The council of appointment consists of from three to five persons, of whom the governor is
always one. This small body, shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to the public eye,
proceed[s] to the execution of the trust committed to them. It is known that the governor
claims the right of nomination. . .; but it is not known to what extent, or in what manner he
exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is contradicted or opposed . . . .And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, all idea of responsibility is lost.
THE FEDERALiST No. 77, at 517-18 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
267. Brief for Appellant Public Citizen at 30-31, Public Citizen (No. 88-429).
268. See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
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acknowledged that the nomination process involves input from many
sources other than the ABA Standing Committee, including senators,
presidential advisors, other governmental sources, and private individuals.2 69 Such individual advisors to the President, whether within or
outside the government, obviously are not covered by FACA. Moreover,
as the WLF pointed out in its brief, the nomination process functioned
quite well and produced many distinguished judges prior to the ABA's
formal introduction into the process during the 1950s. 7 °
Furthermore, no evidence suggests that application of the statute
would impair the operation of the ABA Standing Committee. As the
Public Citizen Litigation Group explained in its brief to the Court, the
application of FACA would require the Department of Justice to prepare a charter for the Committee that would inform the public of the
Department's position regarding the purpose, function, and method of
operation of the Committee; designate a Committee management officer; and provide the public with advance notice of all Committee
meetings. 271 Although the Department of Justice and the ABA tacitly
acknowledged that the actual impact of the statute would be no
broader, they argued that even these seemingly innocuous events would
have a deleterious impact upon the work of the Committee. They stated
their concerns about a lack of confidentiality2 72 and the presence of a
269. Brief for Appellant Washington Legal Foundation at 39, Washington Legal Found. v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989) (No. 88-494).
270. Id.
271. Brief of Appellant Public Citizen at 35, Public Citizen (No. 88-429).
272. The Department of Justice argued in its brief that "private parties might be reluctant
to express to committee members controversial and unpopular views about potential judges" unless complete confidentiality could be assured. Brief of Appellee Department of Justice at 40,
Washington Legal Found. (No. 88-494). The precise dangers of a lack of confidentiality are unclear
because neither the ABA nor the DOJ was very specific about this potential problem. For example,
the WLF pointed out in its Reply Brief that the Mathews Declaration failed to vouchsafe "even a
hint . . . as to what, if anything, in the judicial selection process must be kept confidential, or
whether-FACA would not be able to accommodate whatever confidentiality concerns the Executive
may have." Reply Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation at 14, Washington Legal Found.
(No. 88-494). The WLF contended that "it is not asking too much that, before [the] Court strikes
FACA down entirely as unconstitutional, some record evidence be submitted by the Executive
indicating that the President requires the ABA's advice in order to carry out his nomination powers, and that FACA would prohibit him from getting it." Id. The ABA's sources of information
obviously would dry up rapidly if those sources feared that their candidly unfavorable remarks
about prominent attorneys who might be their friends, colleagues, employers, relatives, proteges,
mentors, clients, or elected officials would not remain confidential. Similarly, a practicing attorney
may fear to make damaging public remarks about a judge under consideration for elevation to the
federal bench or a higher federal judgeship in the attorney's jurisdiction. Moreover, persons who
provide information to the Standing Committee might wish for the information itself, and not
merely their identities, to remain confidential because they might wish to spare the potential nominee from public embarrassment. Brief of Appellee Department of Justice at 40, Washington Legal
Found. (No. 88-494).
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government officer173 at the Standing Committee meetings. Finally, the
Department of Justice argued that the application of the FACA would
subject the Standing Committee to undue federal control and interfere
with its operations.2 74
Although the fears of the government and the ABA were not unfounded, the dangers they identified could be ameliorated. The problem
of confidentiality, the core of the appellant's concern, could be remedied in part by the terms of FACA itself, which adopts some of the
privacy and confidentiality exceptions of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) and the Government in the Sunshine Act. 275 Section 10(d)
of FACA provides that the Act's open meetings requirement shall not
apply to an advisory committee meeting if the President, or the head of
the agency to which the advisory committee reports, determines that
the meeting may be closed to the public in accordance with the exceptions set forth in subsection (c) of the Sunshine Act.27 6 The most obviously relevant exception is subsection (c)(6), which exempts disclosure
of "information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 2 77 Similarly, the
exceptions contained in FOIA are subject to the requirement of section
10(b) of FACA that documents made available to or prepared by each
advisory committee shall be available for public inspection or copying.278 The most obviously relevant exception contained in FOIA is the
provision in section (b)(6) for "personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted in273. The Department of Justice contended that "requiring a federal official to be present at
Committee meetings might deter committee members themselves from expressing their individual
opinions about potential nominees." Brief of Appellee Department of Justice at 40-41, Washington
Legal Found. (No. 88-494).
274. Id. at 41.
275. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988)).
276. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(d) (1988). As originally enacted in 1972, FACA provided that the
President or the head of the responsible federal agency could close an advisory committee meeting
to the public in accordance with the exceptions set forth in FOIA, including the exception protecting the deliberative process. In 1976 Congress amended FACA to provide that advisory committee
meetings could be closed only in accordance with the more limited exemptions set forth in the
Sunshine Act. See id., amended by Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1247-48 (1976).
277. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(6) (1988). Section (c)(9)(B), which exempts disclosure of information
when premature disclosure would "be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed
agency action," also might apply, even though the ABA is not a government agency and the nomination of a judge is not a Department of Justice action.
278. See id. at app. § 10(b). This section defines such documents as "the records, reports,
transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents
which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory committee. .-. ." Id.
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vasion of personal privacy. "279
The appellees' concern about the effect of a federal officer at the
ABA Standing Committee meetings raises a more difficult problem than
its concerns about protecting sensitive meetings and documents from
public assess. Public Citizen argued that the language and purpose of
section 10(e) of FACA would permit the ABA to devise a method of
deliberation on prospective nominees without exposing the Committee
to observation by a Justice Department employee. The Public Citizen
Litigation Group suggested that the Department of Justice could appoint as the designated public official a disinterested person such as "an
employee of GSA who has expertise in the requirements of FACA, but
''
has no interest in, or knowledge of, the judicial nomination process. 80
Such an arrangement, of course, would expose the Standing Committee's deliberations to the danger of embarrassing leaks of information.2 8 Other alternatives, however, might ensure compliance with the
statute while providing solid assurance that the Standing Committee's
deliberations would remain confidential. For example, Public Citizen
proposed that the ABA and the Department of Justice probably could
adopt an arrangement by which the federal employee would be present
only for the beginning of the meeting, to ensure that the Committee
intended to discuss matters that properly could be closed to the public.
Under this arrangement, the employee would not be in the room during
deliberations on prospective nominees. 8
Unlike the appellants' concerns about confidentiality and the presence of a government officer at meetings, the Department of Justice's
eontention that FACA would subject the ABA Standing Committee's
meetings to undue governmental interference lacks merit. This argument overlooks the plain fact that one of the very purposes of FACA is
to ensure governmental supervision of groups, such as the ABA Standing Committee, that act in a quasi-official capacity. To the extent that
some of the dangers recognized by the ABA and Justice Department
could not be avoided, the remaining threat to the operation of the ABA
Standing Committee is outweighed by the countervailing need of the
public to have a clearer idea of how the ABA Committee operates.
The appellants' arguments also overlooked the fact that the application of FACA to a broad array of other organizations has not impeded
279. Id. § 552(b)(6).
280. Reply Brief of Appellant Public Citizen at 19, Public Citizen (No. 88-429).
281. With more naive hope than any foundation in reality, Public Citizen expressed its view
that "[t]here is no hint in the record or appellees' briefs that the mere presence of such an employee would interfere with the Committee's deliberations, particularly if the employee made a
commitment not to divulge the deliberations to anyone else." Id.
282. Id. at 19-20.
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significantly the effectiveness of such groups. As Public Citizen observed in its Reply Brief:
Appellees simply have no answer to the question of why thousands of advisory
committees have found it feasible to both comply with FACA and fulfill their advisory functions, yet application of the Act to the Justice Department's use of the
ABA Committee is so fraught with difficulties that it rises to the level of a constitutional invasion.283

V.

CONGRESSIONAL

REvIEw OF THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE

The Supreme Court's decision in the ABA case permits the ABA
Standing Committee to continue conducting closed meetings and to
maintain the absolute confidentiality of its records. The ongoing controversy, however, concerning the role of the Committee in the judicial selection process will continue. Although the decision permits the
Standing Committee's procedures to remain unchanged, the decision
does not preclude the Department of Justice from altering the Committee's role in the nomination process nor preclude the Senate from
changing the Committee's role in the confirmation process. Although no
changes in the relationship between the ABA Standing Committee and
the Justice Department seem likely, the Committee may play a less influential role in the confirmation process in the future. During the Bork
hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee began to question the ABA
28 4
Standing Committee's role in the confirmation process.
In 1989 the Senate undertook a formal reassessment of its reliance
upon the ABA's ratings. 8 5 In June 1989 the Senate Committee conducted a hearing on the ABA's role in the nomination process. As in
other discussions of the ABA Standing Committee, arguments for re283. Id. at 2. Public Citizen argued that the appellees ignored "the fact that thousands of
advisory bodies, including many that are directly comparable to the ABA Committee, have managed to comply with FACA without suffering... calamities." Id. at 16.
284. For a sampling of critical senatorial remarks concerning the ABA during the Bork hearings, see Bork Hearings,supra note 121, at 1184-1260 (Senate Judiciary Committee questioning of
Harold R. Tyler, Jr., chairman, and Robert Fiske, former chairman, ABA Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary).
285. On February 14, 1989, five of the six Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee
sent a letter to the committee chairperson, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., demanding that the committee
"deinstitutionalize" what the letter called the ABA's "preeminent and quasi-public role," which
threatened to eclipse the Senate's constitutional role, and asserting that the Standing Committee
had not operated in a manner best calculated to assist the Senate. Among other complaints, the
members objected to the Standing Committee's alleged consideration of a judicial candidate's political or ideological views; its alleged failure to accord appropriate weight to excellence in academic and scholarly performance; its failure to disclose the names of persons consulted in the
evaluation process; and its failure to disclose the votes of individual members and the grounds for
such votes. Letter from Senators Strom Thurmond, Alan K. Simpson, Gordon J. Humphrey,
Charles E. Grassley, and Orrin G. Hatch to Senator Joseph R. Biden (Feb. 14, 1989) (provided to
Author by Senate Judiciary Committee).
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form transcended partisan and ideological boundaries. Senator Joseph
Biden explained that the hearings provided an opportunity to review
what the Senate Committee expects from the ABA, how the ABA's process might be improved to meet those expectations better, and whether
the ABA wishes to continue to participate in the process. 56 The Committee hearings themselves did not address any of these proposals in
any detail. Instead, the hearings provided an opportunity for senators
to express their concerns about the ABA's role and to hear the testimony of Attorney General Thornburgh, ABA President Raven, and
Standing Committee Chairperson Judge Harold R. Tyler regarding the
dispute over the ABA's alleged use of ideology in assessing candidates.
The most barbed comments concerning the ABA were made by some of
the conservative Republican senators who vehemently have attacked
the Committee during recent years.2 s The conservative senators particularly blasted the ABA for its alleged use of ideological factors in the
selection process and its alleged lack of accountability.2"'
286. In particular, Senator Biden suggested that the Senate Judiciary Committee might consider the following questions: 1) whether the ABA should make more information on the basis for
the Standing Committee's ratings on lower court nominees as well as Supreme Court nominees
available to the Committee; 2) whether the ABA rating system for lower court nominations should
be simplified; 3) whether the appointment process for the Standing Committee should be reviewed
in order to assure that each person is particularly well suited for such service and that a wide
variety of points of view are represented on the Committee; and 4) whether the ABA should increase its efforts to talk to leaders in the community in which the nominee works and resides. ABA
Hearings, supra note 194. Biden expressed his personal opinion that the ABA should submit a
report and simply a rating.
Senator Thurmond suggested that the Senate Judiciary Committee might wish to consider the
following proposals: 1) disclosure of the factors used by the ABA Standing Committee in making
its judgments regarding nominees; 2) disclosure of the general qualifications, backgrounds, and
professional affiliations of Committee members; 3) disclosure of the names of the persons consulted in the evaluation process, their recommendations, and their basis for such recommendations; 4) disclosure of the votes of individual Standing Committee members and the basis therefor;
5) disclosure of the weight accorded by the ABA Standing Committee to academic and scholarly
performance; 6) disciplinary action against Committee members who violate its rules; 7) adoption
of a rating system for nominees that provides for a rating of either Qualified or Not Qualified; and
8) requirement that the ABA make its recommendation to the Senate rather than to the Administration, unless the Administration specifically requests direct communication. Id.
287. For example, Senator Hatch declared that "it's time to pull the plug on the American
Bar Assocation's preeminent role in judicial selection, and reclaim for this Committee its full place
in the advice and consent function with respect to judges." Id. Although Hatch expressed confidence that the Judiciary Committee would "continue to be interested in the views of the ABA, as
it should be," he stated that "it is no longer appropriate for this one private organization to be
given this special status not accorded to any other group." Id. Contending that the Executive
Branch has adequate resources with which to conduct its own investigation of potential nominees,
Hatch urged the Administration to end the "special relationship" between the Executive Branch
and the ABA. Id.
288. For example, Senator Hatch contended that the "Committee considers the judicial candidates' political, or ideological philosophy" and that it "fails to accord appropriate weight to excellence in academic and scholarly performance." Id. Hatch also criticized the Committee for
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The need for reassessment and reform of the ABA's role in the judicial selection process is greater than the ABA appears willing to concede, but the changes advocated by the ABA's most vociferous critics
are too sweeping. The ABA's role in the judicial selection process
should be placed in its proper perspective, and the ABA's importance in
the process should not be exaggerated. Even if one accepts the truth of
the allegation that the ABA for political reasons has blocked the nomination of some conservatives, the Reagan Administration certainly succeeded in placing an extraordinary number of conservatives on federal
benches. 89 Indeed, even the harshest critics of the ABA are able to allege few instances in which the ABA blackballed potential nominees. 9 °
In nearly all instances in which the ABA's reservations about a conservative nominee's politics allegedly precluded the nominee from receiving the highest ABA rating, the nominee, nevertheless, was
confirmed.2 9 Although one might argue that the Bork exception swallows the rule, the outcry against the Bork nomination was so widespread that it would be most difficult to blame the ABA for Bork's
defeat. Critics of the ABA's role also tend to forget that the ABA's influence during the Reagan era was counterbalanced, at least in part, by
92
groups that lobbied for a more conservative judiciary.
The ABA's role in the judicial selection process is no greater than
the President and the Senate allow it to be. While the extent to which
failing to disclose the general qualifications, backgrounds, and professional affiliations of its members; the votes of individual members and the basis for such votes; and the names, recommendations, or evaluations of persons consulted in the evaluation process. Id. Similarly, Senator Grassley
charged that the Standing Committee "operates in complete secrecy" and that "the routine disclosure of information to the press and to select groups by committee members when it suits them"
belies the Committee's explanation that the secrecy of its proceedings is justified by the need to
maintain confidentiality. Id.
Senator Humphrey declared that "the decades-old arrangement under which the ABA enjoys
a privileged status of a quasi-official advisory board to the Executive and to the Senate, while
operating in perfect secrecy and free of any of the processes of public accountability, is no longer
good enough." Id. Humphrey denounced the current arrangement as "a moldering, corrupted, malodorous old relic which should be given a quick burial for the sake of public health." Id.
289. See, e.g., Note, All the President'sMen? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987) (concluding that the Reagan appointees
have been conservative in their decision making but not significantly more conservative than the
Republican judges appointed by other Republican presidents).
290. See supra note 208.
291. Id.
292. Senator Howard Metzenbaum exclaimed at the recent Senate hearings on the Standing
Committee's role that he was amazed at the furor over the ABA's liberal influence upon judicial
selection because "I sat through eight years of the Reagan administration . . . sending us more
right-wing judges who had been cleared with the Washington Legal Foundation and the Free Congress Foundation, the Center for Judicial Studies, the National Right to Life Committee, the
American Conservative Union-they were all chortling about these 410 judges that came up, and
we approved them." ABA Hearings,supra note 194. Accordingly, Metzenbaum averred that "[t]his
is the most unbelievable hearing I've ever participated in." Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1

the President and the Senate should rely upon the ABA Standing Committee obviously is related to the extent to which the ABA's procedures
are free from reproach, responsibility for the ABA's role ultimately
rests with the government. Even though the government has accorded
quasi-governmental functions to the ABA, the ABA remains a private
organization free to adopt its own internal procedures; indeed, the Supreme Court has refused to impose upon the Standing Committee even
the minimal requirements of FACA. Accordingly, any examination of
the ABA's role should focus upon the extent to which the government
relies upon the ABA's opinions rather than upon the procedures by
which the ABA arrives at those opinions.
In attempting to define the proper limits of the government's reliance upon the ABA, it seems obvious that no single organization ought
to have a dispositive role in the selection of judges. No organization,
and certainly no committee of fifteen persons, can speak for the entire
legal profession, much less for the entire nation. Although the government obviously should accord deference to the ABA's opinions because
its constituency includes nearly half the nation's attorneys and its opinions represent the fruits of widespread research, both the President and
the Senate should avail themselves of the many other resources available for both opinions and technical information. As we have seen, the
President and the Senate always have relied upon other sources of information, even when the ABA's influence was at its peak. During the
past decade, the creation of public judicial selection commissions and
the growing interest in the judicial selection process among private interest groups have ensured that the ABA's influence will be balanced by
other sources of information and influence. Moreover, the continuing
growth of staffs at the Department of Justice, the White House, and the
Senate Judiciary Committee helps to ensure that decision makers can
conduct their own investigations of candidates. The continuing nourishment of such countervailing forces will ensure that the ABA's opinion
of candidates need not be dispositive.
Once the ABA's role is placed in its proper perspective, the need
for any reform of the ABA's procedures is less urgent and less compelling. Moreover, while some proposed reforms are desirable, other suggested changes are ill-advised. Unfortunately, one of the least desirable
reforms is embodied in the only concessions that the ABA made to its
critics: the Brochure's deletion of its reference to ideology and the
ABA's more recent assurances that ideology is not a factor in the evaluation process. Because the ABA Standing Committee's most useful
function is its evaluation of the professional qualifications of potential
judges, the ABA would be unwise to allow ideology to play a large part
in its rating of candidates. Nevertheless, the Committee should not
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blind itself completely to ideology because ideology cannot be separated
wholly from questions of professional fitness. If a potential judge holds
views of judicial or political issues that the Standing Committee believes blatantly would defy generally accepted notions of jurisprudence
or undermine constitutional foundations, the Standing Committee
would be derelict to recommend even a brilliant and accomplished candidate. Even if the Standing Committee was reduced to a mere register
of the statistical qualifications of a candidate, only the naive could suppose that ideological biases never would affect the Committee's
calculations.
Accordingly, the Standing Committee should be permitted frankly
to confess instances in which ideology makes a difference. While the use
of an ideological criterion obviously creates the potential for mischief,
that danger is outweighed by the need to minimize hypocrisy. If the
presence of ideological considerations is frankly acknowledged, the Senate has a better basis for questioning the validity of the Standing Committee's report. The Standing Committee could keep ideological
considerations within proper bounds if it readopted the language of the
1980 Brochure, which declared that the Standing Committee's evaluation was based "primarily" upon competence, integrity, and temperament, and likewise restored the language of the 1988 Brochure, which
provided that "political or ideological philosophy are not considered except to the extent that they bear upon other factors." Although this
language is vague, it is difficult to conceive of how so amorphous a criterion could be made more precise.
The importance of retaining a frank acknowledgement of the role
of ideology is particularly compelling because the Brochure currently
contains language that would permit the Standing Committee to introduce ideological considerations through the back door. According to the
Brochure, "[iln investigating temperament, the Committee considers,
among other factors, the prospective nominee's compassion, decisiveness, open-mindedness, sensitivity, courtesy, patience, freedom from
bias and commitment to equal justice."2 3 This language obviously invites consideration of ideology under the rubric of "temperament," a
word that both liberals and conservatives historically have used as a
2 94
code word for ideology.
293.

1988

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY,

supra note 162, at 4.

294. The likelihood that this provision would encourage the retention of ideological considerations would be even greater if the ABA accepts Senator Biden's suggestion that the Brochure
strike the word "sensitivity" and add the phrase "and sensitivity to the appearance of equal justice" after the phrase "commitment to equal justice." See Memorandum from Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
to Judiciary Committee Members (June 16, 1989) (provided to Author by Senate Judiciary Committee) [hereinafter Biden Memorandum].
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The Standing Committee also can function more effectively if the
sources of its consultations with persons outside the Committee remain
confidential. One former member of the Standing Committee observed
that the Committee "might as well quit" if confidentiality is not maintained because "[ljawyers have to appear before judges."2 95 Moreover,
as explained above,29 6 the ABA's sources naturally are loath to make
unfavorable comments concerning present and former colleagues,
friends, relatives, clients, or former law professors if such comments are
not confidential. Indeed, the web of connections between interviewees
and a potential nominee may be spun almost endlessly; the potential
for future embarrassment or retribution is similarly broad and intricate.
In addition to inhibiting sources from commenting about candidates,
publication of the identity of sources could have the even more deleterious result of encouraging sources to make disingenuous remarks.
For the same reasons, the Standing Committee should not reveal
how individual members of the Committee ranked the candidates. The
revelation of such information would tend to inhibit honest evaluations
and could subject Standing Committee members to outside pressures.
Publication of such information would have little countervailing benefit; it would not facilitate significantly a nominee's defense of his or her
record before the Judiciary Committee or aid an unsuccessful candidate's attempt to persuade the executive branch to reconsider withholding a nomination.
The reasons for maintaining the confidentiality of sources and
votes do not extend to the sources of the information that furnished the
basis for such votes. The ABA's ratings of nominees would be more useful to the Senate Judiciary Committee if they were accompanied by detailed reports explaining the basis on which evaluations of Supreme
Court nominees are made and if the ABA commenced the practice of
providing reports concerning lower court nominees.2 9 7 Although Senator
Biden believes that the information need not be extensive, he rightly
contends that it at least should be enough to provide the members of
295. Roberts, Justices to Decide if ABA Judge-Rating Panel Must Meet in Open, L.A. Daily
J., Dec. 6, 1988, at 9, col. 1. Similarly, former ABA President Eugene C. Thomas has observed that
"[c]onfidentiality is essential. It assures candor and shields persons who provide potentially embarrassing or critical information." Thomas, The ABA and FederalJudicial Selection, A.BA. J., Nov.
1, 1986, at 6.
296. See supra note 272.
297. At the present time, the Standing Committee provides the Senate Judiciary Committee
with explanations of the ratings given to Supreme Court nominees, but it provides only the rating
for lower court nominees. Biden Memorandum, supra note 294. Biden has discerned a consensus
among members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that "the Standing Committee should change
its practice with respect to lower court nominees, and provide some statement of the reasoning
that led to its rating." Id.
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the Judiciary Committee and the public at large with an understanding
of the rationale of the rating system."9 8 Detailed reports also would enable a nominee to prepare a more effective defense before the Judiciary
Committee.
Similarly, there is no merit to the argument that the ABA should
simplify its ratings system and deem each candidate to be merely
"Qualified" or "Unqualified." The existing gradations help to distinguish exceptional candidates from marginal ones.2"' The use of a fourtier gradation for lower court nominees and a three-tier gradation for
Supreme Court nominees should be retained because the range of quality of lower court nominees is likely to be greater and the level of scru30 0
tiny by the Senate Judiciary Committee is likely to be less intense. It
would be helpful, however, if the ABA provided a more precise explanation of the differences between these rankings.
A more difficult question is whether the ABA should compile and
publish reports concerning candidates who are not actually nominated
and whether the ABA should publish the rankings of such candidates.
The ABA needs to be particularly sensitive to claims of unfairness by
persons who are not nominated because the ABA's rating appears to be
more dispositive in such cases. An unfavorable rating may be more
likely to ruin a candidate's chances for nomination than to preclude
confirmation if such a candidate is nominated. The compilation and
publication of such reports would tend to discourage the type of unfairness and irresponsibility that allegedly has caused the Standing Committee to block the nominations of some conservative candidates.3 0 1
Such information also might enable a candidate to persuade the Executive Branch to reconsider its decision. At the same time, however, such
reports would impose an added administrative burden on the ABA and
might embarrass persons who were under consideration but who were
298. Id.
299. Senator Biden contends that "there is merit to retaining a rating above 'qualified' because it enables the Standing Committee to identify for the Judiciary Committee those nominees
who, based on the Standing Committee's criteria of competence, integrity and temperament, are
the most superior candidates for the bench." Letter from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. to Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh (June 16, 1989) (provided to Author by Senate Judiciary
Committee).
300. Senator Biden has detected a consensus among the Judiciary Committee members for
the use of a three-tier rating system for all federal court nominees. Id. In a recent letter to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, however, five Republican members of the Judiciary Committee
expressed support for a two-tier rating of "Qualified" or "Unqualified." Letter from Senators
Strom Thurmond, Orrin G. Hatch, Charles E. Grassley, Gordon J. Humphrey, and Alan K. Simpson to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh (June 14, 1989) (provided to Author by Senate Judiciary Committee).
301. See supra note 208.
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not nominated.302 Indeed, the publication of such reports might make
the ABA vulnerable to lawsuits brought by unsuccessful candidates alleging that the reports damaged their professional standing.303 Perhaps
the best practice would be for the ABA to prepare abbreviated reports
concerning such persons, available for inspection and publication only
at the behest of the candidate.
In formulating any changes in its procedures, the ABA should remain mindful of its influential role in the judicial selection process and
should make every effort to ensure that its proceedings are thorough
and fair. This aspiraton, however, does not mean that the ABA needs to
conduct its investigations with the same thoroughness and objectivity of
a court. No one has a right to become a judge. While an unfavorable
recommendation obviously may dash the hopes and aspirations of a
candidate for judicial office, a candidate's failure to obtain a judgeship
is unlikely to create any stigma that seriously affects the candidate's
professional standing."0 4
302. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 295.
303. Such persons might be able to maintain a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) if they
could persuade a court that the ABA's activities constitute state action. A district court has held
that the Chicago Bar Association and its Committee on Evaluation of Candidates were state actors
for purposes of § 1983. See Rouse v. Judges of Circuit Court, 609 F. Supp. 243, 247-48 (N.D. Ill.
1985). Although the court in that case dismissed the claim of an unsuccessful aspirant for a judicial
position, the court's opinion suggested that the plaintiff might have been able to maintain an action if she had been able to demonstrate that the committee's "not recommended" rating damaged
her standing in the community. Under the facts of the case, the court held that no such damage
occurred because the "not recommended" rating was confidential and was not disclosed to anyone
other than select members of the committee and the candidate herself, and the rating did not
impugn the plaintiff's ability to perform as a lawyer because it was based merely on a finding that
the plaintiff lacked "experience" and "judicial temperament." Id. at 247. Because the court found
that the rating did not injure significantly the plaintiff's professional standing or foreclose her from
employment opportunities, the court held that the rating did not deprive her of any "liberty"
under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 248. The court stated, however, that the attorney could
not have prevailed in the lawsuit even if she had demonstrated such damage because the committee's evaluation procedures did not deny her due process of law. See id. at 249.
304. The Rouse court held that the attorney failed to state a claim for denial of due process
because she did not allege the deprivation of any liberty or property interest; she did not allege
that the rating injured her good name, reputation, honor, or integrity; and she had no entitlement
to the judgeship or even any entitlement to be fairly considered for that position. The court also
observed that the rating did not stigmatize her or foreclose other employment opportunities. See
id. at 248-49. The court added that the attorney's complaint also failed to demonstrate that the
committee's procedures would have denied her due process even if she had pled the existence of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. The court stated:
[T]he C.B.A. is not required to conduct an exhaustive investigation of all the candidate's
experiences or alleged qualifications. Investigators with both personal and hearsay knowledge
of the candidate's qualifications can properly sit on the hearing panel and vote on the candidate. Attorney members of the C.B.A. are not to be disqualified from the panel because they
have opposed the candidate in litigation; in fact, in many ways they are the most useful panelists. There need be no requirement that the hearing panel constitute a cross section of the
legal community with full minority representation. All that is required in peer review is that a
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INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ACTIONS

Any nonprofit organization that interjects itself into a controversy
over any judicial nomination acts at its own peril. In the wake of the
controversy over the Bork nomination, the IRS adopted new guidelines
that would discourage tax exempt organizations from attempting to influence the nomination process. 30 5 Under the new guidelines, a tax exempt organization risks the loss of its tax exempt status if it does not
monitor carefully and restrict its lobbying activities.
A. Confirmation Votes Defined As "Legislation"
In a Notice issued in July 1988, the IRS announced that an attempt to influence the Senate's confirmation of a federal judicial nominee constitutes an attempt to influence "legislation" within the
meaning of sections 501(c)(3) and 501(h) of the Code, which limit the
degree to which certain types of tax exempt organizations may engage
in such activities. 06 Under section 501(c)(3), "no substantial part of the
activities" of certain tax exempt organizations may involve "carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."307 Section 501(h), however, accords a "safe harbor" to tax exempt organizations by permitting them to elect to follow an objective test that will
enable them to preserve their tax exempt status under section
501(c)(1).30 Under this test, an electing organization's total expenditures for "any attempt to influence any legislation through communication with any member or employee of a legislative body, or with any
government official or employee who may participate in the formulation
of legislation," may not exceed the annual sum of one million dollars.3 09

In practice, an organization may not be able to spend one million dollars because qualifying expenditures are limited to specific percentages
of its expenditures for an exempt purpose. 10 Section 501(h) further rerandomly selected group of the candidate's peers determine qualifications.
Id. at 249.
305. See I.R.S. Notice 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 392; I.R.S. Announcement 88-114, 1988-37 I.R.B.
26.
306. See I.R.S. Notice 88-76, supra note 305.
307. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Subsection (3) of § 501(c) applies to
"[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively

for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to
foster national or international amateur sports competition,. . . or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals." Id. Accordingly, the IRS Notice does not affect various nonprofit organiza-

tions described in § 501(c) that might carry on lobbying activities. Most notably, the Notice does
not affect labor unions, which are governed by subsection (5) of § 501(c).
308. For a discussion of these tests, see McGovern, Accettura & Skelly, The Revised Lobbying Regulations-A Difficult Balance, 41 TAx NoTEs 1425, 1426 (1988).
309. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1)(B) (1982).

310. Lobbying expenditures are limited to 20% of the first $500,000 of an organization's ex-
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stricts the amount that an exempt organization can spend on "grass
roots lobbying," which is defined as "any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or
any segment thereof."3 11 An electing organization's expenditures for
grass roots lobbying may not exceed twenty-five percent of its total limitation on lobbying expenditures.8l Failure to comply with these limitations can have drastic consequences for a tax exempt organization. An
organization that exceeds the limitations imposed by the Code is subject to an excise tax in the amount of twenty-five percent of expenditures in excess of the limitations." 3 More significantly, an organization
can lose its tax exempt status if its lobbying expenditures exceed 150
percent of either the total limitation or the grass roots limitation over
the course of a four-year period. 14
The IRS based its conclusion upon the definition of legislation in
section 4911(e), which provides with regard to section 501(h) that "legislation includes action with respect to Acts, Bills, resolutions and similar items." The IRS explained that "[b]ecause the Senate's action of
advice and consent on a judicial nomination is an action with respect to
a resolution or similar item, the Senate's confirmation vote constitutes a
vote on legislation." '
While the IRS policy does not preclude a tax exempt organization
from engaging in lobbying activities because such an organization still
may conduct activities that are not "substantial" or may elect to take
shelter in the safe harbor, the interpretation still creates potential
problems for tax exempt organizations. The determination of what constitutes "substantial" lobbying is at the discretion of the IRS,3 8 which
takes a very dim view of lobbying on judicial nominations. Although the
safe harbor alternative enables the tax exempt organization to determine with greater certainty whether its activities will jeopardize its tax
exempt status, the organization risks the loss of that status if its expenditures somehow exceed the prescribed limitations. Moreover, the
penditures for an exempt purpose, 15% of the next $500,000, 10% of the next $500,000, and 5% of
any remaining expenditures. Id. § 4911(c)(2).

311. Id. § 4911(d)(1)(A).
312.

Id. § 4911(a)(1).

313. Id.
314. See McGovern, Accettura & Skelly, supra note 308, at 1427.
315. I.R.S. Notice 88-76, supra note 305.
316. As one tax expert recently pointed out, "[t]he precise scope and nature of the conduct
which constitutes a 'substantial' part of the organization's activities is a very difficult question."
Haight, Lobbying for the Public Good: Limitations on Legislative Activities by Section 501(c) (3)
Organizations,23 GoNz. L. REv. 77, 84 (1987-1988). Although the IRS has not expressly adopted
any rule, some tax practititioners advise charitable organizations to limit lobbying expenditures to
five percent of their annual receipts. See id. (citing Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (5th
Cir. 1955)).
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alternative rule may impose significant administrative burdens upon a
tax exempt organization.
The potential impact of the IRS policy may be ameliorated substantially, however, by proposed regulations issued by the IRS on December 23, 1988. The proposed regulations would revise, narrow, and
clarify the IRS definition of "grass roots lobbying." The 1988 proposed
regulations replaced controversial regulations issued by the IRS in 1986
that offered a significantly broader definition of "grass roots lobbying. '3 17 Critics of the 1986 proposed regulations complained that the
regulations s18 were excessively broad and objected that the definition
did not require a communication to encourage recipients to act; that the
definition included objective discussions of legislation if such discussion
was disseminated to persons who were expected to share a common
view of the legislation; and that the definition did not require the legislation to be pending or to be introduced imminently.3 1 9 The IRS responded to these concerns in the 1988 proposed regulations by offering
a new definition of "grass roots lobbying" to include only communications that refer to specific legislation, reflect a view on such legislation,
and encourage the recipient of the communication to act with respect to
such legislation.3 20 As IRS officials have explained, "The 1988 lobbying
317. See Lobbying by Public Charities, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,211 (1986) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. Parts 1, 7, 20, 25, 53, and 56) (proposed Nov. 5, 1986). The 1986 proposed regulations had
defined such lobbying as a communication that seeks, opposes, or otherwise pertains to legislation,
reflects a view with respect to the desirability of such legislation, and is communicated in a form
and distributed in a manner so as to reach individuals as members of the general public, that is, as
voters or constituents, as opposed to a communication designed for academic, scientific, or similar
purposes. The proposed regulations further provided that "a communication that pertains to legislation but expresses no explicit view on the legislation shall be deemed to reflect a view on the
legislation if the communication is selectively disseminated to persons reasonably expected to
share a common view of the legislation. . . ." Id. at 40,221.
318. Approximately 200 organizations signed a position statement demanding the immediate
withdrawal of the proposed regulations. See Congressional Support Sought for Protest of IRS
Lobbying Proposal, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at G-1 (Jan. 23, 1987). The IRS also received
approximately 5000 individual comments concerning the regulations. See McGovern, Accettura &
Skelly, supra note 308, at 1427.
319. See McGovern, Accettura & Skelly, supra note 308, at 1430.
320. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(h)-2, -3, 53.4945-2, 56.4911-1 to -7, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,826
(1988). The proposed regulations provide that a communication encourages its recipients to take
action only if it:
(A) States that the recipient should contact a legislator or an employee of a legislative
body, or should contact any other government official or employee who may participate in the
formulation of legislation (but only if the principal purpose of urging contact with the government official or employee is to influence legislation);
(B) States the address, telephone number, or similar information of a legislator or an
employee of a legislative body;
(C) Provides a petition, tear-off postcard or similar material for the recipient to communicate his or her views to a legislator or an employee of a legislative body, or to any other
government official or employee who may participate in the formulation of legislation (but
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definition not only requires. . . that the communication contain a reference to specific legislation, but also requires that the communication
both reflect a view with respect to such legislation and encourage the
recipient to take action."'3 21 The 1988 proposed regulations also clarify
that research and preparation costs of advocacy communications that
are not lobbying communications are not treated as lobbying expenditures except in instances of abuse.3 22 The 1988 proposed regulations
were applauded widely for striking a judicious balance between the government's interest in preventing tax exempt organizations from participating in large scale political activities and tax exempt organizations'
interest in influencing legislation that specially concerns their
members.3 2
B. Nominations As a "Campaign" or "Election"
Despite its determination to define congressional confirmation of
judicial nominations as "legislation" within the meaning of section
only if the principal purpose of so facilitating contact with the government official or employee is to influence legislation); or
(D) Specifically identifies one or more legislators who will vote on the legislation as: Opposing the communication's view with respect to the legislation; being undecided with respect
to the legislation; being the recipient's respresentative in the legislature; or being a member of
the legislative committee that will consider the legislation. Encouraging the recipient to take
action under this [fourth category] does not include naming the main sponsor(s) of the legislation....
Id. § 56.4911-2(b)(2)(iii), 53 Fed. Reg. at 51,836. The only exception to this definition provides that
the IRS will presume a communication to constitute grass roots lobbying if, within two weeks
before a vote by a legislative body, or committee thereof, an organization makes a communication
in the mass media concerning "highly publicized" legislation that reflects an opinion about the
general subject of such legislation and either 1) refers to the highly publicized legislation, or 2)
encourages the public to communicate with its legislators on the general subject of such legislation.
An organization may rebut this presumption by showing that the organization regularly makes this
type of communication in the mass media without regard to the timing of the communication or
that the timing of the communication was unrelated to the imminent legislative action. Id. §
56.4911-2(b)(5)(ii), 53 Fed. Reg. at 51,838.
321. McGovern, Accettura & Skelly, supra note 308, at 1430 (emphasis in original). A very
limited number of mass media communications are exceptions to the requirement. See supra note
320; see also McGovern, Accettura & Skelly, supra note 308, at 1430. The IRS attorneys also have
explained:
Under such a definition, communications may advocate or oppose specific legislation and not
be considered lobbying, so long as the communications do not encourage the recipients to
take action with respect to the legislation. The decision to require "encouragement," i.e., a
direct or indirect call to action, is part of the difficult balance the 1988 regulations strive to
achieve. It bears repeating: the 1988 regulations will not consider an organization to be conducting grass roots lobbying even if the organization seeks to influence legislation by making
communications that advocate or oppose specific legislation, so long as the communications
do not contain the specific information required to "encourage" recipients to action.
Id. at 1430-31.
322. McGovern, Accettura & Skelly, supra note 308, at 1431.
323. See Moriarty, Revised "GrassRoots Lobbying" Regulations, 42 TAx NoTEs 149 (1989).

JUDICIAL SELECTION

1990]

501(c)(3), the IRS Notice of July 1988 indicated that lobbying by tax
exempt organizations on the judicial nominations would not disqualify
such groups under another provision of the same section, which provides that tax exempt organizations may "not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements) any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."' 4 The
IRS, without further explanation, "concluded that attempts to influence
Senate confirmation of a federal judicial nominee do not constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign within the meaning of
501(c)(3)." 23 In the same announcement, the IRS concluded that such
activity did not constitute the "influencing of a public election" within
the meaning of subsection (d)(2) of section 4945, which governs lobbying activities by private foundations."' 6
C. PoliticalExpenditures
In another action that may be related to the Bork episode, an August 1988 Announcement by the IRS affirmed that a tax exempt organization's activities to influence Senate confirmations of judicial nominees
would constitute "taxable political expenditures" under section 527(f)
of the Code.2 7 Section 527(b) of the Code imposes a tax on political
expenditures by an organization that is exempt under any subsection of
section 501(c) if it engages in an "exempt function." 2 " Because the IRS
Announcement governs all organizations that claim tax exemption
under section 501(c), its scope is much broader than the IRS Notice
discussed above, which affects only organizations qualifying for exemption under subsection (3) of section 501(c). 32 9 Section 527(e)(2) defines
"exempt function" as "influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any
324.

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The restriction on activities to influence legis-

lation was added to the federal tax law in 1934, without the benefit of congressional hearings. See
Hopkins, IRS Interpretation of Law on Tax-Exempts-Wrong or Merely Expansive?, 39 TAX
NoTEs 511 (Apr. 25, 1988). The provision concerning intervention in political campaigns was added
as a floor amendment by then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson in an effort to curb the activities of a
private foundation in Texas that Johnson believed had provided indirect financial support to his
opponent in an election campaign. See id. The phrase "in opposition to" was added in 1987 as a
"clarification" to conform the statute to Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1976).

See H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1622, reprinted in 1987 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

N-ws 2313-1, 2313-1202; HR. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1018, reprinted in 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2313-1245, 2313-1764.

325. I.R.S. Notice 88-76, supra note 305.
326.

Id.

327. I.R.S. Announcement 88-114, supra note 305. This Announcement affirmed a January
1988 memorandum of the IRS General Counsel. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 22, 1988).
328. I.R.C. § 527(b) (1982).

329. See supra note 324.
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Federal, State, or local public office in a political organization, or the
election of Presidential or Vice Presidential electors. . ." 0 Under
section 527(f), a section 501(c) organization that expends any amount
for an "exempt function" must pay tax upon the lesser of an organization's net investment income or its "exempt function" expenditure.3 31
As the IRS recognized, "a section 501(c) organization engaged in an 'exempt function' as a relatively small part of its operations might nonetheless have much or all of its investment income subject to tax under
section 527.''ss2 Section 501(f)(3), however, enables a section 501(c)(3)
organization to escape that harsh result if it deposits in a "separate segregated fund" certain contributions for use in an "exempt function"
and thereby exposes itself only to tax on the investment income of that
fund."' 3
The IRS has taken no action on the proposal since the expiration
of the public comment period on March 13, 1989. The Alliance for Justice, joined by forty-six prominent nonprofit organizations, submitted a
memorandum in opposition to the Announcement.3 3 4
330. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (1982).
331. Id. § 527(f).
332. Id. Prior to its new interpretation, the IRS does not appear ever to have applied § 527
to a § 501(c)(3) or § 501(c)(4) organization, perhaps because such organizations cannot participate
in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office. See id. §
501(c)(3), (4); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)1(a)(2)(ii) (1988). The definition of political organization "exempt income" in § 527, however, is
broader than § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on participation in political campaigns because § 527 extends
to expenditures to influence a "nomination, selection or appointment," while § 501(c)(3) is limited
to participation in campaigns for elective office. According to two experts, actions to influence
campaigns for nonelective public office therefore "may well be taxable expenditures under section
527, even though they would not, in the case of a section 501(c)(3) organization, jeopardize the
organization's tax exempt status." Harmon & Ferster, Attempts to Influence Judicial Confirmations Are Not Lobbying, 36 TAX NoTEs 1013, 1015 (1987).
333. I.R.C. § 501(f)(3) (1982).
334. Comments in Response to I.R.S. Announcement 88-114 Concerning Section 527(f) of the
Internal Revenue Code, submitted to the IRS by the Alliance for Justice, Mar. 13, 1989 (source on
file with Author); Letter from Nan Aron, Executive Director of Alliance for Justice, to Robert I.
Brauer, Assistant Commissioner of the IRS (Apr. 3, 1989). Most of the groups that joined in the
memorandum identify themselves as politically liberal. Although not all of those groups are necessarily likely to undertake large-scale lobbying activities concerning judicial nominations, the opposition of so many groups to the IRS Announcement demonstrates again that the judicial selection
process is the subject of widespread public interest and participation. The groups that joined in
the memorandum included the ACLU, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, the American Jewish Congress, the Americans for Democratic Action, B'nai B'rith
Women, the International Union of Electrical Workers, the United Automobile Workers, the
Mental Health Law Project, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the
NAACP, the National Audubon Society, the National Education Association, the National Legal
Aid and Defender Organization, NOW, the National Puerto Rican Coalition, the National Urban
League, the National Wildlife Federation, the Native American Rights Fund, People for the American Way, the Sierra Club, the Women's Law Project, and the Women's Legal Defense Fund. The
AFL-CIO, attorney Gail Harmon, and Senator Alan Cranston also submitted statements in opposi-
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Although the IRS proposal appears to have been issued in response
to questions about the tax status of organizations that opposed the
Bork nomination, the adoption of the regulation alarmed conservative
activists and liberals alike. 3 Accordingly, a broad spectrum of organizations, including the Alliance for Justice, the ACLU, the AFL-CIO,
People for the American Way, and the Heritage Foundation supported
legislation introduced in Congress last year that would have permitted
tax exempt groups to lobby for or against federal judicial nominations
without incurring any tax liability.3 ' Specifically, the legislation would
have amended section 527(f) to provide that the term "exempt function" would not include "influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination or appointment of any individual to any Federal,
State or local non-elective public office. '3 37 Although the legislation had

bipartisan support and was approved by the Senate, the legislation died
because the House did not have sufficient opportunity to consider it. A
number of the groups that oppose the IRS proposed interpretation of
section 527(f) have urged Congress to declare that section 527(f) does
not apply to the activities of section 501(c)(3) organizations.3 38
D. Criticism of IRS Actions
The IRS interpretations of the Code to restrict lobbying on judicial
nominations constitute an errant reading of the legislation and bad
public policy. The IRS conclusion that Senate confirmation votes are
"legislation" within the meaning of section 501, because they are "resotion to the Announcement. The Alliance for Justice argued in its memorandum that "exempt organizations will be forced to abandon all efforts to influence nominations and appointments to public
office" rather than risk the imposition of tax under § 527(f). The Alliance also contended that
"[tihe absence of clear guidance as to what activities are and are not taxable will have a chilling
effect even on activities that are not within the scope of the statute." Letter from Nan Aron,
Executive Director of Alliance for Justice, to Alliance for Justice Members (Apr. 3, 1989) (on file
with Author).
335. See One Year Later, Bork Enters the Campaign, Legal Times, Oct. 24, 1988, at 11, col.
2.
336. See id.; see also 134 CONG. REc. S15,098 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988); Author's interview with
Nan Aron, Executive Director of Alliance for Justice (Jan. 24, 1989). The lobbying effort was coordinated by the Coalition for Free Marketplace of Ideas. Interview with Mark Weinberg (Jan. 26,
1989). Speaking in favor of the legislation, Senator Alan Cranston observed that "[t]his is an issue
which effects organizations across the ideological spectrum. The change in policy this amendment
accomplishes has been endorsed by groups as diverse as the AFL-CIO and the Heritage Foundation." 134 CONG. REc. S15,098 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988).
337. 134 CONG. REc.S15,098 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988).
338. Letter from Nan Aron, Executive Director of Alliance for Justice, to Rep. J.J. Pickle,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means (June
16, 1989) (provided to Author through the courtesy of Nan Aron). Such legislation was urged by
the Alliance for Justice, the ACLU, the AFL-CIO, the Center for Community Change, Concerned
Women for America, the Heritage Foundation, and the Sierra Club. Id.
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lutions" within the meaning of the definition of "legislation" in section
4911, relies upon a strained definition of the word "resolutions." Moreover, as a number of prominent tax attorneys have pointed out, the IRS
interpretation overlooks the fact that a Senate confirmation vote does
not involve the exercise of legislative power under article I of the Constitution but rather imposes a restraint on the President's exercise of
power under article II. s9
Likewise, the interpretation 'of section 527 seems faulty; both the
language and legislative history of the statute indicate that it should
apply only to lobbying for elective office. The statute's reference to
"public office" most reasonably can be read to refer only to an elective
office. Such a reading is consistent with an IRS ruling3 40 that the term
"public office" will be defined, for purposes of section 527, in accordance with the "facts and circumstances of each case" and the principles set forth in the regulation s41 that defines a "public employee." The
essential element in determining whether a public employee holds a
"public office" is "whether a significant part of the activities of a public
employee is the independent performance of policy making functions.

3

42

Because the federal judiciary generally is not deemed to par-

ticipate in policy-making functions, federal judges would not appear to
hold public office within the meaning of the IRS ruling. 3 Moreover,
another IRS regulation provides that an analogous reference
to "public
44
office" in section 501(c)(3) refers to an elective office.
The IRS interpretation of section 527 also is at odds with the legislative history of section 527, which demonstrates that it was intended to
339. See, e.g., Harmon & Ferster, supra note 332, at 1014; Hopkins, supra note 324, at 511.
At least one critic of the IRS interpretation has argued that the interpretation also seems at odds
with the generally accepted definition of legislation as the formulation of general rules or princi-

ples for human conduct. Id. at 513-14 (citing J. SUTHERLAND,

SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CON-

1:02 (4th ed. 1972)). This argument, however, ignores the fact that the statute has
defined the word "legislation" more broadly to include both resolutions and private acts, neither of
which prescribes general rules of conduct. See Skelly, In Defense of the GCM on InfluencingJudicial Confirmations,39 TAx NOTES 883 (May 16, 1988).
340. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1976).
341. Id. § 53.4946-1(g)(2) (1972).
342. Id.
343. See Harmon & Ferster, supra note 332, at 1015-16. Gail Harmon and Andrea Ferster
point out:
[N]o one believes more firmly than the Reagan Administration that it is not the proper role of
a Supreme Court Justice to "make policy," and recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions are replete with disavowals of intent to preempt the legislature's prerogative in this regard. Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Service would have difficulty in arguing that the position of a
Supreme Court Justice constitutes a "Federal public office," since to do so would run directly
contrary to this Administration's formal views on the appropriate role of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Id. at 1016.
344. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1976).
STRUCTION §
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apply to section 501(c)(3) organizations only to the extent that those
organizations engage in the same activities as political parties, campaign committees, and political action committees. 4 5 Moreover, the interpretation of both sections likewise constitutes bad public policy
because it will have the effect of discouraging public interest groups
from making a valuable contribution to the judicial selection process. 4 6
As Senator Alan Cranston observed during the floor debate on the measure to amend section 527:
[Als Senators, it is our obligation to advise and consent on the nominations the
President makes. In order to carry out that duty, we often call upon organizations
to offer their views. If the IRS decision is maintained, this valuable source of information could be lost. No matter what position a Senator takes on a particular nomination or appointment, I think all my colleagues will agree that these outside
opinions are beneficial to us in the course of our deliberations. 47

By interpreting the Code in a manner that discourages public organizations from exercising their right of free speech, the IRS Announcements also could be vulnerable to attack under the first amendment.
Although a recent Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of section 501(c)(3)'s restrictions on the political activities of tax
exempt organizations 4 8 would seem to preclude the success of a first
amendment challenge, a constitutional challenge might succeed if it
345. See S. REP. No. 1357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEws 7478, 7505.
346. In a letter to the Senate Finance Committee opposing the proposal, Nan Aron, the exec-

ADMIN.

utive director of the Alliance for Justice, explained that the proposal concerning § 527 "would have
a significant negative impact on legitimate, constitutionally protected activities of nonprofit
groups, particularly with regard to the serious administrative burden it could impose." Letter from
Nan Aron, Executive Director of the Alliance for Justice, to Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman, Senate
Finance Committee (Aug. 25, 1988), reprintedin 134 CONG. REc. S15,099 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988).
Similarly, Morton H. Halperin, an ACLU official, has protested to the Treasury Department that

the proposed regulation would either cause exempt organizations "additional administrative expenses or create a chilling effect on otherwise permissible activities." Letter from Morton H.
Halperin, Director of the Washington Office of the ACLU, to Assistant Treasury Secretary 0. Donaldson Chapoton, reprinted in 39 TAx NoTs 1001, 1001-02 (1988) [hereinafter Halperin Letter].
Halperin also correctly has observed that "[m]easuring the section 527 tax by the entire investment income of an organization that only spends a small amount on 'exempt function' activities is
obviously too harsh and inconsistent with the goal of taxing investment income of political parties." Id.
347. 134 CONG. REc. S15,098 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988). Similarly, seven senators stated the
following in a letter to Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker, III:
As Senators, charged under the Constitution with granting or withholding consent to Presidential nominations for executive branch and judicial appointments, we often call upon such
organizations to provide us with their views. We would, therefore, be very concerned about
any changes in the enforcement of the law which makes [sic] it more difficult or more costly
for groups to provide such assistance.
Letter from Senators Bill Bradley, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, John D. Rockefeller, Donald W.
Riegle, Jr., Max Baucus, John C. Danforth, and George J. Mitchell to Secretary of the Treasury
James A. Baker, I (May 20, 1988), reprintedin 134 CONG. Rac. S15,098 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988).
348. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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could be demonstrated that the IRS deliberately promulgated the regulation for the purpose of discouraging future lobbying on judicial nominations by the groups that helped to defeat the Bork nomination.34 9 In
the decision upholding section 501(c)(3), the Supreme Court held that
while the first amendment does not require Congress to subsidize lobbying, 3 ° and while Congress has discretion to select the groups that can
lobby without losing their tax deduction,51 Congress may not "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.',,'
Finally, any discussion of the imposition of tax liability on organizations that lobby for or against federal judicial nominations needs to
consider whether the reasons for excluding exempt organizations from
participation in political campaigns for executive or legislative officers
also should not require the exclusion of lobbying on judicial nominations. It is possible to draw a qualitative distinction between the two
types of activities: federal judicial offices are nonpartisan, even though
the selection process may be highly political. Moreover, there is a quantitative distinction; it is unlikely that any exempt organization will regularly conduct extensive campaigns for or against judicial nominations.
If it later appears that tax exempt organizations do engage in such activities, Congress can make appropriate amendments to the Code to
draw a clearer distinction between exempt organizations and quasi-political organizations.
E.

The Association of the Bar Case

In a recent decision that could have significant impact upon future
lobbying in connection with judicial nominations, the Second Circuit
gave section 501(c)(3) a highly restrictive reading.11 A unanimous
349. In his letter to the Treasury Department, Mr. Halperin wrote that "I also note that,
while we [in the ACLU] do not do so, the recent events in the Senate may cause some to question
the motives of the Treasury in announcing the application of section 527 at this time." Halperin
Letter, supra note 346, at 1002.
350. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46.
351. Id. at 548-50. The Court in Regan rejected the plaintiff's contention that the Code violated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause because it imposed no restrictions on lobbying by veterans' organizations that qualified for tax exempt status.
Id.
352. Id. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
353. Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'g 89 T.C. 599
(1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1768 (1989). The litigation arose out of the Association of the Bar's
petition to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in May 1982 for recognition as an exempt charitable and educational institution under § 501(c)(3). See Brief for the Association of the Bar at 2,
Association of the Bar (No. 88-4001). Although the Association for many years had been recognized as a "business league" exempt from taxation under § 501(a)(6), qualification under §
501(c)( 3 ) would have provided additional advantages including exemption from New York State

1990]

JUDICIAL SELECTION

three-judge panel ruled in September 1988 that the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (the Association) does not qualify as a tax
exempt organization within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) because its
rating of candidates for elective judicial office constituted "forbidden
political activity."' 5 According to the court, the Association's ratings
violated the prohibition in section 501(c)(3) against participation or intervention in "any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
3' 55
any candidate for public office. "

In Association of the Bar the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
had appealed the Tax Court's declaratory judgment that the Association qualified for exemption under section 501(c)(3). By a vote of ten to
six, the Tax Court had found that the ratings belonged in the category
of "permissible voter education activities" because the ratings were
based upon the professional experience and technical ability of each
candidate rather than upon "partisan or political preferences" or "comparisons between candidates seeking the same office." ' 5 6 Furthermore,
the court found that the ratings do not advocate or oppose the election
of any particular individual or recommend that the public vote for or
against a specific candidate. The court also observed that the Association "merely reports" the ratings in a "passive" manner, which the
court distinguished from such "active" conduct as the distribution of
35 8
campaign literature.

As the Second Circuit pointed out, however, the Tax Court's opinion seemed ambivalent. Although the court found that the Association's
activities were sufficiently neutral to qualify it for exemption, the court
acknowledged that the Association's ratings involved "the potential for
abuse" and "necessarily will reflect the philosophy" of the organization
that compiles the ratings.3 59 The court likewise pointed out that the
Association publishes the ratings with the intent that they may sway
the voter.360 Furthermore, the court recognized that the prohibition
against political campaign activities by section 501(c)(3) organizations
"stems from the general policy that the Federal Government should be
and City sales and use taxes, and eligibility for lower bulk mail postal rates. Id. at 2-3, n.3. In 1985
the Commissioner issued a final adverse determination denying the application on the ground that
the Association's rating of candidates for elective judicial office constituted intervention or participation in political campaigns on behalf of candidates for public office. Id. at 3. The Association
then commenced its action in the Tax Court for a declaratory judgment that it was exempt under
§ 501(c)(3).
354. Association of the Bar, 858 F.2d at 877.
355. Id.
356. Association of the Bar, 89 T.C. at 611.
357. Id. at 609-10.
358. Id. at 611.
359. Id. at 609-10.
360. Id.
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neutral in political matters and therefore should not directly or indirectly subsidize such activities." '6 1
On appeal, the Government argued, in effect, that the exception
that the Tax Court seemed to carve out of section 501(c)(3) swallowed
the rule. The government contended that the court's apparent distinction between "objective" and "political" campaign activity had no statutory basis, because the statute prohibits any participation in a political
campaign, regardless of the organization's motives.3 2 Indeed, the Gov-

ernment suggested that the ratings were not truly objective because the
ratings failed to "convey pros and cons about the candidate which the
public can weigh in the balance to reach a conclusion of its own. 3 63 The
Government argued that the ratings failed to qualify as neutral information, the hallmark of "voter education." To the contrary, the ratings
4
expressed preference for some candidates and opposition to others.
In its opinion, the Second Circuit carried the Government's argument a step farther and flatly declared that the Association's ratings
were not objective. The court explained that while a "representation
that a candidate is a lawyer or a judge is a readily provable statement
of objective fact," a "representation that a candidate is able and has
proper character and temperament is simply a subjective expression of
opinion.

3 65

The court also rejected the Association's contention that

the undisputed nonpartisan character of its ratings enabled the Association to qualify under section 501(c)(3). The court found that the statute was not limited in its application to the partisan campaigns of
candidates representing recognized political parties. 66 The court also
observed that "[a] candidate who receives a 'not qualified' rating will
derive little comfort from the fact that the rating may have been made
361. Id. at 610.
362. Brief for the Appellant at 11, Association of the Bar (No. 88-4001).
363. Id. at 27.
364. Id. at 27-28.
365. Association of the Bar, 858 F.2d at 880. The court declared that "[o]bjective data are
...independent of what is personal or private in our apprehension and feelings, that use facts
without distortion by personal feelings or prejudices and that are publicly or intersubjectively observable or verifiable, especially by scientific methods." Id. The court contrasted the Association's
ratings with the standards that the IRS had set forth in discussing the standards for qualification
under § 501(c)(3) for an organization that publishes information about candidates for public office.
Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980.2 C.B. 178). The IRS had stated that such a publication would
not violate the § 501(c)(3) exemption if it presented the voting records of all incumbents and did
not 1) identify candidates for reelection; 2) comment upon an individual's overall qualifications for
public office; 3) expressly or impliedly endorse or reject any incumbent as a candidate for public
office; 4) widely distribute its compilation of incumbents' voting records; or 5) attempt to target
the publication toward particular areas in which elections are occurring or time the publication
date to coincide with an election campaign. Id. at 880-81.
366. Id.
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in a nonpartisan manner." 61 Finally, the court refused to accept the
Association's contention that the phrase "substantial part of its activities" as used in the prohibition against influencing legislation should be
carried over into the prohibition against participation in any political
campaign. According to the court, the Association's argument contravened the plain words of the statute. Moreover, the court observed that
it was unlikely that the "sporadic and relatively inexpensive rating of
candidates for public office" would constitute either a substantial part
of a charitable organization's activity or budget. Thus, the interpretation urged by the Association would make this portion of section
501(c)(3) substantially meaningless. 6 8
The Second Circuit does not clarify whether its decision is limited
to endorsements of candidates for elective state judicial offices or
whether the decision also extends to the Association's practice of endorsing federal nominees. The language of section 501(c)(3) that refers
to participation or intervention in "any political campaign" would seem
to suggest that the decision would apply only to endorsements for elective positions. 6 Indeed, as we have seen, even the IRS has taken the
position that attempts to influence federal nominations do not fall
within the prohibition set forth in section 501(c)(3).370
The Association of the Bar case presented a difficult issue of statutory interpretation. The clear language of section 501(c)(3) seems to
proscribe any form of intervention in a political campaign, no matter
how slight, but the question of whether the types of endorsement offered by the Association constituted such participation is not answered
easily. 71 Although the Second Circuit's decision appears to represent
sound statutory interpretation and thus may be correct as a matter of
law, the decision's impact on public policy may not be wise. The decision promotes sound policy only to the extent that it encourages consistency and minimizes IRS intrusiveness. It also forecloses the danger
that nonprofessional organizations that qualify for exemption under
section 501(c)(3) may cloak endorsements of judicial candidates under
the guise of speciously "objective" ratings. The decision, however, has
the less salubrious effect of discouraging professional organizations
367. Id. at 881.
368. Id.
369. IRS Notice 88-76; see supra note 324 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
371. As the IRS observed in its brief, "[i]t goes without saying that the determination
whether an organization is 'biased' rather than 'unbiased' in its manner of selecting candidates for
endorsement can be hard to make." Brief for Appellant at 29, Association of the Bar (88-4001).
Accordingly, the IRS correctly observed that the IRS rule avoids disparate tax consequences for
similarly situated taxpayers and "avoids a possibly open-ended and intrusive examination into the
reasons why a charity chooses to support one candidate over another." Id.
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from providing an important public informational service by ranking
the qualifications of candidates for judicial office.3 72 Such rankings are
particularly useful because voters usually know little about the professional qualifications of candidates for judicial office.
Because professional organizations that rank candidates for judicial
office perform a valuable public service, Congress should amend section
501 to create an exception to permit professional legal organizations
that qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3) to publish rankings
of candidates for judicial office. Such an amendment, of course, would
need to be drafted deftly in order to avoid abuse. For example, Congress would need to define professional organizations to include bar associations whose activities are primarily nonpolitical and to exclude
groups that might act as a front for partisan activities. Such an amendment, likewise, should permit exemption only for rankings that are
based primarily upon professional qualifications rather than partisan or
ideological considerations. Such a law would seem to be preferable to
the present law, which has the effect of discouraging professional orgas73
nizations from performing a most useful public service.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although the selection of judges, especially Supreme Court Justices, always has inspired widespread public interest, the clear trend of
the past twenty years is toward greater scrutiny of nominees by the
Senate, special interest organizations, and private citizens. While few
nominations are likely to create the furor that Bork's selection stirred,
the Bork episode was no anomaly. It was a natural corollary to the
growing public interest in the judicial selection process, and it presages
continued and perhaps heightened scrutiny of judicial nominees.
It is unfortunate that the tawdry histrionics that demeaned public
discourse during the Senate's consideration of the Bork nomination obscured the salutary benefits of widespread and energetic public participation in the judicial selection process. Inasmuch as the decisions of
federal judges profoundly affect every American, citizens have an important stake in that process. Unless the public exercises a role in the
judicial selection process that goes beyond the mere selection of the
President and members of the Senate, the constitutional provision for
372. As the Association argued, "[flt would be poor public policy indeed to encourage bar
associations generally to provide information to the public on matters concerning the administration of justice, but not to permit those same associations to evaluate the qualifications of nominees
for judicial office." Brief for the Petitioner-Appellee at 9, Association of the Bar (No. 88-4001).
373. One should not overestimate the chilling effect of the Second Circuit's decision because
the Association of the Bar and similar organizations still may receive partial exemptions under §

501(c)(6).
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the appointment of judges to lifetime posts is inconsistent with the
steady advance of participatory democracy that has occurred during the
first two centuries of the Republic's history. When citizens express their
views concerning prospective nominees to the President and contact
senators during the confirmation process, such citizens can have a significant and proper influence upon the selection process.
Although organizations obviously should refrain from distortions of
a nominee's record, an organization may properly oppose a nominee on
grounds that are narrower than the grounds on which a senator might
oppose a nominee. Organizations whose interests are parochial should
not hesitate to oppose a nominee whose judicial record is likely to affect
adversely the interests of the organization's members. While the senators have a duty to take a broader view of the public interest and to
measure a nominee's merits by more objective criteria, senators certainly should listen to the views of constituents and organizations that
express an opinion concerning a nomination. Private individuals and organizations also can serve a useful role in the nomination process by
conducting research and investigations into a nominee's record. Contrary to the often-expressed fear that the Bork episode augurs excessive
politicization of the judicial selection process, it is unlikely that widespread public participation in that process will permit narrow interest
groups to hector the Senate into rejecting well-qualified nominees who
are acceptable to a broad spectrum of the American public.
Participation in the judicial selection process is a prerogative of citizenship and serves a number of useful functions; therefore, the federal
government and the states should not discourage such participation. In
particular, the government should not impose tax penalties or administrative inconveniences upon organizations that support or oppose a
nominee for federal judicial office. Recent actions by the IRS that
would impose such burdens on such organizations are unjustified under
the language and legislative history of the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code and generally contravene sound public policy. If the
IRS proceeds to enforce those measures, Congress should amend the
Code to provide that a nonprofit organization's participation in the federal judicial selection process will not affect its tax status or require it
to alter its accounting procedures.
Broader and more intelligent public participation in the judicial selection process also would be facilitated if the ABA's Standing Committee complied with the requirements of FACA. Although the ABA's
investigations of nominees and potential nominees should remain confidential, the principal meetings, including policy meetings, between the
Department of Justice and the Standing Committee should be opened
to the public. While the Standing Committee also is reviewing its inter-
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nal procedures for rating judicial nominees and prospective nominees,
those procedures need fewer adjustments than many senatorial critics
have suggested. In particular, the Standing Committee should continue
to protect the confidentiality of its sources, although it should publicize
more information concerning the content of information provided by
confidential sources. The Standing Committee also should restore language from earlier editions of its Brochure that indicated ideology
would be considered in ranking candidates in rare instances in which
ideology might affect the prospective judge's competence or temperament. Although the ABA certainly should minimize ideological considerations in its evaluations because its role is so influential and its
constituency is so diverse, attempts to exorcise ideological considerations completely from its review process are likely to foster hypocrisy.
Public apathy is the bane of democracy. Although broader public
participation in the judicial selection process may encourage some of
the excesses that occurred during the deliberations on Bork, greater
public interest and awareness of the process ultimately should ensure
the selection of better judges.

